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CHAPTER 13 
Constitutional Law 
JOSEPH D. CRONIN* 
§13.1. Mandatory Retirement: Equal Protection. In Massachusetts 
Board of Retirement v. Murgia,1 the United States Supreme Court, re-
versing a three-judge district court, 2 held that a Massachusetts statute 
requiring a uniformed state police officer to retire at age fifty3 did not 
contravene the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.4 In so holding, the Court clearly announced5 that state statutes 
classifying individuals on the basis of age for the purposes of public 
employment would be upheld if they bore a rational relation to a 
legitimate public interest. 6 Only Justice Marshall, in dissent, took a dif-
ferent view. 7 
As in other equal protection cases,s the Court first considered which 
*JOSEPH D. CRONIN is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§13.1. 1 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). 
2376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974). Plaintiff Murgia's initial complaint had been 
dismissed by a single district court judge on the ground that the complaint did not 
allege a "substantial constitutional question." Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retire-
ment, 345 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (D. Mass. 1972), rev'd and remanded, No. 72-1300 (1st 
Cir., filed September 10, 1973) (unreported). The United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, in reversing, directed the district court to convene a three-judge court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970). See 427 U.S. at 310. The three-judge court 
issued the decision in favor of Murgia, 376 F. Supp. at 754, which was ultimately re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court. 427 U.S. at 317. 
3 G.L. c. 22, § 26(3). Section 26(3) allows state police officers who have served on the 
force for less than twenty years to continue beyond age fifty until they have completed 
twenty years. However, because G.L. c. 22, § 9A requires that new enlistees be no more 
than thirty years old, few retirements are delayed beyond age fifty. See 427 U.S. at 
308-09 n.l. It appears that only those who left the service and then returned or those 
who are entitled to certain special statutory dispensation - in all about thirty-five out of 
the 2,061 individuals who have served on the force since 1921 - remained on the force 
beyond age fifty. See 345 F. Supp. at 1143. While Murgia had initially claimed that the 
special exemption allowing certain officers to serve beyond age fifty violated his right to 
equal protection, id. at 1141, the claim does not appear to have been raised at the Su-
preme Court level. 427 U.S. at 308-09 n.l. 
4427 U.S. at 317. 
5 The majority opinion, in which seven Justices joined, was per curiam and the tone 
of the opinion suggested that the Court regarded the case as presenting no special 
~roblems. Justice Marshall dissented and Justice Stevens did not participate in the deci-
sIon. 
6427 U.S. at 312-14. 
71d. at 317-27. 
8 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973); San Antonio In-
dependent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 16-17 (1973). 
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standard of review was appropriate for determining whether the Mas-
sachusetts retirement statute violated plaintiff Murgia's right to equal 
protection.9 In a quite synoptic analysis, the Court decided that a "rel-
atively relaxed" rational basis standard was the proper test to be 
applied. lo The Court noted that if the retirement statute had en-
croached upon a "fundamental right"ll or created a "suspect classifi-
cation,"12 then it would have judged the statutory scheme by the more 
demanding "strict judicial scrutiny" test. 13 The Court concluded, how-
ever, that there is no fundamental right to governmental employ-
ment,14 and that the class of uniformed state police officers over fifty 
is not a suspe~t class for the purposes of the equal protection clause. IS 
With respect to the statute's age classification, the Court reasoned that 
older persons, particularly where age fifty is the standard, are not the 
victims of such systematic oppression or so politically powerless that 
they should be the objects of special judicial solicitude.16 More 
9 Plaintiff Murgia was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Uniformed Branch of the Mas-
sachusetts State Police. Upon reaching the age of fifty, he was involuntarily retired by 
the Massachusetts Board of Retirement pursuant to the state police mandatory retire-
ment statute. G.L. c. 22, § 26(3). Murgia subsequently brought a civil action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts claiming that § 26(3) de-
nied him equal protection. 376 F. Supp. at 753. 
10 427 U.S. at 314. 
11 The Court listed as fundamental rights the right to privacy involved in the abortion 
decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the right to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405 
U.S. 134 (1972), the right of interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969), rights guaranteed by the first amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 
(1968), and the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See 427 
U.S. at 312 n.3. 
12 The Court listed as suspect classifications alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365 (1971), race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and ancestry, Oyama v. 
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See 427 U.S. at 312 n.4. 
13 427 U.S. at 312. Statutes subjected to strict scrutiny must be shown by the state to 
serve a "compelling interest" by the least restrictive means. San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). The broad contours of the compel-
ling interest test are difficult to define, though clearly the standard is more rigid than 
mere "rationality." For a brief but sound overview of the Supreme Court's work in the 
equal protection area, see Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1535-36 n.9 (1974). 
14 The Court noted that a standard less than strict scrutiny "has consistently been 
applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." 427 
U.S. at 313, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). During the Survey 
year, the Sixth Circuit also concluded that there is no constitutionally protected right to 
public employment. See Talbot v. Pyke, 533 F.2d 331, 332 (6th Cir. 1976). 
IS 427 U.S. at 313. 
16 The Court noted that: 
[Wlhile the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not wholly been free of 
discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated 
against on the basis of race or national ori~in have not experienced a "history of 
purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis 
of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
Id., quoting in part San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 
(1973). 
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broadly, the Court, in dicta, indicated that even those statutes which 
more clearly penalize the elderly by requiring retirement at ages be-
yond fifty do not "impose a distinction sufficiently akin" to suspect 
classifications to require strict judicial reviewP Concluding its analysis 
of the appropriate standard of review, the Court stated that its inquiry 
would accord the statute its usual presumption of validity, recognizing 
that legislative perfection in classifications is neither "possible nor 
necessary."IB 
Having determined that a rational basis test was the proper stan-
dard, the Court had no trouble upholding the statute as rationally 
furthering the purpose identified by the Commonwealth. Physical fit-
ness of uniformed police officers was obviously, the Court noted, a 
legitimate governmental objective "presumptively" furthered by re-
quiring retirement at fifty.19 Accordingly, the Court found the re-
quirement constitutional even though officers between the ages of 
forty and fifty have to pass rigorous annual physical exams and many 
officers would be physically capable of performing effectively after 
age fifty.20 Given the standard of review, the Court did not require a 
showing that the governmental interest could not be sufficiently 
served by further physical examinations on an individual basis after 
age fifty.21 
Justice Marshall's dissent in Murgia took a fundamentally different 
approach to analyzing the mandatory retirement statute. Unlike the 
majority, Justice Marshall attempted to relate the case to the entire 
body of equal protection law. In so doing, Justice Marshall strongly 
criticized the recent work of the Court. Although he has voiced the 
same objections in somewhat different form many times before,22 his 
17 427 U.S. at 314. Because the Massachusetts statute drew the line at age fifty, the 
Court did not view it as creating a classification penalizing the elderly. Age fifty, the 
Court noted, is a line "at a certain age in middle life." !d. at 313. 
IBId. at 314. 
19Id. at 314-15. 
2°Id. at 314-16, 314 n.7. The Court cited the principle accepted by Massachusetts 
legislative commissions that the appropriate maximum retirement age should be the age 
"at which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the group is such that it 
is in the public interest that they retire." Id. at 316 n.9. 
21 A few years ago the Court might have held that the refusal to determine fitness on 
a case-by-case basis created an irrebuttable presumption. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine has been much criticized, see Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption 
Doctrine In The Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1544-49, 1556 (1974); Note, The 
Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800, 
827-30 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 
450-51 (1975), and now appears to be out of favor with the Court itself. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 22-24 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 
749,767-85 (1975). 
22 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,70 (1973) 
(Marshall, j., joined by Douglas, j., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 
508 (1970) (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
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views deserve attention because they seem to have merit and have 
been left largely unaddressed by other members of the Court. 
Justice Marshall's major criticism was that the Court's two-tier ap-
proach to equal protection is too rigid and does not reflect the di-
versity of the problems that come before the Court. 23 Justice Marshall 
argued that the Court should recognize that certain rights, while not 
classified as "fundamental," are yet vital to a flourishing society; and 
that certain classes, while not classified as "suspect," nonetheless suffer 
invidious discrimination unrelated to their members' individual worth. 
These rights and classes, he reasoned, do not deserve to be cast into 
the outer darkness of the mere rationality standard.24 
A further problem with the majority's approach, in Justice Mar-
shall's view, was that the Court, perhaps sensitive to the criticism that 
the strict scrutiny test is so severe and the rationality test so loose that 
the decision of which standard to apply usually predetermines a case's 
outcome, has in fact partially abandoned its two-tier approach, with-
out quite admitting it has done SO.25 For example, on occasion the 
Court, while professing to apply a rationality test, in fact applied some 
intermediate standard of review involving at least a "reasonably prob-
ing look at the legislative goals and means" as well as the "significance 
of the personal rights and interests invaded."26 The problem, Justice 
Marshall noted, is that the Court has supplied no doctrinal foundation 
for the shift away from the strict two-tier approach.27 Instead, the 
Court, on the one hand, has simply refused to expand the current list 
of fundamental rights and suspect classifications; in this way the 
Court, recognizing perhaps that the strict scrutiny standard results in 
virtually every case in the striking down of the statute in question, has 
declined to give that standard broader applicability.28 On the other 
23 427 U.S. at 318-20 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
24Id. at 319-20. 
25Id. at 318,320. See cases cited at note 26 infra. 
26Id. at 320. Justice Marshall cited a series of Supreme Court cases from 1971 to 
1975, including San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(statute affecting right to education; classification based on wealth); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (classification based on marriage); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971) (sex classification). Justice Marshall's views have been echoed elsewhere. In Nor-
wick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court noted: 
In recent years the SU'preme Court has apparently been less willing to accord even 
those statutes involving non-fundamental, non-suspect categories the virtually au-
tomatic approval that such legislation had historically enjoyed. The Court has in-
dicated that a statute creating any classification must at least "be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference have a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation,. so that all persons similarly., circumstanced ,shall 
be treated alike." 
Id. at 917 n.7, quoting in part Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (emphasis added by 
the district court). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreward: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
27427 U.S. at 327 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
28Id.at319. 
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hand, the Court now deals with nonfundamental, nonsuspect 
categories on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, with virtually no review at 
all in purely economic cases and some undefined level of scrutiny for 
cases touching on individual liberties, thereby robbing the law of sys-
tem and predictability.29 
In light of the criticisms thus leveled against the majority's two-tier 
analysis, Justice Marshall went on to argue that it was tiine to rec-
ognize the inadequacies of the old approach and cut a fresh begin-
ning in an effort to articulate a generally applicable standard. The 
standard envisioned by Justice Marshall would be a flexible one that 
could accommodate the different variables presented by the vast array 
of equal protection cases. The fundamental inquiry according to Jus-
tice Marshall would focus upon "the character of the classification in 
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class dis-
criminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not re-
ceive, and the state interests asserted in support of the classifica-
tion."30 This inquiry, Marshall added, should be accomplished by "in-
dividualized assessments of the particular classes and rights involved 
in each case."31 
Applying this standard to the statute in Murgia, Justice Marshall rea-
soned that individuals have an important interest in employment, 
whether or not this interest is labelled a "fundamental right;"32 and 
that given the widespread discrimination against the elderly in 
employment, elderly workers constitute a class which "merits judicial 
attention,"33 even if it is not "suspect." Thus, Marshall concluded that 
the Commonwealth was required to "show a reasonably substantial in-
terest and a scheme closely tailored to achieving that interest."34 Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that the Commonwealth failed to meet the 
second prong of his proposed test. While agreeing that the interest of 
the state in a physically fit police force was "legitimate, and indeed 
compelling," Justice Marshall found the means utilized to achieve the 
purpose drastically overinclusive.35 In this context, Justice Marshall 
pointed to the fact that every officer must pass a rigorous physical 
examination every year after age forty.36 A person who failed the an-
nual examination would have his employment terminated or be re-
fused reenlistment.37 Therefore, by the Commonwealth's own admis-
29/d. at 320-21. 
30ld. at 318, 321-22. 
311d. at 319 n.1. 
32 Justice Marshall reviewed almost a century of Supreme Court cases, see id. at 322-
23, construing the constitutional status of "the right of the individual ... to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life." ld. at 322, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
33427 U.S. at 324 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
3' ld. at 325 (emphasis added). 
351d. 
361d. at 325. 
371d. at 325-26. 
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sion, every officer still on the force at age fifty would have shown re-
peatedly that he was physically fit for the job. In sum, Justice Marshall 
found the Massachusetts statutory framework irrational because it re-
quired retirement of those who had best shown an ability to serve the 
state's interests.3s Accordingly, Justice Marshall determined that the 
mandatory retirement law, when measured against the "significant 
deprivation" the statute worked,39 was unconstitutional. 40 
Justice Marshall's equal protection theory contains both a critique 
and a suggested reform. His criticism of the current state of equal 
protection law seems meritorious. The Court appears to realize that its 
two-tier approach is defective and has modified it at least in applica-
tionY Nonetheless, the m£tiority of the Court is unwilling to accept 
Justice Marshall's proposed reform, even though other members of 
the Court must perceive the force of his criticism. The reason for 
their reluctance to embrace the Marshall theory may be that while his 
approach does speak effectively to the defects in currently prevailing 
analysis, it creates problems that are equally serious. 
While Justice Marshall's approach does avoid the inflexibility and 
the mechanical aspects of the Supreme Court's two-tier approach, it 
may effect a replacement of the Court's approach with a calculus 
more appropriate for the legislative than the judicial branch. Justice 
Marshall identified the following three factors to be weighed: 
I. The character of the classification; 
2. The importance of the governmental benefits denied; and 
3. The state interests asserted in support of the classification.42 
If the Court is to make a case-by-case assessment of the impact of 
these factors and then make an overall determination based on such 
case-by-case assessment of the validity of the classification, it would be 
open to the criticism that it was presuming to make value judgments 
for the rest of society in a way that invades the role of the legisla-
ture. 43 Indeed, in many ways there is more principle and pre-
38 [d. at 327. 
39 Justice Marshall relied in part on a report of the American Medical Association's 
(AMA) Committee on Aging which found that mandatory retirement poses a direct 
threat to the health and life expectancy of the retired person. The AMA submitted an 
amicus brief on behalf of Murgia to the Supreme Court. See id. at 323 & nA. 
40 [d. at 327. 
41 See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
42427 U.S. at 318, 321-22. Justice Marshall employed a similar standard when writing 
for the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). According to Justice Mar-
shall: "To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in 
essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual in-
terests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support 
of the classification." [d. at 335. 
43 This was precisely the reason the interventionist doctrine of substantive due process 
was laid to rest. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963). The Court noted 
in Ferguson that states had the power freely to legislate against "injurious practices in 
their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of 
6
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dictability in the majority's approach, perhaps enough so that it ought 
to be reformed rather than abandoned. The Court has always accom-
panied the decision that a particular right is fundamental or that a 
certain classification is suspect with an explanation of why the cate-
gory in question triggered heightened judicial scrutiny.44 While admit-
tedly the "compelling interest" test may in some instances be too se-
vere,45 it might also be criticized as too lenient insofar as it has 
allowed the Court to apply a high standard of deference to purely 
economic legislation.46 However, with few exceptions,47 the role of 
strict scrutiny has for the most part been well-defined, well-explained, 
and rooted in constitutional history. More importantly, however, the 
most significant defect in the Court's two-tier system is that there is 
not, except perhaps subsilentio, an intermediate standard. Appropriate 
standards for reviewing statutes that implicate individual liberties, but 
do not fit into the favored categories of fundamental rights and sus-
pect classifications have not been clearly articulated. Hence, it is un-
clear in such cases whether a court should accord the same deference 
to the Legislature as it would accord in cases involving business reg-
some specific constitutional provision." ld. at 730-31. This "relaxed" approach was re-
versed during the interventionist years of the Warren Court and the early years of the 
Burger Court. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. 
J. 920, 926-30, 935-43 (1973). The objections to the interventionist approach have been 
stated often and are best illustrated by the Court's language in Ferguson: 
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation" ... [nlor 
are we willing to draw lines by calling a law "prohibitory" or "regulatory." Whether 
the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, 
or some other is of no concern of ours. 
372 U.S. at 731-32, quoting in part Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 
423 (1952). 
44 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. (1973), in 
which the Court explained in detail, with recapitulation of relevant prior cases, its con-
clusion that "education" is not a fundamental right and "wealth" classifications are not 
suspect.ld. at 18-39. 
45 See 427 U.S. at 319, where dissenting Justice Marshall noted that statutes subjected 
to strict judicial scrutiny are nearly always struck down. Marshall cited Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in support of this proposition. 
48 But see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam), overruling 
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). In Dukes, the Court noted that Morey was the only 
case in the last half century to invalidate an economic regulation. 427 U.S. at 306. How-
ever, it appears that the Dukes Court did employ a somewhat stricter standard of review 
than is customary for purely economic regulation. See text at notes 63-65 infra. 
41 The Court has not yet resolved whether strict scrutiny is applicable when the sus-
pect classification is also benign or remedial. Compare DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 
312,320 (1974) (Douglas, j., dissenting) with Morton v. Maricari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) 
and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). But see Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
17 Cal. 3d-, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1976), cm. granted, 97 
S. Ct. 1098 (1977). See generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Pre-
ferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Sandalow, Racial Preferences 
in Higher Education: Political Respansibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 
(1975). 
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ulation.48 Absent further guidance, lower courts are left to choose 
between the inflexibility of the majority's approach and the risk of 
subjectivity inherent in Justice Marshall's proposed reform. 
Professor Gerald Gunther has written an article, frequently cited in 
Justice Marshall's opinions and elsewhere, that offers even a third ap-
proach to the Court's equal protection analysis.49 Gunther's approach 
is to preserve strict scrutiny in the areas in which it is already 
established-this apparently as a concession to doctrinal continuity, 
and because these classifications on the whole have firm historical 
roots-but to avoid development of additional categories. 50 For other 
cases, the Court should focus on means, not ends, and should make 
the test of equal protection whether the "legislative means ... sub-
stantially further [the] legislative ends" articulated by the state.51 This 
would be a less severe standard than strict scrutiny, but much more 
severe than the extreme deference traditionally associated with ordi-
nary economic legislation. Courts would assess the legislative purposes 
on the basis of materials actually offered by the state, and not on the 
basis of conjecture or "perfunctory judicial hypothesis."52 This 
means-oriented scrutiny, Gunther advocates, would be applicable to a 
wide range of statutes, including the social and economic regulations 
traditionally evaluated under the "toothless minimum scrutiny stan-
dard."53 Gunther concludes that his "modest interventionism" ap-
proach would provide an appropriate "common meeting ground" re-
flecting both the Court's gradual turning away from the "extreme 
judicial abdication" of the 1930's, and the Court's revived concern for 
certain non fundamental rights and interests.54 
To some extent the Gunther and Marshall approaches intersect be-
cause, under both, the relationship of means to ends is evaluated. For 
Justice Marshall, however, the degree of closeness required between 
means and ends is a function of the relative importance in the particu-
lar case of the three factors noted above: the nature of the classifica-
tion, the loss to the individual, and the governm~ntal end to be 
achieved. Because Justice Marshall regarded the classification in 
Murgia-age-as at least somewhat invidious and the interest in 
employment a crucial one, he insisted on a tight fit between means 
and ends. Justice Marshall found this fit wanting, although he con-
ceded that the state pu}'pose is not only legitimate but compelling.55 
48 E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976). 
49 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on 
a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as GUNTHER]. See also K. Karst, BOOK REVIEW, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 
1031-37 (1976). 
50 GUNTHER,supra note 48, at 24. 
511d. at 20. 
52ld. at 21. 
53/d. at 21, 19. 
541d. at 37-46. 
55427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
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It is not at all clear that the majority approach in Murgia is defective 
by the Gunther standard. There is a fairly detailed assessment of the 
relationship between means and ends and, in substance, the Court 
found that the classification substantially furthered the articulated 
state purpose of a physically fit uniformed state police.56 Such an 
analysis of the majority's approach in Murgia is not meant to suggest 
that the Court has embraced the Gunther methodology. It does ap-
pear, however, that Murgia is a further indication that for cases mid-
way in the spectrum between the purely economic and the most 
established of the strict scrutiny categories, the Court is more willing 
to examine the relationship between legislative means and legislative 
ends than it is to accept Justice Marshall's invitation to enter into a 
weighing of the relative societal importance of the various values im-
plicated in a particular case.57 
Part of Gunther's suggestion is that means scrutiny should be 
utilized in purely economic cases in contradistinction to the excessive 
deference to legislative judgment usually displayed by the Court in 
such cases. 58 City of New Orleans v. Dukes,59 another per curiam decision 
handed down the same day as Murgia, might appear at first to signal a 
rejection of this suggestion because in it the Supreme Court overruled 
Morey v. Doud,60 the "only case in the last half century to invalidate a 
wholly economic regulation solely on equal protection grounds .... "61 
Closer analysis reveals, however, that Dukes may not indicate a rejec-
tion of Gunther's suggestion. In Dukes, a New Orleans ordinance pro-
hibited vendors from selling foodstuffs from pushcarts in the French 
56Id. at 314-17. 
51 For a recent example of heightened means scrutiny, see Anthony v. Massachusetts, 
415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976) (threejudge court), a case that considered the con-
stitutionality of the Massachusetts Veterans' Preference Statute, G.L. c. 31, § 23. The 
court perceived the case as involving sex discrimination because of the more limited 
opportunity women have had to serve in the Armed Forces. Relying on applicable Su-
preme Court precedent, the district court determined that the statutory classification 
would be upheld if supported by a "convincing factual rationale." Id. at 495 (citations 
omitted). Applying this standard, the court determined that the statute was un-
constitutional because of its inequitable impact upon women. Conceding that the legisla-
tive purpose of rewarding veterans is "worthy," the court nonetheless found that the 
means chosen to further that purpose unconstitutionally deprived women of their equal 
protection rights. Id. at 496. In reaching its decision, the court gave great weight to evi-
dence that showed that the absolute preference for veterans established by the statute 
had the effect of permanently depriving women of a significant number of civil service 
positions for which they otherwise would have qualified on the basis of test scores. Id. at 
497-98. Furthermore, the court found it critical that less drastic means of attaining the 
same legislative goal, such as a limited point-system based on length of military service, 
were available. Id. at 499. Anthony has been distinguished on the facts. See Branch v. 
DuBois, 418 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D. III. 1976) (Illinois statute that did not give veter-
ans an absolute preference upheld). 
58 GUNTHER. supra note 48, at 43-44. 
59 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam). 
60 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
61 Dukes, 427 U.S. at 306. 
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Quarter in order to preserve the distinctive character of that area for 
residents and tourists. The ordinance contained a grandfather provi-
sion in favor of vendors who had already been there eight years or 
longer. The practical effect of the grandfather clause was to favor two 
pushcart vendors who had worked the area for twenty years or 
more. 62 In an explicit discussion of constitutional standards, the Court 
set forth its classic two level analysis. According to the Court: 
Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is 
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, 
or alienage, our decisions ... require only that the classification 
challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest .... 
[I]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimina-
tion, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 
In applying the two level analysis, however, the Duke Court took a 
somewhat more sophisticated approach than might be expected given 
the language utilized by the Court to describe the analysis. The Court 
carefully assessed the rational relation between the "grandfather" ex-
ception and the legislative objective. The Court noted three factors 
that influenced its holding with respect to the validity of the "grand-
father" provision. First, the Court indicated that the ordinance ban-
ning all but two pushcarts vendors may be merely the first stage in a 
gradual elimination of all such vendors in the area, invoking the famil-
iar principle that the legislature may move one step at a time in ad-
dressing a problem.64 Second, the Court found it a reasonable as-
sumption that the city determined that vendors more recently 
established in the area are less likely to have developed a substantial 
reliance interest in continued operations. Finally, the Court stated that 
the city could reasonably have decided that the two vendors in ques-
tion had themselves become part of the character and charm of the 
French Quarter due to their long tenure in the area. 65 The Court's 
analysis of these factors indicates a greater willingness to probe the ra-
tionality of legislative means than might have been expected under 
the circumstances. Indeed, the mere fact that the Court spoke with a 
full written opinion, even of the per curiam variety, may be taken as a 
sign of agreement with Gunther's point that even purely economic reg-
ulations should be subjected to more than entirely casual scrutiny for 
a rational relationship between means and ends.66 
62 [d. at 298-300. 
63 [d. at 303-04. 
64 [d. at 305, citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966). 
65 427 U.S. at 305. 
66 The overruling of Morey is somewhat of a puzzle. In Morey, The Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that imposed certain financial re-
sponsibility requirements on businesses issuing money orders, but made a specific ex-
ception for the American Express Company. 354 U.S. at 457. The statute further 
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In light of recent Supreme Court decisions like Murgia and Dukes, it 
can be expected that the Court will continue to adhere formally to its 
rigid two-tier approach in reviewing legislative classifications under 
the equal protection clause. Its review, however, in nonsuspect, non-
fundamental categories should also contain a willingness to question 
the legislative purpose of the classification and the means adopted to 
effectuate that purpose. More explicit formulation of equal protection 
review must await further decisions in this area. 
§13.2. Selective Incorporation Revisited: Application of the Bill 
of Rights to Massachusetts Law. A fundamental problem of con-
stitutional law is the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the 
fourteenth amendment. The first eight amendments to the United 
States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, ex proprio vigore bind only the 
federal government, not the states. 1 The fourteenth amendment, 
however, which on its face is binding on the states,2 imposes values 
parallel to those in the Bill of Rights,3 even though there is no express 
"incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.4 
Moreover, there has long been a vigorous minority who argue that the 
fourteenth amendment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights and 
exempted American Express from a prohibition against selling money orders in retail 
establishments and a requirement that a showing of public convenience and advantage 
be made before a license to sell money orders could be issued. Id. at 463. In a six to 
three decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the exceptions for American Express vio-
lated the equal protection clause. Id. at 469-70. 
The Fifth Circuit in Dukes had relied on Morey in holding the grandfather clause in 
Dukes unconstitutional. Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 713 (5th Cir. 
1974). The Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeals had reached the correct 
conclusion, given Morey, and therefore felt obliged to overrule Morey explicitly. See 427 
u.S. at 306. It is unclear, however, why the Court so readily conceded, without discus-
sion, that Morey was indistinguishable from Dukes and that Morey had been wrongly de-
cided. Dukes involved merely the recognition of the economic disaster that could befall a 
financially helpless pushcart vendor if he were banished from the area where he had 
built up a business over a period of twenty years. Morey, on the other hand, involved a 
statutory scheme that severely regulated companies that already had problems enough 
competing with American Express. It would seem then that American Express was not 
in need of a special statutory exemption akin to the grandfather clause in Dukes. Thus, 
it is not clear that Morey had to be overruled rather than distinguished in order to save 
the statute in Dukes. 
§13.2. 1 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.' (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 .(1833). See generally Israel 
and LaFave, Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell 4:23, (2d Ed. 1975). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). 
4 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937); Frankfurter, Me77Wrandum On "In-
corporation" Of The Bill Of Rights Into The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment, 
78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965); Morrison, Does The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate The 
Bill Of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). 
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that, consequently, these amendments are as binding on the states as 
the federal government.s Finally, there is a compromise view to the 
effect that some but not all of the Bill of Rights are incorporated, 
namely, those that are "fundamental."6 Although the intellectual un-
derpinnings of this latter position remain unclear, the theory appears 
to have carried the day.7 Its application over the years has resulted in 
the "incorporation" of most of the provisions of the first eight 
amendments. 8 
During the Survey year, two cases were decided that touch upon the 
selective incorporation of provisions in the Bill of Rights to Mas-
sachusetts law. In Commonwealth v. Davis,9 the. Supreme Judicial Court 
applied the doctrine in a relatively straightforward manner; in Ludwig 
v. Massachusetts,10 however, the United States Supreme Court ap-
peared to suggest some backsliding to a doctrine once regarded as 
firmly discredited. 
In Davis, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of a 
man for illegal possession of a shotgun. 11 Among the defenses re-
5 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black,]., dissenting); Maxwell v. 
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 616-17 (1900) (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
6 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963). 
7 The doctrine of selective incorporation does not seem to have been the intention of 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment. Compare Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) 
with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black,]., concurring) and Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black,]., dissenting). 
'See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 & nn. 3-9. Notable exceptions are the 
fifth amendment right to indictment by grand jury, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516,538 (1884), and the seventh amendment right to certain civil jury trials, Walker v. 
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875). Because the grand jury as an institution is under 
fire, see Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973); 
Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of the 
Prosecutor, 2 N.M. L. REV. 141 (1972); Younger, The GrandJury Under Attack, 46]. CRIM. 
L.C. & P.S. 214 (1955); and because the need and utility for jury trials in civil cases is 
widely questioned, see Peck, Do Juries Delay Justice? in 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956); Desmond, 
Juries in Civil Cases - Yes or No, 36 N.Y.ST. B.J. 104 (1964); Devitt, Federal Civil Jury 
Trials Should be Abolished, 60 A.B.A.]. 570 (1974); Steuer, The Case Against The Jury, 47 
N.Y. ST. B.]. 101 (1975); it is not likely that these provisions will be made applicable to 
the states, although of course the states may if they choose make use of the grand jury 
and civil jury as a matter of state law. For an extra-judicial statement by Justice Bren-
nan regarding the related question of state courts' interpreting their own constitution as 
providing more protection than the Supreme Court finds in the federal constitution, 
see 62 A.B.A.]. 993-94 (1976). While the state courts are free to reach this result 
through interpretations of state law, they are not free to depart from Supreme Court 
interpretations of federal law, even where the result would be more protective of in-
dividual liberties. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 688,343 N.E.2d 847. 
10 427 U.S. 618 (1976). 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 695, 343 N.E.2d at 847. Defendant was convicted under 
G.L. c. 269, § lO(c) , which section penalizes possession of a shotgun with a barrel less 
than eighteen inches long. Section 10 has been amended by Acts of 1974, c. 649, § 2, 
and further amended by Acts of 1975, c. 113, §§ 2, 3, and by Acts of 1975, c. 588, § I, 
all inapplicable to the present case. 
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jected by the Court was the claim that the statute under which the 
prosecution was brought violated the defendant's second amendment 
right "to keep and bear arms."12 The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the second amendment had not been made applicable to the 
states and probably would not be "for unlike some other provisions of 
the bill of rights, this is not directed to guaranteeing the rights of in-
dividuals, but rather, as we have said, to assuring some freedom of 
State forces from national interference."13 
The Court's position seems correct. Although citations offered by 
the Supreme Judicial Court to support the proposition that the second 
amendment is not incorporated are dated,14 the result in these cases 
has survived the many changes in constitutional theory. No funda-
mental personal right would seem to be at stake; thus, incorporation 
of the second amendment would not be appropriate. IS 
Furthermore, even if the second amendment were applicable 
against the states, it does not follow that all gun control legislation is 
unconstitutional. The amendment was included in the Constitution to 
meet the needs of a period when men called for service supplied their 
own arms.16 As a result, the second amendment has been construed to 
prohibit only regulations that interfere with the efficiency of a well 
regulated militia 17 and to apply only to weapons that are part of ordi-
nary military equipment. 1s Today, it is largely an anachronism. 19 
Therefore, because the Massachusetts statute is not an attempt to in-
terfere with the protection of the public or regulation of military 
equipment, but is merely a restriction on private access to weaponry, 
the amendment would not affect the Massachusetts statute. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 693-95, 343 N.E.2d at 850-51. The second amendment 
provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. 
II. 
Defendant Davis also argued that the Massachusetts statute violated the state constitu-
tional provision contained in article 17 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
guaranteeing the "right to keep and bear arms." The Court rejected the argument rea-
soning that article 17 was directed only to providing adequate means for the common 
defense and not to guaranteeing individual ownership or possession of weapons for the 
purpose of self-defense. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 689-92, 343 N.E.2d at 848-49. In this 
respect the Court's reasoning is very similar to its analysis of the federal constitutional 
provision. See text at note 13 infra. 
13Id. at 694, 343 N.E.2d at 850. 
14 See id. at 693-94, 343 N.E.2d at 850. The cases are all from the nineteenth century 
when it was not generally believed that the fourteenth amendment incorporated any-
thing. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,96-98 (1908). 
15 See text at note 6 supra. 
l6See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-83 (1939). 
17Id. at 178. See also United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (1971), vacated on 
other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972). 
18 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939). 
IHC! United States v. Three Winchester Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290 n.5 (7th Cir. 
1974) (defendant's second amendment defense to federal firearms conviction rejected 
without discussion). 
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If Commonwealth v. Davis is an application of the doctrine of selective 
incorporation, Ludwig v. Massachusetts 20 appears to be a questioning of 
it. Ludwig is one of a spate of cases considering and rejecting chal-
lenges to the de novo system of criIl).inal appeals that flourishes in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere. 21 Among various claims rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court was the argument that the requirement 
of an initial trial without a jury as a precondition to a jury trial de 
novo places an unconstitutional burden on the right to a jury in non-
petty criminal cases. 22 
The Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, stated that the 
standard to be applied is the "Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee 
that no person may be deprived 'of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.' "23 Applying this standard, the majority con-
cluded that the financial and psychological hardship of two trials 
along with the potentiality of a harsher sentence at the second trial 
did not amount to an unconstitutional burden upon the right to a jury 
trial.24 The Court, conspicuously, did not refer to the sixth amend-
ment. The Court also noted that it was not obliged to reconsider an 
earlier Supreme Court decision, Callan v. Wilson,25 holding a federal 
criminal de novo system unconstitutional because, among other rea-
sons, the right to a jury trial in federal courts is also guaranteed by 
the third clause of section two of Article III of the United States Con-
20 427 U.S. 61S (1976). 
21 See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 32S, 333-3S (1976) (Kentucky two-tier court requir-
ing initial trial before a nonlawyer police judge does not deny due process to a de-
fendant subject to possible imprisonment when a later de novo trial is available in the 
circuit court before a lawyer-judge); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114-19 (1972) 
(Kentucky System whereby circuit court may impose greater penalty than police court 
not a denial of due process). 
The two-tier system is used by many states. See Co/ten, 407 U.S. at 412 nA. The Mas-
sachusetts system is composed of a first tier consisting of district courts of the state's 
several counties and the Municipal Court for the City of Boston. C.L. c. 21S, § 1. The 
district court and municipal court do not provide a jury trial. [d., § 2. If a judgment of 
guilty is made at the first tier, the defendant may appeal to the superior court where a 
twelve-person jury is available, id. 1, §§ 2, IS, or to the jury division of the district court 
where a six-person jury is available. [d., §§ IS, 27 A. 
22 427 U.S. at 624-30. Defendant Ludwig also argued that the Massachusetts proce-
dure violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution by forcing 
him to bear the risk of two trials. The Court rejected this argument with little discus-
sion, noting that the decision to elect a second trial rests with the defendant and not the 
state. In this respect, the Court found Ludwig's position no different than that of a 
convicted defendant who successfully appeals on the basis of error at his first trial and 
gains a reversal of his conviction and a remand for a new trial. [d. at 630-32. 
23 [d. at 624. 
24 [d. at 626-27. The Court noted that the accused could mitigate the hardship by not 
presenting a full defense at the first trial. In addition, the indigent defendant could re-
ceive counsel without cost. [d., citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1975). The 
Court also noted that the risk of a harsher sentence inherent in a two-tier system was an 
argument squarely disposed of in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, ) 14-19 (1972). See 
note 21 supra. 
25 127 U.S. 540 (ISSS). 
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stitution.26 Why this provision should have a different impact upon 
the states than the sixth amendment right to a jury trial in regard to 
the constitutionality of the de novo system was not explained.27 
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in Ludwzg. 28 The entire 
opinion apart from citations, consisted of the following statement: 
I join the opinion of the Court, as I understand it to be consis-
tent with my view that the right to a jury trial afforded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not identical to that guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment. . .. I add only that Callan v. Wilson '" is dis-
tinguished most simply by the applicability to that case of the 
Sixth Amendment. 29 
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall joined in a dissent by Justice 
Stevens that went to the merits of the questions raised,30 but strangely 
did not address itself to the potentially important implications con-
tained in Justice Powell's concurring notation and portions of the 
Court's opinion with respect to the distinction between sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights. 
These implications must-be assessed in the light of the cases involv-
ing the sixth amendment right to a jury trial decided by the United 
States Supreme Court in the past few years. In the 1968 case of Dun-
can v. Louisiana,31 the Court held the sixth amendment right to a jury 
trial in all criminal cases applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Thereafter, the question arose whether the sixth 
amendment right as applied to the states necessarily required a jury of 
twelve. Two years after the decision in Duncan, the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Florida 32 answered this question and held that a jury of 
twelve was not a constitutional requirement. The Justices in Williams 
disagreed on whether their decision "diluted" the sixth amendment as 
26 427 U.S. at 629-30. 
27 If there is any conflict in meaning between these two provisions, the meaning of 
the amendment controls. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65-68 (1904); R. BERGER 
I \IPEACHMDIT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 82 (1973). 
28 427 U.S. at 682. 
29/d. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam): 
[I) am of the opinion that not all of the strictures which the First Amendment im-
poses upon Congress are carried over against the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but rather that it is only the "general principle" of free speech, Gitlow 
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes j., dissenting), that the latter in-
corporates. 
Id. at 291 (Rehnquist, j., concurring and dissenting). 
30 Justice Stevens in dissent gave great weight to the fact that the Massachusetts sys-
tem did not allow a defendant to waive the trial at the first tier. The dissent also be-
lieved that the two-tier system constituted an unconstitutional burden upon a defendant 
due in large part to the psychological hardships he must endure to receive his jury trial 
at the second tier. 427 U.S. at 634-38. 
31 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968). 
32 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970). 
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it had recently been made applicable to the states by Duncan. 33 Despite 
this disagreement, however, they continued to concur in the proposi-
tion that because of the selective incorporation theory, whatever the 
sixth amendment requires in the federal context the fourteenth 
amendment requires in the state context.34 The obvious followup 
question to Williams, whether unanimous juries are constitutionally re-
quired in criminal cases, was considered in two subsequent cases. In 
Johnson v. Louisiana,35 the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth 
amendment did not require a unanimous jury to implement the rea-
sonable doubt standard. The Court decided the case under the four-
teenth amendment because the facts of the case took place before 
Duncan, and Duncan had been held nonretroactive.36 In the compan-
ion case to Johnson, Apodaca v. Oregon,37 the sixth amendment question 
was squarely presented, but because of a curious division in the Court 
it was only obliquely decided. In Apodaca, eight of nine Justices agreed 
that the sixth amendment was applicable to the states.38 However, 
these eight Justices divided four to four on whether the sixth amend-
ment required unanimity.39 The crucial swing vote was supplied by 
Justice Powell, the one Justice who believed the sixth amendment not 
applicable to the states.40 Justice Powell agreed that the sixth amend-
ment required a unanimous jury, but refused to allow this interpreta-
tion of the amendment to be binding on the states.41 Justice Powell, 
therefore, was willing to supply the critical fifth vote in favor of an in-
33 Compare the majority opinion of Justice White, id. at 100-03, with the concurring 
opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 117-29, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, 
id. at 116-17. 
34 See id. at 86-87, 103: id. at 105 (Burger, C. J., concurring); id. at 116-17 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting in part). Justice Harlan stood by his position in Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171, 
that the fourteenth amendment incorporates none of the provisions in the Bill of 
Rights. 399 U.S. at 133. 
35 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1970). 
36 See DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-35 (1968). 
37 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
38 Justice White wrote the plurality opinion in Apodaca in which Chief Justice Burger, 
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquistjoined. [d. at 405-15. A majority of the Justices 
in Apodaco accepted without question the view that Duncan correctly made the sixth 
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth. [d. at 407. Justice Stewart 
wrote a dissenting opinion in Apodaca in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. 
[d. at 415-16. The dissenting justices also accepted the teaching of Duncan without ques-
tion. Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissenting opinion in Apodaca which is attached to 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 381-395, likewise accepting Duncan's incorporation of 
the sixth amendment. See id. at 386. Only Justice Powell, whose opinion is also attached 
to Johnson, dissented on this point. /d. at 370-74 (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). 
39 Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist 
agreed that the sixth amendment did not require unanimity. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407. 
Justices Stewart, Brennan and Marshall thought the opposite conclusion was correct. [d. 
at 415. Justice Douglas also believed that unanimity was the correct view. Johnson, 406 
U.S. at 384. 
40 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 370-74 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
41 /d. at 379-81. 
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terpretation of the sixth amendment requiring unanimous juries.42 
However, Justice Powell would not supply this vote insofar as it per-
tained to the states.43 Accordingly, the Court upheld, five to four, 
Oregon's less-than-unanimous jury verdict requirement.44 The conclu-
sion to be drawn from Apodaca is that, as a matter of constitutional 
law, unanimous juries in criminal cases are required in federal but not 
state cases, even though eight Justices rejected the theoretical basis 
for the possibility of such a result, i.e., that the sixth amendment binds 
the federal government, but not the states.45 
Justice Powell's role as "swingman" on the Court surfaced again in 
Ludwig. Justice Powell, in a brief concurring notation,46 supplied the 
critical fifth vote to the majority opinion upholding the de novo sys-
tem of criminal appeals in Massachusetts. Justice Powell frankly re-
peated in Ludwig his position in Apodaca that the sixth amendment is 
not applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendmentY Jus-
tice Powell also expressed his understanding that the opinion of the 
Court in Ludwig was "consistent" with his view.48 It is unclear, how-
ever, whether Justice Powell meant that the Court impliedly stated 
that which he expressly stated or merely that the opinion of the Court 
did not indicate a view to the contrary. If Justice Powell intended the 
latter interpretation, then his statement with respect to the Court's 
opinion being "consistent" with his own view is trivial because surely 
the Court has emphasized on many occasions that the fourteenth 
amendment incorporates many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
and not merely that the fourteenth amendment contains some values 
analogous to certain provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court's fail-
ure explicitly to repeat this doctrine would certainly not be significant. 
If the question is not one of the Court's failing expressly to set forth 
a view contrary to the one held by Justice Powell, the issue then be-
comes whether Justice Powell was correct in believing that the Ludwig 
Court majority was sending preliminary signals of a willingness to re-
consider the doctrine of selective incorporation in favor of an in-
terpretation of the fourteenth amendment that had prevailed for 
many decades,49 but seemed to have been buried in dishonor some 
years ago, over the protests in particular of the second John Marshall 
Harlan.50 There are some signals in Ludwig. The Court, as noted, in-
421d. at 372. 
43/d. at 381. 
44 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 415. 
45 The Supreme Court does not have to face up to the anomaly cast in terms of the 
sixth amendment, however, since in any event the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require a unanimous verdict. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). 
46 For the text of Justice Powell's opinion, see text at note 29 supra. 
47 See 427 U.S. at 632 (Powell, j., concurring). 
481d. 
49 See note 14 supra. 
50 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan,j., dissenting). See note 
34 supra. 
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dicated that its standard was the fourteenth amendment.51 Signifi-
cantly, the Court in its "standards" discussion did not provide any ref-
erences to the sixth amendment.52 Furthermore, the distinction be-
tween federal and state cases on the basis of the Ludwig majority's ref-
erence to Article III federal jury trials has about it something of the 
deus ex machina: no explanation is given why this provision speaks to 
the problem in a way that the sixth amendment does not. 
It may be that there is a further signal about the meaning of Ludwig 
in Roe v. Wade. 53 Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court in both Roe 
and Ludwig. One of the principal theoretical problems encountered by 
the Court in Roe, although unnoticed popularly at the time because of 
the sensitivity of the subject matter, was the opposite side of the selec-
tive incorporation coin. Under the selective incorporation doctrine, 
the fundamental issue is to determine whether a provision of the Bill 
of Rights is contained in the fourteenth amendment. Roe considered 
whether the Court may strike down under the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment substantive regulations not running afoul 
of the specifics of the Bill of Rights,54 and, if so, whether such an ac-
tion by the Court would constitute a return to the substantive due 
process era, during which era the Court arrogated to itself the powers 
of a super legislature.55 
The stage had been set for speaking to such substantive due process 
considerations in Roe in the earlier case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 56 
which case dealt with the related problem of contraceptive devices. In 
Griswold, a majority of the Court, uncomfortable with the fact that the 
specifics of the Bill of Rights were not involved, but more uncomfort-
able with the prospect of ruling that the statute was constitutional, at-
tempted to finesse the issue. In this context, the Griswold majority 
claimed that while the provisions of the Bill of Rights were not pre-
cisely at issue in the case, the statute violated a constitutional zone of 
privacy formed by "emanations" and "penumbras" from various of the 
amendments, including the ninth.57 In Roe, however, Justice 
51 424 U.S. at 624. 
52 At other points the Court's opinon seems ambivalent on the incorporation question. 
Towards the beginning of the opinion, the Court determined that one of the issues pre-
sented by Ludwig was "[wlhether the Massachusetts procedure violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment made applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth." [d. at 620. This is traditional selective incorporation language. Later in the 
Ludwig opinion, however, the Court stated that Duncan resolved whether there is a right 
to a jury trial "by reference to, and in light of, the Sixth Amendment." [d. at 624. This 
appears to be a much more cautious statement. 
53 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
54 [d. at 129, 152. The Roe majority struck down the state criminal abortion statutes as 
violative of a pregnant woman's right to privacy. [d. at 147-64. The Court admitted that 
the Constitution does not specifically mention a right to privacy, id. at 152, but found 
such a right implicit in the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty." [d. 
at 153. 
55 See id. at 167 (Stewart, j., concurring). 
56 381 U.S. 471 (1965). 
57 [d. at 484. 
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Blackmun, now writing for the Court, did not seem concerned with 
preserving intellectual continuity with Griswold, but seemed willing to 
base the Court's authority directly on the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.58 While it is regrettable that Justice Blackmun 
did not address more of his opinion to this crucial aspect of the cases, 
its significance for the problems suggested by Ludwig lies in its 
foreshadowing of a greater willingness by the Court to strike down 
state statutes under the fourteenth amendment, without "incorporat-
ing" a specific provision of the Bill of Rights. In addition, while it is 
logically possible to adhere to both the doctrine of selective incorpora-
tion and substantive due process, in general those Justices who have 
been the most willing to find substantive content in the fourteenth 
amendment, independent of the Bill of Rights, are those who think 
that the incorporation theory is doctrinally flawed. 59 
If it is true that Ludwig portends some backing off from incorpora-
tion theory, the implications could be momentous. It is not likely that 
decisions making provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states will be overturned. However, as indicated by Ludwig itself, the 
meaning of constitutional requirements could be more flexible as to 
the states under the fourteenth amendment than as to the federal 
government through the more specific constitutional provisions. For 
example, in Palko v. Connecticut,60 one of the classic cases from the 
substantive due process era, the Court ruled that the fourteenth 
amendment did not incorporate the double jeopardy provision of the 
fifth amendment. Nevertheless, the Court in Palko acknowledged that 
the fourteenth amendment of its own force might forbid certain 
forms of double jeopardy.61 Thus, a new trial of an acquitted de-
fendant on a claim of trial error might be consistent with due process, 
while a new trial just because the government wanted a second bite at 
the apple might not be, even though both would be inconsistent with 
the double jeopardy prohibition in the fifth amendment sense. This 
possibility would of course have its analogues in many other Bill of 
Rights provisions. 
If there is even a germ of a possible alteration in the Court's ap-
proach to the incorporation issue in the majority opinion, it is interest-
ing to question why the dissent does not contain criticism specifically 
directed to such a possibility. It is always perilous to speculate con-
cerning the reasons for what is contained in or omitted from judicial 
opinions.62 It is conceivable, however, that perhaps the dissenting Jus-
58 See 410 U.S. at 153. 
5. This would seem to be Justice Powell's position. See 424 U.S. at 632. See also Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 328 (1937). 
60 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
61Id. at 328. 
62 For a very interesting article on the behind the scenes discussions and motivations 
involved in Supreme Court opinions, see Note, The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A 
Study of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J. 1202 (1974). This article 
was based largely on the papers of Mr. Justice Burton on deposit in the Library of 
Congress. 
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tices, some of whom had already expressed anguish over what they 
perceived to be a dismantling of the patrimony of the Warren years,63 
and who are aware that it is necessary to voice objections to new be-
ginnings at an early stage,64 simply regarded a possible retreat from 
incorporation theory as too horrible to contemplate seriously. Maybe it 
would go away if not commented on, whereas dissenting commentary 
would make it appear the wave of the future. 
§13.3. Nude Bathing as Constitutionally Protected Activity. The 
Cape Cod National Seashore ("Seashore") is a national park 
established in 1959. It contains within its limits beaches and adjacent 
lands covering a substantial portion of Cape Cod. It also includes pri-
vate property that has not been the subject of condemnation. 1 
Long before the federal government acquired any regulatory power 
over the beaches, nude bathing was an accepted practice at certain 
beaches. For decades summer visitors had engaged in the practice of 
nude bathing without governmental interference at remote locations 
between established town beaches.2 One of the areas traditionally used 
for this purpose is a stretch of beach known as Brush Hollow, located 
approximately one mile south of the Truro town beach. 
The National Park Service has classified the beach at Brush Hollow 
as "a natural environment area."3 As such, it is open to the public for 
recreation but, unlike a "managed beach," does not provide 
lifeguards, bathhouses, sanitary facilities, or public parking. There is 
no public parking available within one mile of the beach at Brush Hol-
low.4 
For many years the practice of nude bathing continued at Brush 
Hollow without opposition. The intervening federal control of the 
beach area in 1959 had also made no difference. During 1973 and 
1974, however, due to widespread publicity about Brush Hollow, 
there occurred an abrupt increase in the number of bathers and on-
. 63 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (Brennan, j., 
dissenting). 
64 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 519 n. 14 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 525-43 (1976) (Marshall, j., dissenting). In Stone, Jus-
tice Brennan stated: . 
Although the Court does not expressly overrule Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), and its progeny involving collateral review of Fourth Amendment 
Claims of federal prisoners (indeed, the Court accomplishes today's results without 
expressly overruling or distinguishing any of our diametrically contrary pre-
cedents), Kaufman obviously does not survive. This tactic has become familiar in 
earlier decisions this Term .... 
428 U.S. at 519 n. 14 (Brennan, j., dissenting). (citations omitted). 
§13.3 1 Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 123 (D. Mass. 1975), affd sub nom., 
Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). 
"Id. 
3Id. at 124. 
4Id. 
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lookers, culminating in a crowd of approximately twelve hundred on 
August 25, 1974.5 This increased crowding gave rise to numerous 
problems, including severe parking congestion at various points in 
Truro, trespass upon and damage to private property that was used as 
a short cut to the beach, and various forms of environmental damage 
to the beach area such as littering, destruction of beach grass, and 
dune erosion. 6 
As a result of complaints from occupants of residential property 
within the Seashore, the Park Service reviewed the problem and a 
range of possible solutions. Eight alternatives were considered. These 
included totally banning nudity, closing all beach areas to swimming 
except for managed areas designed for beach use, accommodating 
nude bathing at existing managed beaches, developing Brush Hollow 
as a managed beach, and, finally, using Brush Hollow at a level consis-
tent with its status as a natural environment area. 7 At the conclusion 
of the study of these alternatives in 1975, the Secretary of the In-
terior promulgated a regulation proscribing public nudity, including 
public nude bathing by any person on federal property within the 
Seashore.s In making this decision, the Secretary placed primary em-
phasis on conservation and, in accordance with the statutory require-
ment, the interests of the owners of private property within the area.9 
In Williams v. Kleppe,10 regular summer users of Brush Hollow 
beach sought a declaration that the Department of the Interior reg-
ulation was invalidY The original defendants were officials of the 
Department of the Interior and the National Park Service. The Truro 
• ld. There was testimony that the opportunity to observe nude bathing had even at-
tracted low-flying aircraft. Brief for Appellee at 7, Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 
(1st Cir. 1976). 
6 Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 806 & nn. 4-8 (1st Cir. 1976). 
7 Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 125 (D. Mass. 1975), affd sub nom., Wil-
liams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). The district court opinion did not set 
forth all eight alternatives. 
old. at 123. The Regulation provided: 
Public nudity, including public nude bathing, by any person on Federal land or 
water within the boundaries of Cape Cod National Seashore is prohibited. Public 
nudity is a person's intentional failure to cover the person's own genitals, pubic 
areas, rectal area, or female breast below a point immediately above the top of the 
aureola when in a public place. Public place is any area of Federal land or water 
within the Seashore, except the enclosed portions of bathhouses, restrooms, public 
showers, or other public structures designed for similar purposes or private struc-
tures permitted within the Seashore, such as trailers or tents. This regulation shall 
not apply to a person under 10 years of age. 
36 C.F.R. § 7.67(g) (1976). 
• Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 805 (1st Cir. 1976). In 16 U.S.C. § 459b-6(b)(2) 
(1970), the Secretary of the Interior is directed to "provide public use areas ... as ... 
will not diminish for its owners or occupants the value or enjoyment of any improved 
property located within the seashore." 
10 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). 
IIld. at 804-05. 
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Neighborhood Association, an organization of residents and summer 
residents of Truro, was allowed to intervene as a party defendant. I2 
The district court upheld the regulation despite its view that con-
stitutional rights were implicated. I3 Some measure of constitutional 
protection was appropriate, in the view of the court, because the tradi-
tional practice of nude bathing at Brush Hollow is a "liberty" interest 
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.14 However, the 
court, in applying a balancing test, found that the plaintiffs' liberty in-
terest was outweighed by the interest of the government in alleviating 
the problems that gave rise to the regulation. IS The district court ac-
knowledged that the problems associated with nude bathing could 
have been addressed through alternative means, but concluded that 
the constitutional right involved was not of such "moment" that the 
government was obliged to adopt the solutions that would preserve 
the practice of nude bathing. I6 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmedY 
Like the district court, the circuit court first considered whether any 
constitutional ri~ht at all was involved. The plaintiffs contended that 
tradition had g1Ven rise to an expectation that nude bathing some-
where within the Seashore outside of the sight of those who might be 
offended would be permitted. IS The significance of this long tradition 
of nude bathing, the plaintiffs argued, was that "where there is no 
claim that persons have been offended by the practice of nude bath-
ing, the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty to engage in 
that practice, based on the Fifth Amendment cannot be denied."19 
12 [d. at 804. 
13 Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 127, 129 (D. Mass. 1975). 
14 [d. at 127. The district court expressly limited constitutional protection to the 
bather at Brush Hollow because that was the only area shown by the plaintiffs to be a 
nude beach by tradition and custom. [d. at 127 n.1. 
IS [d. at 128. The court adopted the balancing framework of analysis from Richards v. 
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (lst Cir. 1970), in which it was stated that when a "personal 
liberty is involved," a court must determine "whether there is an out-
weighing [governmental] interest justifying the intrusion. The answer to this question 
must take into account the nature of the liberty asserted, the context in which it is as-
serted, and the extent to which the intrusion is confined to the legitimate public interest 
to be served." [d. at 1285. 
16 Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 129 (D. Mass. 1976). 
17 539 F.2d at 807. 
18 [d. at 806. The plaintiffs claimed: "[W]here ... as at Brush Hollow, tradition, cus-
tom and usage have given rise to the reasonable expectation that one may engage in a 
harmless, healthful-activity outside the sight of those who might be offended without 
fear of harassment, arrest and prosecution, there exists a right to nudity." [d. 
19 Reply Brief for Appellant at 11, Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (lst Cir. 1976). 
Plaintiffs' emphasis on prior community tolerance of nude bathing appears to conflict 
with the argument presented forcefully in their original brief that the justifications for 
the regulation were actually a subterfuge for opposition to nudity per se. Main Brief for 
Appellant at __ , Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). The First Circuit 
ignored the argument apparently because the case had not been tried on such a theory. 
If the plaintiffs had raised this contention in the trial court, it would have involved the 
court in an unusually murky area of the law. The general rule had been that courts do 
22
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Whatever the source of the claimed constitutional right, the circuit 
court briskly concluded its discussion by assuming that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to at least some measure of substantive constitutional 
protection, without, however, actually deciding that "incandescent 
question."20 The standard of review was to be the "ordinary, relaxed 
not inquire into the motives of the legislature. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 
(1971). But the reality has always been more complicated than the black letter would 
suggest. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, ]., dissent-
ing). See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problems af Unconstitutional 
Motivation, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.]. 1205 (1970). In Palmer, the City of Jackson, Mississippi had 
closed its municipal swimming pools in the aftermath of a desegregation decree. 403 
U.S. at 218-19. Petitioners, black citizens of Jackson, claimed that the closing was moti-
vated by invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. /d. at 224-
26. The city claimed that the pools were closed because it feared violence and because it 
believed the swimming pools were no longer economically viable. See id. at 219. The, 
Supreme Court, dividing five to four, affirmed an en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit 
419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1969), that had divided seven to six in upholding the city, 
largely on the grounds that motivation is both irrelevant and unascertainable. 403 U.S. 
at 225; id. at 228 (Burger, C.j., concurring). 
The Supreme Court again considered the motivation problem this past term in Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, applicants for the District of Columbia 
Metropolitan Police Department claimed that a written personnel test violated the con-
stitution because of its disproportionate impact upon blacks. ld. at 232-33. In that case, 
which involved constitutional standards rather than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970) (amended 1972), the Court ruled that "our cases 
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to 
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it 
has a racially disproportionate impact." ld. at 239. The Court was unwilling to impose 
even a special burden of justification on classifications that are neutral in ends, but ra-
cially uneven in impact, in view of the varied contexts in which such problems arise. See 
id. at 248 n.14 (de facto school segregation; minimum wage and usury laws; pro-
fessional licensing requirements). Having determined that statistical impact alone, ab-
sent a racially discriminatory purpose, is not enough to make out a constitutional viola-
tion, the Court then had to come to grips with cases such as Palmer which held that 
motivation is irrelevant. Referring to Palmer, the Court said: 
The opinion warned against grounding decision on legislative purpos~ of motiva-
tion, thereby lending support for the proposition that the operative effect of the 
law rather than its purpose is the paramount factor. But the holding of the case 
was that the legitimate purposes of the ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid 
deficits-were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were ac-
tually motivated by racial considerations. Whatever dicta the opinion may contain, 
the decision did not involve, much less invalidate, a statute or ordinance having 
neutral purposes but disproportionate racial consequences. 
/d. at 2439. Later in the opinion the Court put it more bluntly: "To the extent that 
Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant 
in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases ... are to the contrary." /d. at 2440 n.11. 
After Davis, the problem of the unconstitutional motive seems to be even more opaque 
than it was before. In the course of rejecting the view that proof of a discriminatory 
racial purpose is not necessary to make out an equal protection violation, the Court 
listed and disapproved fifteen lower federal court cases that were to the contrary. ld. at 
2440 & n. 12. Included in the list was Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st Cir. 
1972), in which the First Circuit had held that an intelligence test may not be used in 
screening applicants for the police force unless the test is validated. 
20 Williams, 539 F.2d at 807. 
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standard of review, satisfied by a conceived rational relationship."21 
Applying this standard, the court found that the regulation "easily" 
passed scrutiny.22 
The apparent reason for the court's abbreviated discussion of the 
constitutional questions is that recent decisions of the Supreme Court 
had undercut the legal position of the plaintiffs. At the time of the 
decision by the district court, the plaintiffs had a respectable array of 
precedent to invoke for their position that public nudity at Hollow 
Beach was not subject to state prohibition. First, broad decisions such 
as Roe v. Wade23 and Griswold v. Connecticut24 had clearly established 
that constitutional protection under the due process clause is available 
to prevent state action infringing certain liberties not specifically 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.25 Second, it seemed that the 1975 
Supreme Court case of Erznoznik v. City of jacksonville 26 extended such 
protection in some manner to restrict the state's power to proscribe 
public nudity. In that case, decided a few weeks before the decision of 
the district court in Kleppe, the Supreme Court struck down a munici-
pal ordinance proscribing nudity on any drive-in theatre screen visible 
from a public street, in part on the theory that any offended persons 
had merely to avert their eyes.27 Finally, the plaintiffs in Williams had 
reason to rely heavily on the First Circuit's prior decision in Richards v. 
Thurston. 28 In Richards, the First Circuit had held that suspension of a 
21Id. 
22Id. The court accepted the conclusion in the trial record that banning nudity "bears 
a real and substantial relationship to the objectives of the seashore." Id. The court noted 
in particular the continuing threat to the fulfillment of the Seashore's conservation 
purposes.ld. 
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
24 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
25 The effect of Roe and Griswold is discussed in text at notes 53-58, § 13.2 supra. 
26 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
27Id. at 211. The City of Jacksonville had argued that "any movie containing nudity 
which is visible from a public place may be suppressed as a public nuisance." Id. at 208. 
The Court dismissed the claim and held that the ordinance violated the first amend-
ment. Id. at 217-18. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), where the Su-
preme Court reversed a conviction for wearing in the corridor of a courthouse a jacket 
bearing a plainly visible vulgar expletive. The Court stressed that offended viewers had 
merely to avert their eyes. /d. at 21. 
The significance of Ennoznik as precedent for the plaintiffs position was undercut 
somewhat by the Court's statement that the nudity displayed in a pornographic drive-in 
is distinguishable "from the kind of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent expo-
sure laws." 422 U.S. at 211 n.7. Also, on the same day that the Court decided Ennoznik, 
it dismissed for want of substantial federal question an appeal from a decision uphold-
ing the validity of an ordinance prohibiting nudity on a town beach. Ellis v. California, 
422 U.S. 1030 (1975). The plaintiffs in Williams distinguished their position from the 
indecent exposure cases by stressing that the nudity at Hollow Beach is public only in a 
limited sense because it is at a remote beach. Brief for Appellant at , Williams v. 
Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). 
28 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). Richards addressed a question which had divided the 
lower courts, see id. at 1282 n.3, and which the Supreme Court had declined to resolve. 
See Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (denial of certiorari). 
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student from school for refusal to have his hair cut violated the stu-
dent's substantive rights protected by the "liberty" assurance of the 
due process clause.29 The circuit panel determined that the right to 
wear one's hair as on wishes is entitled to some constitutional protec-
tion.30 
With regard to the applicable standard of review, the Richards court 
stated that "whether there is an outweighing state interest justifying 
the intrusion" must be assessed in relation to "the nature of the liberty 
asserted, the context in which it is asserted, and the extent to which 
the intrusion is confined to the legitimate public interest to be 
served."31 No justification for the suspension had been presented and 
the court did not regard any as self-evident.32 For the plaintiffs in Wil-
liams, Richards was a significant case because it put the First Circuit on 
record as regarding the liberty of the fourteenth amendment as em-
bracing comparatively minor matters of personal autonomy and as 
employing a standard of review that appeared to be of at least in-
termediate intensity.33 
By the time Williams was argued in the First Circuit, however, the 
plaintiffs' position had been significantly undercut. The First Circuit 
cited two recent Supreme Court cases for the proposition that the rel-
atively minor rights of personal autonomy reflected in decisions like 
Richards might not be entitled to the same substantive protection as 
previously assumed.34 In the first case, Kelley v. Johnson,35 the Su-
Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari declared: 
Today the court declines to decide whether a public school may constitutionally 
refuse to permit a student to attend solely because his hair style meets with the 
disapproval of the school authorities. The court also denied certiorari in Olff v. 
Eastside Union High School District, 404 U.S. 1042, which presented the same issue. I 
dissented in OljJ, and filed an opinion. For the same reasons expressed therein, I 
dissent today. I add only that now eight circuits have passed on the question. On 
widely disparate rationales, four have upheld school hair regulations (see Freeman 
v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (CAIO 1971); King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 445 
F.2d 935 (CA9 1971); Jackson v. DOTTier, 424 F.2d 213 (CA6 1970) and Ferrell v. 
Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (CA5 1968) ), and four have struck 
them down (see Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (CA4 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 
F.2d 1069 (CA8 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (CAl 1970); and Breen 
v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (CA7 1969) ). 
405 U.S. at 1032. 
29 424 F.2d at 1284-86. Defendant, principal of the school from which plaintiff was 
~uspended, admitted that there was no written regulation governing hair length or 
style.Id. at 1282. 
30 The court stated that "within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing free-
dom great and small, is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes." Id. at 1281. 
31 Id. at 1285. 
32Id. at 1282-83. 
33 There are, however, distinctions between Williams and Richards. In Richards, the 
student was compelled to attend school and then was subjected to a regulation which 
affected his lifestyle not merely while in school, but virtually all months of the year. In 
Williams, the plaintiffs sought to continue. an activity which was, at best, seasonal. 
34 Williams, 539 F.2d at 803. 
35 425 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1976). 
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preme Court upheld a grooming regulation for policemen against a 
claim that it infringed fourteenth amendment rights. While Kelley 
would not at first glance appear to be fatal to the claim of the plain-
tiffs in Williams, given the obvious difference between the rights of 
public employees and private bathers,36 the decision nonetheless un-
derscored the recent disinclination of the Burger Court to extend the 
Roe-Griswold principles to lesser areas of personal autonomy. The 
Court laconically observed that "whether the citizenry at large has 
some sort of 'liberty' interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in 
matters of personal appearance is a question on which this Court's 
cases offer little, if any, guidance."37 Providing the cue for the First 
Circuit's handling of the claim in Williams, the Court then assumed an 
affirmative answer without actually deciding the question.38 There can 
be no doubt that the Court in Kelley did not value very highly this 
"right," the existence of which it assumed. The Supreme Court re-
garded the grooming regulation as so clearly valid that it thought the 
trial court had been correct in dismissing the complaint without hear-
ing any evidence.39 Its standard of review was whether the regulation 
was totally arbitrary. Certainly, there was not even a germ of "least re-
strictive alternative" analysis.40 Indeed, the regulation specifically pro-
hibited the less intrusive means of wearing wigs or hairpieces in order 
to conceal hair lengths which exceeded the standards set forth in the 
regulationY 
The First Circuit also cited Paul v. Davis42 as a recent indication of 
the reluctance of the Supreme Court to give additional substantive 
scope to fourteenth amendment liberty. Paul further undercut the 
plaintiffs' position in Williams because the case, unlike Kelley, did in-
volve state action which arguably infringed the rights of private citi-
zens and not just the rights of public employees. In Paul a photo-
graph of the plaintiff bearing his name was included in a flyer of "ac-
tive shoplifters" distributed to approximately eight hundred mer-
chants by police authorities after the plaintiff had been arrested on a 
shoplifting charge. Shortly after the flyer was circulated, the charge 
36 The Kelley Court emphasized the distinction between the due process rights of the 
citizenry at large and the lesser rights of public employees. See id. at 244-47. Although 
the broad principle is that public employment may not be conditioned on the surrender 
of constitutional rights, see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Garrity 
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); see generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction In Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968), the state has in-
terests as an employer that give it greater power to regulate the first amendment ac-
tivities of its employees than it has in regard to citizens generally. See Broadrick v. Ok-
lahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United States Civil Servo Comm. v. National Ass'n of Let-
ter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). 
37 425 U.S. at 244. 
38Id. 
39/d. at 247-48. 
4°Id. at 248. 
41 See id. at 255 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
42424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
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against the plaintiff was dismissed. 43 The Court, speaking through 
Justice Rehnquist, who also wrote for the Court in Kelley, held that the 
defamation involved in the distribution of the flyer did not deprive 
the plaintiff of any "liberty" or "property" within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment.44 
The plaintiffs' legal position was also undercut by a decision not 
cited by the circuit court, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,45 which again 
indicated the Supreme Court's disinclination to extend the Roe-
Griswold principles. In that case, the Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed a lower court decision that a state sodomy statute proscribing 
private, adult, homosexual activity did not violate the fourteenth 
amendment.46 Once again, points of distinction are readily available 
43Id. at 694-96. 
HId. at 710-12. An earlier sign that the Court would not uncritically extend Roe-
Griswold into other areas of personal autonomy came in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). In Belle Terre, the Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, 
upheld an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings, defining the word 
"family" to include not more than two unrelated persons. The challenge to the ordi-
nance arose when the owners of a house in a village inhabited by only about seven 
hundred people rented the house to six unrelated students. Id. at 2-3, S-1O. Justice 
Douglas concluded that no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as 
association or privacy, was at stake.Id. at 7-S. Essentially, in the Court's view, Belle Terre 
was simply a zoning case. Because it was in the area of social and economic legislation 
and was not totally arbitrary, the classification was upheld as valid. See also Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 50S 
n.lS (1975). 
Justice Marshall in dissent in Belle Terre protested that the students rights of privacy 
and association were indeed at stake and that therefore strict judicial scrutiny was ap-
propriate. 416 U.S. at 15-lS. (Marshall,]., dissenting). For Justice Marshall this case was 
well within the Roe-Griswold doctrine of constitutional autonomy, because it involved the 
deeply personal matter of choice of household companions. The ordinance was both 
overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to the stated objectives of restricting un-
controlled growth, managing traffic problems, and maintaining reasonable rental levels. 
Therefore, in the view of Justice Marshall, the ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. at 
IS-19. 
45 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, J]', voting to note probable 
jurisdiction and set case for argument), afj'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-
judge court). 
46 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court). The district court 
majority in Doe read precedents such as Griswold to stand only for the proposition "t.hat 
the Constitution condemns State legislation that trespasses upon the privacy of the in-
cidents of marriage, upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family life." 
/d. at 1200. But Judge Mehrige in dissent viewed those same cases "as standing for the 
principle that every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern." Id. at 1203. 
The principles of Doe have been followed. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 
45 U.S.L.W. 2074 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976) (discharge of homosexual from the Air Force 
upheld on authority of Doe). The vitality of pre-Doe decisions which suggested that state 
power was limited in this area would seem to be in question. E.g., Commonwealth v. 
Balthazar, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2001, 2004-05, 31S N.E.2d 47S, 4S0-S1, where the Su-
preme Judicial Court interpreted a statute forbidding "unnatural and lascivious" acts 
not to apply to private, adult, consensual activity. The Court in reaching that interpreta-
tion was influenced by its doubts whether such conduct could any longer be forbidden 
under prevailing constitutional standards. See id. at 2005 & n.2, 31S N.E.2d at 4S0 & 
n.2. 
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and aim in different directions. On the one hand, presumably the 
state interest in suppressing the activity in Doe-preserving the integ-
rity of the family-is stronger than the state interests in conservation 
and private property rights at stake in Williams. Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs in Williams would not be foreclosed by Doe from arguing that 
the nudity regulation was not justified by a sufficient state interest. On 
the other hand, the personal privacy interests at stake in Doe are much 
stronger than the plaintiffs' interest in Williams and much more closely 
analogous to the interests protected in Griswold-Roe. 47 Whatever the 
distinction, Doe again highlighted that the decision in Williams, once it 
reached the circuit court, was a foregone conclusion.48 
For the view that court decisions should be value neutral except insofar as the values 
espoused may be traced to the text of the Constitution, see Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). For the view that the courts properly 
police legislation to insure that it actually reflects current moral values, see Perry, Abor-
tion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 
23 U .C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976). 
47 The plaintiffs in Doe relied chiefly on Griswold in pressing their claim at the district 
court. See 403 F. Supp. at 1200. Dissenting Judge Mehrige thought Griswold required 
the court to hold the state sodomy statute unconstitutional. See id. at 1203-04. In addi-
tion, the activity involved in Doe was private, as distinguished from the secluded-public 
activity in Williams, pointing to a plausible argument that Doe should be controlled by 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-68 (1969), which held that the private possession 
in the house of obscene materials cannot constitutionally be punished. 
48 The precise significance of Doe cannot be determined because the case was a sum-
mary affirmance. This is noteworthy and, to some, shocking in itself. See A. Lewis, No 
Process of Law, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1976, at 37, col. 1. A summary affirmance, unlike 
a denial of certiorari, is a decision on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). 
One interpretation of the summary disposition is that the Court thought that the con-
stitutional challenge was so obviously insubstantial that plenary consideration was un-
necessary. This poses a logical problem. Affirming the decision of a three-judge district 
court implies that the court was properly convened. This in tum implies that there was 
a substantial federal question. See Colorado Springs Amusements Ltd. v. Rizzo, 96 S. Ct. 
3228,3233, (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). If this interpreta-
tion is followed, due allowance having been made for the points of distinction between 
Doe and Williams, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that Williams was correctly 
decided, particularly once the teaching of Kelley v. Johnson is put into the equation. 
However, the Court has left an ambiguity in its practice regarding summary affir-
mances. It has made it plain that they are to be accorded full precedential weight by 
lower courts, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), but at the same time has em-
phasized that it will itself more readily refuse to follow one of its own precedents, if that 
precedent was the product of summary action without the benefit of full briefing and 
oral argument. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,670-71 (1974). Thus, the Court may 
not in effect be saying that no substantial constitutional issue was presented in Doe, but 
merely that it does not wish to address the question at this time. This has the effect of 
freezing development of the law in the lower courts, a result that would not occur if the 
case were within the discretionary jurisdiction and certiorari were denied. In view of the 
serious nature of the arguments against the result in the lower court in Doe, it is possi-
ble that a later full consideration is not foreclosed. 
As a solution to the problem that summary dispositions tend to deprive the Court of 
the opportunity to obtain guidance from further consideration of a problem in the 
lower courts, Justice Brennan has proposed remanding the constitutional issues for 
further consideration in the case "giving appropriate, but not necessarily conclusive, 
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While the recent Supreme Court cases suggest that the First Circuit 
decided Williams correctly, they do not provide detailed guidance on 
the three main questions presented by Williams: 
1. Is any constitutional liberty at all involved in nude public bathing? 
2. What is the standard of review to be applied to nude bathing? 
3. If the government regulates nude bathing, is it obliged to utilize 
the least restrictive alternative? 
It is hard to find that if the Supreme Court squarely decided the 
first question, it would fail to conclude that constitutional rights are 
involved.49 The rights asserted by the plaintiffs in Williams should not 
be viewed as insignificant. A law requiring all citizens to wear hats 
would not be a minor matter. There must be in personal matters a 
presumption in favor of liberty, and it must be recognized that it is of 
constitutional magnitude.50 This is not to say that there cannot be suf-
ficient countervailing interests51 or that the requirement that what 
statutes quaintly call "opaque coverings"52 be provided for certain 
parts of the body is indistinguishable from a requirement that all citi-
zens wear hats. 
The second and third questions left unanswered by Williams and re-
cent Supreme Court cases are somewhat related. If a standard of re-
view of mere "rationality" is applied in the way it has been in the past, 
regulations such as are found in Williams will be upheld routinely. Jus-
tice Marshall seems clearly wrong in Kelley when he says in his dissent 
that no consideration need be given to the question of standard of re-
view because the grooming regulation there failed to satisfy even min-
weight to our summary dispositions." Colorado Springs Amusements Ltd. v. Rizzo, 96 
S. Ct. 3228, 3233 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See generally Com-
ment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal By the Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal 
Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 508 (1976), concluding that 
the distinction between appeal and certiorari is now so eroded that this is an additional 
reason for Congress to abolish the Court's obligatory jurisdiction. See also Note, Summary 
Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited 
Precedent, 52 B.U. L. REV. 373 (1972) . 
•• The Court has indicated that under some circumstances "bar room" type nude 
dancing may be entitled to first amendment protection. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 
422 U.S. 922 (1975); California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
50 Refusal to find substantive content in the fourteenth amendment, apart from the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, may be a solution to the problem of judicial usurpation, 
but it may leave the door open to totalitarian legislation. For example, with regard to 
involuntary sterilization, compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 u.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary 
sterilization unconstitutional) with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) and In Re Moore, 289 
N.G. 95. 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976) (involuntary sterilization not unconstitutional). 
51 The requirement of helmets for motorcyclists is an example, though even this has 
been challenged by litigants. See Commonwealth v. Cowan, 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 396, 344 N.E.2d 419; Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968); see generally Note, Motor Cycle Helmets and the Constitu-
tionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1969). 
52 The regulation is set forth in full at note 8 supra. 
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imal scrutiny.53 On the other hand, least restrictive alternative analysis 
appears to be too harsh. It would be possible to attack the problems 
associated with the nude bathing in a more direct fashion. Parking 
facilities could be provided; cars could be ticketed or towed. If there is 
a littering problem, the littering could be prohibited and sanctioned 
by a fine. 54 If the number of people using a beach is ecologically un-
desirable, the number can be restricted. It was not necessary, there-
fore, to attack the problems indirectly by prohibiting nude bathing 
altogether. Public nude bathing, however, does not have such an 
exalted constitutional status that it may not be restricted simply be-
cause less inhibiting alternatives are available, at least where those 
alternatives are much more awkward administratively. The govern-
mental interests clearly articulated in Williams, including the protec-
tion of the interests of private property owners, are very substantial. 
These interests seem quite adequate to satisfy an intermediate "sub-
stantial relation" standard of review, however that standard may be 
denominated. The judgment whether the awkwardness of alternatives 
justifies a restriction on constitutional rights must be left for the ap-
propriate political department where the constitutional right is not 
fundamental and the governmental interest is very substantial. 
It may be conceded that this makes for an anomalous situation be-
cause parking, littering, and other problems are not directly related to 
whether the users of the beach are clad or unclad. If it is true that the 
objection was not to nudity per se, but to the various problems that 
arose indirectly from the beach's availability for the purpose of nude 
bathing, one might wish that the appropriate authorities could have 
found remedies more sharply and immediately focused on the prob-
lem. It is another thing to claim that a fulfillment of that wish is to 
be found in the interstices of the Constitution. 
§13.4. School Desegregation: Federal Court Remedial Power. In 
the well-publicized 1974 case of Morgan v. Hennigan,l the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts held that certain defendant 
school authorities2 had intentionally brought about substantial un-
53 425 U.S. at 256 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
5< This is the choice that the first amendment requires where the problem is littering 
caused by the distribution of handbills and circulars. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 
(1939); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 346-47 (1970). It has been held 
that the rule is otherwise in regard to commercial handbills. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
316 U.S. 52 (1942). However, the major premise of that case, that commercial speech is 
wholly outside the first amendment, has since been repudiated. Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
§13.4.1 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.),afJ'dsub nom., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
• The defendants in Hennigan were the Boston School Committee, its individual 
members, the Superintendent of the Boston public schools [hereinafter referred to col-
lectively as the "defendant officials"], and the Board of Education of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, its individual members, and the Commissioner of Education 
[hereinafter referred to as the "state defendants"]. 379 F. Supp. at 415. 
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constitutional segregation in the Boston public schools.3 In accordance 
with applicable Supreme Court precedent,4 the district court ordered 
the defendant officials to formulate and implement a plan to de-
segregate the Boston schools within the remedial guidelines 
established by the court. 5 The plan ultimately submitted by the de-
fendant Boston School Committee was rejected by the district court in 
a separate opinion, Morgan v. Kerrigan. 6 The court found the Commit-
3 The district court found that the policies of the defendant officials in several areas 
were marked by "segregative intent." !d. at 481. Specifically, the district court found 
segregative practices with respect to facilities utilization and the planning of new struc-
tures, id. at 425-30; the drawing and redrawing of school district lines, id. at 433-37; the 
developing of "feeder" patterns which determine enrollments at specific high schools, 
id. at 441-49; the open enrollment and controlled transfer policies, id. at 449-55; and 
the hiring, promotion, and assignment policies with respect to black faculty and staff, id. 
at 456-61, 463-66. 
The district court also found unconstitutional de facto segregation in the city's com-
petitive examination schools, Boston Latin, Girls Latin, and Boston Technical. 379 F. 
Supp. at 466-67. The district court concluded that these schools had been intentionally 
segregated because the defendant officials failed to rebut the presumption of dis-
criminatory intent set forth by the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Den-
ver, 413 U.S. 189 (1972): 
"A finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful por-
tion of a school system creates a presumption that other segregrated schooling 
within the system is not adventitious. It establishes ... a prima facie case of un-
lawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those au-
thorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are 
not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. This is true even if it is de-
termined that different areas of the school district should be viewed independently 
of each other because ... there is high probability that where school authorities 
have effectuated an intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion of the 
school system, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in 
other areas of the system." 
379 F. Supp. at 467, quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. 
The district court's finding of liability, however, did not extend to the state de-
fendants. In this regard, the court concluded that the evidence "did not warrant a find-
ing that the state defendants intentionally contributed to or participated in any substan-
tial way in creating or maintaining racial segregation in the Boston public schools." [d. 
at 476. Nevertheless, the district retained the state defendants for purposes of formulat-
ing and implementing appropriate remedies. !d. at 477, citing Griffin v. County School 
Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). 
4 Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. I (1971); Raney v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 
443 (1968); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
s 379 F. Supp. at 482-84. The remedial guidelines proposed by the district court in-
cluded the "starting point" that a proper desegregation plan "ideally" would provide ra-
cial proportions for each Boston school that are identical to the corresponding racial 
proportions of the public school population as a whole. [d. at 483. 
6401 F. Supp. 216, 228-29 (D. Mass. 1975), afJ'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 935 (1976). 
It is difficult but necessary to keep the liability and remedial phases of the litigation 
separate. The liability issue was decided by Federal District Judge Arthur Garrity in 
June, 1974 and is reported as Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974). 
Judge Garrity'S disposition of the remedial phase of the litigation is reported as Morgan 
v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975). Both decisions were appealed to the 
First Circuit and are now cited respectively as Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st 
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tee plan to be constitutionally inadequate because it did not "promise 
realistically to desegregate the public schools."7 Because time did not 
permit further proposals before the 1975 school year commenced,s 
the district court devised its own comprehensive desegregation plan9 
and ordered the appropriate defendant officials to oversee its im-
plementation within the timetable established by the district court.10 
On appeal in Morgan v. Kerrigan,l1 defendants set forth several 
broad challenges to the district court's desegregation plan.12 Of par-
ticular note was the defendants' claim that the remedy ordered by the 
district court was overbroad because it sought to effect the maximum 
practical amount of actual desegregation and not merely the elimina-
tion of that segregation which was the result of official action. 13 A 
second claim raised by the defendants was that the district court's re-
fusal to consider the potential effects of "white flight"14 from the Bos-
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (affirming liability issues) and Morgan v. 
Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976) (affirming remedial 
order). 
7 401 F. Supp. at 228-29. The School Committee proposed a "freedom of choice" 
plan consisting of a series of options to the students and parents. Students in schools 
that remained "racially isolated" after the voluntary assignment process would be re-
quired to attend certain desegregated third-site resource centers one day a week for 
elementary schools and one day every two weeks for middle schools. /d. at 228. 
The Boston Home and School Association, as intervening defendants at the remedial 
stage of the litigation, and the plaintiffs filed their own plans which the district court 
declined to adopt. Id. at 226-27, 229. 
8 The School Committee plan was submitted on January 27, 1975. A panel of four 
masters, appointed by the district court, held evidentiary hearings which considered the 
merits of this plan, as well as the plans submitted by the plaintiffs and the Home and 
School Association; see note 7 supra. On March 31, 1975, the masters filed a final re-
port with the court which proposed a new plan incorporating elements of the other 
plans and the suggestions of the masters. 401 F. Supp. at 227. The district judge 
rendered his decision rejecting the school committee plan on June 5,1975. By this time, 
commencement of the new school year was only three months away. See id. at 229. 
9Id. The district court extended and revised the plan submitted by the masters, see 
note 8 supra, by reducing the maximum allowable racial disparity in school assignments. 
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 407 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). 
The heart of the district court plan consisted of a restructuring of the Boston School 
System into eight Community School Districts and one citywide school district. Within 
each district were "geocode units" consisting of a bounded area of five to fifteen 
residential blocks. For each district, planning specifications were set forth which 
established allowable percentage variations in the racial composition of the schools in 
light of the racial composition of the district as a whole. 401 F. Supp. at 252-57. Where 
possible, students were assigned on the basis of their preference.Id. at 258, 261. To the 
extent necessary to meet the planning specifications in each geocode, the plan provided 
for mandatory transportation of students. The court estimated that 21,000 students 
would be subject to this requirement. Id. at 263. 
10ld. at 268-70. By this time the Mayor of Boston had been joined as a defendant. See 
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 406 n.2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). 
II 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). This was the appeal on the 
remedial portion of the litigation. See note 6 supra. 
12 See 530 F.2d at 408. 
laId. at 415. 
14 The district court defined "white flight" as the "departure of white children from 
the Boston city schools to parochial, private, or suburban school systems." 401 F. Supp. 
at 233-34. 32
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ton schools in devising its plan constituted an abuse of discretion con-
stituting grounds for reversal,l5 Finally, the defendants argued that 
the district court plan exceeded the restrictive desegregation guide-
lines set forth by Congress in the Equal Educational Opportunities Act 
of 1974.16 
In an extensive and thorough opinion, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit rejected all of the defendants' chal-
lenges17 and affirmed the order of the district court. IS The decisive 
15 530 F.2d at 419-20. 
161d. at 411-15. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (the "Act"), PUB. L. 
No. 93-380, August 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 514-21, is codified at 20 U.S.C. 1701-58 (Supp. 
IV 1974). This challenge, as pressed by the Mayor of Boston, see note 10 supra, and 
joined in by the Home and School Association, see note 7 supra, was based primarily on 
§ 213 of the Act which provides that a court shall "impose only such remedies as are 
essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protec-
tion." 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. IV 1974). The Mayor argued that the plan proposed by 
the court-appointed masters, see note 8 supra, was constitutionally sufficient. Therefore, 
the district court plan, which went beyond the masters' plan, violated § 213's command 
to limit remedies to the extent necessary to "correct particular denials ... equal protec-
tion." See 530 F.2d at 411. 
17 530 F.2d at 414-15,417-18,422. The circuit court panel also had no trouble reject-
ing the defendants' claim that the district court's refusal to adopt the school committee 
plan, see note 7 supra, was not error. 530 F.2d at 409-11. In this regard, the circuit 
court agreed with the district court that the school committee plan "could not re-
alistically sustain the burden of achieving desegregation of the Boston city schools." Id. 
at 410. The circuit court also rejected claims that the district court's use of ratios, see 
note 9 supra, was improper, finding that the planning specifications establishing ranges 
of thirty to seventy percent black and white were consistent with statistical ranges 
sanctioned in other desegregation cases. 530 F.2d at 423, citing United States v. School 
Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 546-47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975) 
(citywide school racial composition eighty percent white, twenty percent black; schools 
to be five to thirty-five percent black, sixty-five to ninety-five per cent white); Yar-
brough v. Hulbert-West Memphis School Dist. No.4, 457 F.2d 333, 334-35 (8th Cir. 
1972) (citywide elementary schools forty-seven percent white, fifty-three percent black; 
schools to be thirty to seventy percent for black and white). 
18 530 F.2d at 431. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the defendants' petition 
for review in June of the Suroey year, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), thereby putting to rest the 
last hopes that the district court's broad desegregation order would be revised. How-
ever, the precedential impact of a denial of certiorari is at best limited. In an im-
mediate, practical sense, it is true that the effect of the Court's refusal to hear a case is 
to leave the judgment of the court below unreviewed and therefore undisturbed. 
Nevertheless, It must be remembered that the Court has been emphatic that failure to 
grant a petition does not mean that the Court agrees with the judgment, much less the 
reasoning, of the court below. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489-97 (1953) 
(opinion of Frankfurter, j.); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 
917-19 (1950). As stated by Justice Frankfurter in Baltimore Radio, a denial of a petition 
for certiorari "simply means that fewer than four members of the court deemed it de-
sirable to review a decision of the lower court." /d. at 917. 
A single exception to this prevailing view was the opinion of Justice Blackmun writing 
for the majority in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). In this case Justice 
Blackmun attempted to derive inferences from the Court's denial of certiorari in earlier 
cases, although he acknowledged that "a denial of certiorari normally carries no im-
plication or inference." Id. at 443. Even this limited departure from the normal rule 
provoked a stinging rebuke from Justice Marshall in dissent who stated: "Reliance on 
denial of certiorari for any proposition impairs the vitality of the discretion we exercise 
in controlling the cases we hear .... When we deny certiorari, no one, not even our-
33
Cronin: Chapter 13: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
376 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.4 
circuit court opinion clearly establishes that the district court de-
segregation of the Boston schools is unlikely to be disturbed. 19 The 
remainder of this section will consider the First Circuit panel's treat-
ment of the defendants' three major challenges to the district court 
order. In examining the court's treatment of the defendants' claim 
under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, particular at-
tention will be devoted to determining whether specific anti-busing 
legislative proposals conform to constitutional standards. 
I. THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL DESEGRATION REMEDIAL POWER 
The defendant officials' general objection to the district court rem-
edy was that it was not limited to the extent of the constitutional vio-
lation determined at the liability portion of the litigation. The de-
fendants contended that a large part of the segregation of the Boston 
schools was simply the product of population patterns in neighbor-
hood schools and not of illegal state action.20 Because the fourteenth 
amendment as interpreted prohibits only state imposed racial segrega-
tion,21 the defendants claimed the district court's remedial power was 
limited to remedying the specific effects of the "state action."22 
While admitting that the defendants' theory possessed "some sur-
face plausibility," the court of appeals rejected this line of reasoning 
for two reasons: first, binding United States Supreme Court precedent 
is to the contrary; second, the illegal causes of segregation in the 
schools and the indirect effects thereof are not truly severable from 
other causes.23 Because the Supreme Court precedent constituted the 
crux of the circuit court's reasoning, it is appropriate to review the 
main cases themselves. 
The three major United States Supreme Court cases found binding 
by the First Circuit were Green v. School Board of New Kent County,24 
selves, should think that the denial indicates a view on the merits of the case." ld. at 
460-61 (citations omitted). 
At any rate, it is at least the general rule that the denial of certiorari means that the 
Supreme Court has chosen not to hear the case and nothing more. See R. STERN & E. 
GRESSMAN. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 213-18 (4th ed. 1969). 
'9 Other aspects of Judge Garrity'S continuing implementation of desegregation of the 
Boston schools have likewise been affirmed by the First Circuit. In a companion case, 
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), the First 
Circuit upheld an order directing the hiring of one black teacher for each white teacher 
until the percentage of black permanent teachers in the district was approximately the 
same as the percentage of blacks in the city population. See also Morgan v. McDonough, 
540 F.2d 527, 533-35 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding an order of the district court designat-
ing a temporary receiver for South Boston High School.) 
20 530 F.2d at 415. 
21 The circuit court, noting the defendants' reliance upon the "language of the Four-
teenth Amendment," cited the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), for the state action 
proposition. See 530 F.2d at 415. 
22530 F.2d at 415. 
231d. at 415-19. 
24 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
34
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/17
§13.4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 25 and Keyes v. School 
District No.1, Denver. 26 Green, the earliest of the three, is sometimes re-
ferred to as the case in which the Supreme Court first insisted on ac-
tual integration as a remedy for segregation in the public schools 
rather than merely the elimination of governmental establishment of 
segregation.27 If Green was an innovation, however, it was a mild in-
novation. There a "freedom of choice" plan was adopted in a county 
that had practiced total segregation as a matter of state statutory and 
constitutional law.28 Although the Court did not determine that free-
dom of choice plans are per se unconstitutional, it did hold that free-
dom of choice was an inadequate remedy in that particular case.29 In 
context, this was not a far-reaching determination. There were only 
two schools and no residential segregation in the county. Under prior 
law, one school had been "white" and one "black."30 Given the circum-
stances of community hostility to Brown v. Board of Education,31 the 
Court believed that freedom of choice was insufficient to eradicate the 
effects of past de jure segregation, especially where the alternative of 
geographic zones was so obviously and simply available.32 
Although Green seemed to be a modest extension of the Brown prin-
ciple,33 the Court in the course of its discussion made two observations 
25 402 U.S. I (1970). 
26 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
27 See 413 U.S. at 220-21 (Powell, j., concurring). See generally L. GRAGLlA, DISASTER 
BY DECREE 67-89 (1976). In the decade after Brown there was relatively little progress 
made in legal challenges to segregated school systems. See Bickel, The Decade of School 
Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964). This lack of progress 
ended when Congress enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, PUB. L. No. 88-
352, §§ 601-05, 78 Stat. 252-53 (1964), which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 
2000d-4 (1970). Title VI permitted the Justice Department to bring suit against segre-
gated school systems and such systems cut off from federal funds. The latter power of 
the Justice Department became especially important as a result of the federal funds that 
resulted from passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 236 et seq. (1970). That desegregation subsequently came to be defined in 
H.E.W. bureaucratic guidelines which in turn influenced the courts in making their 
constitutional determination, explains in part the transition from Brown to Green. See N. 
GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 77-84 (1975); L. GRAGLlA, DISASTER BY DECREE 46-66 
(1976); Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation In the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 
12 (1967). 
28 391 U.S. at 431-42. 
29Id. at 439-41. 
30Id. at 432. 
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
32 391 U.S. at 439-42. The Court noted that in three years of operation, not a single 
white child (out of five hundred fifty) chose to attend the all black school, while one 
hundred fifteen black children (out of seven hundred forty) chose to attend the all 
white school. Id. at 441; see id. at 432. 
33 The Court in Brown stated simply: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but 
equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. There-
fore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions 
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
347 U.S. at 495. 
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that have proved to be oft-quoted and seminal. The Court stated that 
the school board was charged with an "affirmative duty to take what-
ever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."34 Further, 
the Court, wearied after years of foot dragging since Brown, an-
nounced that "the burden on a school board today is to come forward 
with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises re-
alistically to work now. "35 These statements by the Court, although 
ambiguous because of their context, can be regarded as authority for 
the proposition that the remedy for de jure segregation must be an 
actually integrated school system and not merely the cessation of gov-
ernmental involvement in segregation, i.e., integration, not merely de-
segregation.36 
The next case of principal concern to the First Circuit in Morgan 
was Swann. This was a case involving remedies analogous to the rem-
edies adopted by the district court in Morgan. On the rhetorical level 
there is a tantalizing ambiguity in the case concerning whether school 
authorities must adopt integration as a remedy or merely desegrega-
tion. On the one hand, the Court reaffirmed the Green principle that 
there is an obligation to convert to a unitary school system in which 
the effects of de jure segregation are eliminated root and branch.37 
On the other hand, the Court pointed out that ')udicial powers may 
be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation," and that 
"as with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the 
scope of the remedy."38 As an abstract matter, these latter statements 
would seem to establish that desegregation, not integration, is what is 
required. 
34 391 U.S. at 437-38 (citations omitted). 
35/d. at 439 (emphasis in original). 
36 A case decided the same day as Green, Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 
U.S. 450 (1968), involved somewhat different facts. Monroe concerned a school system 
in Jackson, Tennessee that formerly had been segregated by law. After a successful 
challenge to this system in federal district court, the respondent school board adopted a 
desegregation plan that called for geographic zoning, with a provision for "free trans-
fer" at the option of any student, on a space available basis. Students taking advantage 
of the transfer option had to supply their own transportation because the school system 
did not operate any buses.ld. at 452-54. Because of residential segregation and optional 
transfers by both black and white students, comparatively little integration resulted. In 
schools that were predominantly white there were as few as three blacks out of 781 stu-
dents, but no more than 160 blacks out of 682 students. /d. at 454, 457. The school sys-
tem as a whole was about forty percent black.ld. at 452. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the school board's plan violated the Constitution, stressing the following factors: the 
school board had long delayed before adopting any plan at all; the board had adminis-
tered its own plan in a discriminatory fashion until checked by legal action; and the 
board acknowledged in its brief that the transfer option was necessary to prevent white 
students from fleeing the school system altogether. The Court thus regarded the plan 
not as a desegregation plan, but simply as a device to facilitate resegregation. /d. at 
458-59. 
37 402 U.S. at 15. 
3Bld. at 16. 
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The problem with this interpretation is that Swann is more than just 
a compilation of aphorisms about the law of constitutional remedies. 
These statements were made in a context where the Court upheld a 
remedial plan that went beyond what had been imposed in Boston. 
For example, some of the school zones were neither compact nor con-
tiguous and were the product of what the Court itself described as "a 
frank-and sometimes drastic-gerrymandering of school districts 
and attendance zones."39 Nothing so severe was imposed by the dis-
trict court in Morgan. 4o Thus, while some of the abstract statements in 
Swann might provide support for the theory that desegregation is a 
sufficient remedy for de jure segregation, in the full context the 
Court made it plain that integration is required. 
The third and final United States Supreme Court case found con-
trolling by the Morgan court was Keyes. Keyes was important because it 
applied principles of desegregation derived in "southern" cases to Den-
ver, Colorado, a "northern" city in which racial segregation in public 
education was never mandated or permitted by lawY Nevertheless, as 
in Morgan, various racially identifiable policies of the school board, in-
cluding the manipulation of student attendance zones, school site selec-
tion, the utilization of mobile classrooms, and teacher and staff as-
signments, created racially segregated schools throughout the city 
which led to a decree requiring a remedy for the segregation in the 
schools.42 In reaching its decision, the Court specifically rejected the 
claim, which had prevailed in the lower courts, that the constitution-
ally appropriate remedy is merely the elimination of specifically dem-
onstrated abuses and not the total integration of the entire school 
system: 
Our Brother Rehnquist argues in dissent that Brown v. Board of 
Education did not impose an "affirmative duty to integrate" the 
schools of a dual school system but was only a "prohibition against 
discrimination" "in the sense that the assignment of a child to a 
particular school is not made to depend on his race .... " That is 
the interpretation of Brown expressed 18 years ago by a three-
judge court in Briggs v. Elliott· "The Constitution, in other words, 
does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." 
But Green v. County School Board rejected that interpretation in-
391d. at 27. 
40 The plan adopted to desegregate the Boston schools is set out at note 9 supra. 
41 402 U.S. at 191. Prior to Keyes, one might still have objected that cases like Green 
and Swann were "southern" cases where a frank, open and complete system of racial 
separation of the races in the schools had been the order of the day before Brown and, 
indeed, in the years immediately after Brown. Thus, it was arguable that a system such 
as Boston that practiced no de jure segregation should not be treated in accordance 
with the southern model simply because certain administrative decisions had rendered 
the system in part segregated in a technical sense. Keyes put to rest the possibilities of 
such a double standard. 
421d. at 200-02. 
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sofar as Green expressly held that "School boards ... operating 
state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged [by 
Brown II] with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial dis-
crimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green remains 
the governing principle.43 
Whether or not one agrees with the analysis provided in these cases 
by the United States Supreme Court, it appears that they provide 
ample authority to support the First Circuit's affirmance of the district 
court remedy in Morgan. Indeed, the binding nature of these pre-
cedents seems inescapable. The catalogue of examples of de jure 
segregation is very much the same in Morgan as it was in Keyes. Most 
importantly, whatever doubt there may have been about the scope of 
an appropriate remedy or its application in a northern setting was cer-
tainly eliminated by Keyes. 44 As a practical matter, the circuit court's 
skepticism in Morgan of efforts to distinguish intentionally caused 
segregation from that which results from residential patterns45 is un-
derstandable. The task of unscrambling what the racial composition of 
the different neighborhoods would have been absent unlawful dis-
crimination would be speculative if not impossible. An added dif-
ficulty in this task would be the need to determine the extent to 
43 [d. at 200 & n.10 (citations omitted). In its opinion, the Court also repeated a point 
that had been made in Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21, and was ultimately relied upon by the 
First Circuit in Morgan, see 530 F.2d at 418, that the aggregate of acts of de jure segre-
gation may have an effect on the racial composition of residential neighborhoods. Since 
any such effect is not really ascertainable, it would be impossible thereafter to separate 
racial isolation in the schools into de facto and de jure components. It would appear 
that this point, if true, is the real answer to Justice Rehnquist's claim that a decree re-
quiring integration is in effect remedial overkill. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity 
and the Courts, 5 I TEX. L. REV. 411, 452, (1973). 
44 However, despite its broad language as to the proper scope of relief, the Keyes 
Court did not hold that the intentional separation of a substantial part of a school sys-
tem is not of itself proof that the whole system is intentionally segregated. Rather, the 
Court stated that it would apply a presumption that the segregative intent found in a 
substantial pap of the system affects the whole system and leaves the burden of proving 
otherwise to the school authorities. 413 U.S. at 208. The application by the district court 
of the Keyes presumption to the segregative practices in the Boston schools is somewhat 
unclear. Keyes was decided rather late in the district court's liability phase of the Morgan 
litigation. As a result, the defendants may not have been given the opportunity to rebut 
the presumption that a school system that was intentionally segregated to a substantial 
degree was to be regarded as a completely segregated system. See 530 F.2d at 419 n.26. 
However, the district court did apply the Keyes presumption to find that Boston's elite 
examination schools had intentionally discriminated against black school children. See 
note 3 supra. 
At any rate, attempts to raise such questions once again at the remedy phase were re-
jected and the court was willing to entertain only those plans that had as their premise 
that Boston was in its entirety a segregated school system. 401 F. Supp. 225, 229. In this 
regard, the court stated: "In default by school authorities of their obligation to proffer 
acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will as-
sure a unitary school system." [d. at 229, quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. 
45 401 F.2d at 418. See text at note 23 supra. 
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which intentional acts of segregation in schools affected the residential 
patterns in the neighborhood. Finally, as the circuit court in Morgan 
noted, partial desegregation in schools in which minorities remained 
segregated might not in the future be treated even-handedly by ad-
ministrators.46 Consequently, the prevention of such abuses would be 
best effectuated by making sure that no schools were identifiable by a 
concentration of minority students. 
In light, then, of the binding Supreme Court precedent and the 
practical difficulty in severing the illegal from the legal segregation, 
the circuit court's disposition of the defendants' challenge of over-
breadth appears correct. 
II. THE "WHITE FLIGHT" CO:-.JTROVERSY 
Another major challenge proferred by the defendants was that the 
district court's refusal to consider the potential effect of "white flight" 
from Boston schools constituted an "abuse of discretion," rendering 
the desegregation plan defectiveY The circuit court in Morgan re-
jected this challenge stating that "white flight" is not a "practicability 
for which [a desegregation] plan must make an accommodation."48 In 
so deciding, the court pointed out that a refusal to accommodate op-
position to desegregation has characterized the cases.49 Responding to 
defendants' claim that such a stance destroys the ultimate effectiveness 
of a plan because of the "resegregation" that occurs when whites 
withdraw in substantial numbers, the court stated: 
The constitution cannot solve all problems. On the contrary, to 
the extent that it demands that rights which have previously been 
overridden be enforced, it creates social problems. It in-
conveniences, sometimes substantially, law enforcement officers, 
prison wardens, university administrators, and government 
bureaucrats .... But expectable individual, official or group reac-
tion does not outweigh constitutional rights. We therefore must 
agree with another court which said, "concern over white flight 
... cannot become the higher value at the expense of rendering 
equal protection of the laws the lower value."50 
The First Circuit's decision, in light of applicable precedent, appears 
correct. There would be little rule of law if the courts crumbled in the 
46 401 F.2d at 418. This consideration would entirely undercut any possibility of 
distinguishing between that segregation resulting from official action and that resulting 
from other causes. 
47 530 F.2d at 419-20. "White flight" is defined at note 14 supra. 
48 530 F.2d at 419. 
49 The First Circuit relied in large part on Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs., 391 U.S. 450 
(1960), a case that likewise rejected the "white flight" defense. See id. at 459. 
50 430 F.2d at 422, citing Mapp v. Board of Educ. ·of Chattanooga, 525 F.2d 169, 171 
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976) quoting 366 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D. 
tenn. 1973). 
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face of community opposition to enforcement of constitutional rights. 
Nevertheless, the special nature of the "white flight" problem may 
merit closer attention than the Morgan circuit and district courts were 
willing to devote. One aspect of the problem is that "white flight" is 
not illegal activity. 51 Thus, it is not quite accurate to characterize judi-
cial willingness to consider this factor as subservience to threats of il-
legal interference with the execution of court decrees. Rather, one 
might claim that courts that are willing to consider "white flight" are 
merely evaluating a legal response of citizens that potentially will frus-
trate desegregation decrees, thereby reducing racial balance to levels 
prior to judicial intervention. In light of recent Supreme Court pre-
cedent forbidding a district court to respond to demographic changes 
after a constitutional plan has been implemented,52 it would seem that 
the better practice is for district courts at least to consider evidence of 
"white flight" before tying its hands irrevocably. 53 
A second aspect of the "white flight" problem is that the "resegrega-
tion" that occurs when a substantial number of white children with-
draws from balanced schools is not, as the First Circuit in Morgan rec-
ognized,54 segregation in a legal sense because it is not state imposed 
and because there is no constitutional right to any particular racial 
balance in schools. Such treatment is at least philosophically in-
consistent with judicial willingness to include in a desegregation plan 
even those schools that are segregated in a de facto sense.55 In the 
former situation, courts are quite willing to regard as lawful the 
segregation that occurs when white students frustrate a decree simply 
51 While there is no right to interfere with the execution of court decrees, see Cooper 
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court has recognized "a First Amendment 
right 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas'." See NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). "From this principle it may be assumed that parents 
have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that 
promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that children have an equal 
right to attend such institutions." See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976). A 
fortiori, there would be such a right when the motive is not a belief in or desire for 
segregated schools but opposition to transportation out of the neighborhood or fear of 
violence or concern over the quality of education available in the public schools. 
52 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
53 This would allow district courts to soften the effect of "white flight" by modifying 
racial balance formulas to predict certain demographic changes in neighborhoods where 
the evidence of potential "white flight" was the greatest. The type of evidence relevant 
in such a determination is generally found in sociological studies of population shifts. 
See 530 F.2d at 420-21 nn. 29 & 30. 
54Id. at 421-22. citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). 
55 See text at notes 20-43 supra. In Morgan, the court spoke disparagingly about the 
possibility or desirability of regarding any segregation as de facto once there is a finding 
of substantial de jure segregation in the system: 
[no require a district court to preserve intact every scrap of segregated education 
that somehow can be separated from governmental causation is to involve the fed-
eral courts in planning continued segregation and in perpetuating the community 
and administrative attitudes and psychological effects which desegregation should 
assuage. 
530 F.2d at 418. 
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by withdrawing from the system. On the other hand, in the latter, 
courts remain quite unwilling to consider the possibility of segregation 
by geographical accident once the finding of specific intent has been 
made. Such dual treatment, in effect, is a concession that the issue in 
desegregation cases is not whether a school is "balanced," but whether 
there is discrimination. 
To be sure, grave problems would arise from taking "white flight" 
into account in formulating a plan. First, it is difficult to show a clear 
empirical consensus as to the relationship between "white flight" and 
court ordered desegregation. 56 Second, to adopt a rule that potential 
withdrawal of students from the system is a factor to be taken into ac-
count in formulating a desegregation plan would put a premium on 
the manufacturing of community opposition along with threats and 
predictions of flight from the city. 
A dilemma seems to emerge. There are practical and perhaps 
theoretical obstacles to taking "white flight" into account in formulat-
ing plans. Nevertheless, it appears that if the problem arises, as it ap-
parently has in the Boston schools, 57 the courts-given what the Su-
preme Court has said about modifying decrees58 and about metropoli-
tan remedies59-can respond to the resegregation of schools only by 
throwing up their hands and announcing that this segregation is "de 
facto." 
One solution might be for courts to grapple with the problems60 of 
distinguishing between segregation that has been caused by the action 
of school authorities and that which is the product of residential pat-
terns and other causes. In this manner, district courts could formulate 
56 The circuit court in Morgan noted that the "relationship between white flight and 
court ordered desegregation is a matter of heated debate among experts in sociology, 
and a firm professional consensus has not yet emerged." 530 F.2d at 420-21 n.29. 
57 School department statistics released in early November, 1976, indicated that more 
than 20,000 white students, out of the 53,593 counted in 1973, left the city's school en-
rollment since busing began in September 1976. The number of black students 
dropped very slightly from 31,963 in 1973 to 31,910 in November 1976. The enrollment of 
"others" remained relatively steady at about 9,000. N.Y. Times, November 13, 1976, p.8. 
58 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 472 U.S. 424 (1976). See text at note 
52 supra. 
5·See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In Milliken, the Court held that a 
cross-district remedy should not be imposed unless it is first shown that there has been 
a constitutional violation in one district that produces a significant segregative effect in 
another. ld. at 744-45. But see Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975), in which the 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed an order of a three-judge district court, 393 F. 
Supp. 428 (D. Del. 197.5), requiring an inter-district remedy. See generally Note, In-
terdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REV. 521 (1976). See also Hills 
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976), where the Court approved a plan requiring 
metropolitan public housing desegregation. In Hills, the remedy was commensurate 
with the wrong because HUD regarded the city housing market rather than the city 
limits as the relevant geographical area in its prior planning. ld. at 300-06. 
60 See text at notes 45-46 supra. 
41
Cronin: Chapter 13: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
384 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.4 
plans that would have wider community acceptance and would at the 
same time remedy the constitutional violation. The more draconian 
solutions that have been adopted up to now have had the effect of 
embittering some segments of the community and, because of "white 
flight," further isolating those minorities the plans were designed to 
aid. 61 However, until the Supreme Court announces differently, lower 
courts such as the district court and the First Circuit in Morgan should 
not be criticized for faithfully following the clear and binding pre-
cedents in the area. 
Ill. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTION OF FEDERAL COURT REMEDIAL POWER 
Defendant officials in Morgan also claimed that the district court de-
segregation decree violated section 213 of the Equal Educational Op-
portumties Act of 1974, which .provides that a court shall "impose only 
such remedies as are essential to correct particular denials of equal 
educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws."62 The de-
fendants argued that a proper interpretation of section 215 was one 
that required district courts to adopt a more modest desegregation 
plan if the plan could of itself pass constitutional muster.63 The circuit 
court rejected this argument largely on the basis of section 203 of the 
Act which disavows any intention to restrict the obligation of the 
courts "to enforce fully" the obligation of the Constitution.64 The 
court read section 203 a~ indicating that Congress did not intend to 
overrule prior Supreme Court cases that called for remedies in which 
"discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."65 In light of 
61 This is not simply a conflict between the black and white communities. It is in-
creasingly common for minority citizens closest to the actual impact of desegregation 
decrees to prefer solutions that emphasize increased local control and improved educa-
tional programs rather than a total emphasis on numerical mixing of the races, particu-
larly where "white flight" makes further busing orders futile. This can result in a con-
flict in goals between the plaintiffs in segregation cases and the policies of national or-
ganizations such as the NAACP. For a thorough treatment of this problem see Bell, 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976). See also L. GRAGLIA. DISASTER By DECREE 330 n.107. 
62 20 U.s.C. § 1712 (Supp. IV 1974). Section 1215 of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1714 
(Supp. IV 1974), facially proscribes any court ordered transportation of a student to a 
school other than one "closest or next closest to his place of residence." 20 U.S.C. § 
1714 (Supp. IV 1974). The defendants conceded that this section must be read in con-
junction with § 203, 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (Supp. IV 1974), which states that the pro-
visions of the Act "are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts 
... to enforce fully ... the Constitution." 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (Supp. IV 1974). See 530 
F.2d at 411 n.12. 
63 530 F.2d at 41 L In particular, the defendants claimed that the district court should 
have adopted the plan submitted by the masters. See note 8 supra. The masters' plan 
contemplated busing for 6,100 fewer students of the 84,000 total student population 
than did the court's plan. See 530 F.2d at 41 L 
64 530 F.2d at 412. Section 203, 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (Supp. IV 1974) is set out in 
relevant part at note 62 supra. 
65 530 F.2d at 412, quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 436. 
42
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/17
§13.4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385 
this language, the court concluded that the Act's restriction on de-
segregation remedies must be read as simply a direction to "guide and 
channel" judicial discretion.66 Having so construed congressional in-
tent, the circuit court had little trouble finding that the district court's 
remedy "reflected the channelling contemplated by the Act."67 
In light of the ambivalent and internally conflicting nature of the 
statutory language,68 the First Circuit's conclusion seems justified. In 
effect, the First Circuit in Morgan has worked an accommodation of 
congressional intent to limit desegregation remedies to the well-settled 
desegregation precedent that has accumulated in the past twenty-three 
years. This handling of the claim is perhaps illustrative of how courts 
would assess the constitutionality of a more forthright anti-busing 
statute. In view of the recurring nature of anti-busing proposals,69 at 
least some sketching of the outlines of the problems with such pro-
posals is appropriate. 
On the surface the constitutionality of an anti-busing statute seems 
to be a simple problem. Court decisions in this area are of constitu-
tional magnitude. Therefore, Congress can respond to them effec-
tively only by considering possible amendments to the Constitution. 
Ordinary legislation would be void under settled principles. 
There are reasons, however, why this analysis may be overly facile. 
Under the Constitution, Congress has control over the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. 70 While constitutional scholars maintain 
that there are limits to any such control, it has not been settled that 
there are limits, much less has it been settled what those limits may 
be.71 Further, Congress has authority to regulate the jurisdiction, rem-
66530 F.2d at 413 . 
• 7Id. 
68 See note 62 supra. 
69 See, e.g., President Ford's proposals for school desegregation, "School Desegrega-
tion Standards and Assistance Act of 1976," reprinted in part in G. GUNTHER. CONSTITU. 
TIONAL LAW AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44-45 (Supp. 1976) and 
W. LOCKHART. Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174-176 (Supp. 1976). 
Two key sections provide for liability and relief: 
Liability: A state or local education agency will be liable for acts of unlawful 
discrimination if committed for the purpose of controlling the composition of thf> 
student population of schools. Relief: The court must limit the remedy to the par-
tic.ular school, if feasible. If unsuccessful, the court may examine the school system 
as affected by the unlawful acts of discrimination. A hearing will be conducted by 
the court to determine the degree of discrimination resulting from the unlawful 
acts. If unlawful discrimination exists the court must state the extent to which the 
relief reflects the unlawful acts. Finally the proposal requires transportation of stu-
dents to be terminated upon completion of a three year period. The court may ex-
tend the remedy if there has not been good faith compliance or in other extra-
ordinary circumstances. 
70 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, d. 2; Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869). 
71 See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 & n.8 (1974). See generally Ratner, Con-
gressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 
(1960); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide To Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973). 
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edies, and indeed the existence of inferior federal courts. 72 Thus, it 
is by no means self-evident that any legislation restricting the circum-
stances in which busing could be required as a remedy would be un-
constitutional. It seems probable that the Supreme Court, if faced 
squarely with the question, would rule that while Congress may reg-
ulate or even forbid a particular court remedy, it may not forbid the 
only remedy that can effectively vindicate a constitutional right in a 
particular case. In practice this might well mean that no anti-busing 
legislation73 would have much more effect than did the 1974 Act in 
Morgan. The main point, however, is that the question is not a simple 
one, and it is not certain how the Supreme Court would respond. 
In determining the constitutionality of such a statute, the Supreme 
Court would also have to take into account the power of Congress 
under section five of the fourteenth amendment to enforce equal pro-
tection by appropriate legislation. 74 It is now settled that Congress, 
legislating pursuant to section five, may require by legislation what 
equal protection of its own force would not require. 75 The Court has 
also indicated, however, in dictum that while Congress has the power 
to enforce equal protection, it may not "dilute" equal protection. 76 It 
may be suggested that an anti-busing proposal would be such a dilu-
tion of equal protection, but it is not inevitable that it be so viewed. 
The Supreme Court, in evaluating the scope of the power of Congress 
under section five, defers to the superior factfinding competency of 
Congress. 77 Congress might, for example, draw conclusions on the de-
gree to which "white flight" frustrates court desegregation plans or 
the extent to which de jure segregation has influenced residential pat-
terns. Congress might also draw conclusions about the empirical valid-
72 See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1, d. 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850); See generally 
Eisenberg, Congressional Autlwrity to Restrict Lower Federal Court jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. j. 
498 (1974). 
73 See note 68 supra. 
74 Section five of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CON ST. 
amend. XIV, § 5. 
75 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966). See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976) (The eleventh amendment 
and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies is limited by the enforcement 
provisions of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment); United States v. New Hampshire, No. 
76-1018 (1st Cir. Aug. 5, 1976). (Reporting requirements of Title VII of Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, are valid 
as to state employees because of the power of Congress under section five of the four-
teenth amendment.) 
76 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966). 
77 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 141 (1970) (Douglas, j., concurring and dissent-
ing); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966); see generally Cohen, Congressional 
Power To Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 602 (1975); Rotunda, 
Congressional Power to Restrict the jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem at 
$chool Busing, 64 GEO. L. J. 839 (1976). 
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ity of the Supreme Court's rule that a substantially segregated school 
system is presumed to be a totally segregated system. 78 Buttressed by 
appropriate factual findings, a statute sharply curtailing transportation 
of students as a required remedy might not be perceived as a dilution 
of equal protection. 
To be sure many of these conclusions are tentative. The point is 
that anti-busing proposals raise questions that go very much to the 
heart of the conflict of competency between the judicial and the polit-
ical departments of the federal government. Arguments that Congress 
can influence events in this area by ordinary legislation are at least 
plausible. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§13.5. Constitutional Law-Mandatory Death Penalty for Rape-
murder: Commonwealth v. O'Neall In December of the Survey year, 
the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Massachusetts mandatory 
death penalty statute for rape-murder2 violated the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.3 In the case leading to the Court's holding with 
respect to the mandatory death penalty, defendant Robert E. O'Neal 
had been found guilty by special verdict of a jury of murder in the 
first degree, as defined in section 1 of chapter 265 of the General 
Laws,4 on the ground that the murder was committed in the course of 
rape.s Pursuant to section 2 of chapter 265,6 the trial judge imposed 
78 See note 44 supra. 
§13.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3502, 339 N.E.2d 676. 
2 G.L. c. 265, § 2 reads in relevant part: 
Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer the punishment of 
death, unless the jury shall by their verdict, and as a part thereof, upon and after 
consideration of all the evidence, recommend that the sentence of death be not 
imposed, in which case he shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
for life. No such recommendation shall be made by ajury or recorded by the court 
if the murder was committed in connection with the commission of rape or an at-
tempt to commit rape. 
The second sentence of section 2 constitutes the mandatory death penalty provision. 
Hereinafter murder committed in connection with the commission of rape or an at-
tempt to commit rape will be referred to as rape-murder in the text. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3502, 339 N.E.2d at 677. 
• G.L. c. 265, § 1 provides in pertinent part: 
Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a 
crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first de-
gree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the sec-
ond degree .... The degree of murder shall be found by the jury. 
• The defendant was indicted on and found guilty of five separate charges: murder 
in the first degree; rape; robbery while being armed; assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon; assault with intent to murder while being armed. On the first de-
gree murder indictment, the jury, by special verdict, found the defendant guilty of 
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the mandatory sentence of death. 7 On appeal to the Supreme Judicial 
Court,8 the defendant, relying heavily on the 1972 United States Su-
preme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia,9 challenged both the con-
viction and the sentence.10 In Furman, the Supreme Court had held 
that the imposition of the death sentence under state statutes giving 
the jury untrammeled discretion to impose the death penalty consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States ConstitutionY O'Neal 
argued that the mandatory death penalty for rape-murder, likewise, 
contravened the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal 
constitution,12 as well as article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights. 13 The gist of defendant's argument was that an impermissible 
murder committed in the commission of armed robbery and murder committed with 
deliberately premeditated malice aforethought as well as murder committed in the 
commission of rape. Main Brief for the Commonwealth at I, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3502, 339 N.E.2d 676. 
6 See note 2 supra for text of G.L. c. 265, § 2. 
71975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1086, 1086,327 N.E.2d 662, 663. 
8 Defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to G.L. c. 278, 
§§ 33 A-H. Main Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh~ 3502, 339 N.E.2d 676. 
• 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1086, 1088,327 N.E.2d at 663, 664. 
11 408 U.S. at 239-40. Although none of the nine Justices set out in detail the state 
statutes under attack, it is clear that the statutes provided for discretionary sentencing 
by the sentencing authority. See ill. at 240, 256 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310-11 
(White, J., concurring). U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states that "Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
The eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments has been found to 
apply to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See 
Louisiana ex. reI. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (Reed, J., announc-
ing judgment of the Court) (dicta). In Francis, Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Vin-
son and Justices Black and Jackson, stated that the "Fourteenth would prohibit by its 
due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner." Id. at 463. In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Frankfurter declined to find the eighth amendment binding on the 
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 468-70. In-
stead, Justice Frankfurter believed that the fourteenth amendment imposed in-
dependent restrictions on a state's right to prescribe punishments: "the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a demand for civilized standards which 
are not defined by the specifically enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 
468. The view of the four Justices in Francis was apparently adopted by a majority of 
the Supreme Court. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (Stewart, 
J., writing the opinion of the Court); id. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
12 Main Brief for Defendant at 45-127, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 1975 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 3502, 339 N .E.2d 676. 
'3Id. at 38-45. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVI provides in full: "No magistrate or court 
of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or 
unusual punishments." 
The defendant urged the Supreme Judicial Court to recognize that article 26, which 
employs the disjunctive form of the phrase, "cruel or unusual punishments," has a dif-
ferent meaning from the eighth amendment phrase, "cruel and unusual punishments." 
Main Brief for Defendant at 39-43, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
3502, 339 N.E.2d 676. The defendant cited People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 
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degree of discretion was inherent in the conviction and sentencing 
process so that the death sentence, although mandatory under the 
state statute, had been arbitrarily imposed on the defendant, in viola-
tion of the Furman holding.14 In the alternative, the defendant as-
serted that the death penalty, whether imposed under a discretionary 
or mandatory sentencing system, was excessively cruel in the constitu-
tional sense. IS 
In Commonwealth v. O'Nea[16 (O'Neal I), decided on April 18, 1975, 
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, but deferred a 
final determination of the constitutionality of the mandatory death 
penalty statute. 17 The justices were unable to achieve a majority for a 
finding that the conviction and sentencing process, although manda-
tory under the statute, involved a degree of discretion forbidden by 
Furman. 18 They also could not reach a consensus on which state 
and/or federal constitutional provisions were appropriate for evaluat-
ing the mandatory death penalty statute.19 Four justices did agree, 
however, that further briefing was necessary on the "question of the 
extent of the Commonwealth's interest in the imposition of the death 
penalty in rape-murder cases."20 
Cal. Rptr. 152,493 P.2d 880 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), in which the Su-
preme Court of California held that capital punishment violated the "cruel or unusual" 
punishment proscription of pt. 1, § 6 of the California constitution. [d. at 654-57, 100 
Cal. Rptr. at 70-71, 493 P.2d at 898-99 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court of 
California based i~ decision in part on the use of the disjunctive phrase in the Califor-
nia constitution which that court found created separate tests of the cruelty and the un-
usualness of the punishment challenged. Id. at 636-37, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58, 493 
P.2d at 885. The California court concluded that capital punishment was both cruel and 
unusual in the constitutional sense. Id. at 654-57,100 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71,493 P.2d at 
898-99. 
14 Main Brief for Defendant at 45-79, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
3502,339 N.E.2d 676. 
15 Id. at 80-127. 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1086,327 N.E.2d 662 [hereinafter cited as O'Neal J]. 
17 /d. at 1093, 1l00-0l, 327 N.E.2d at 664,668-69. 
18 Chief Justice Tauro rejected the defendant's contention that the Massachusetts 
statutory framework embodied in G.L. c. 265, §§ 1, 2, gave the jury discretion to im-
pose the death penalty. These provisions permitted the jury to find the defendant 
guilty of either rape-murder requiring the death sentence, or second degree murder, 
for which no death sentence could be imposed. Chief Justice Tauro opined that a jury, 
which must find the facts upon the evidence presented, may not, if properly instructed, 
exercise discretion in determining whether a defendant committed first or second de-
gree murder. [d. at 1090-93, 327 N.E.2d at 664-66. In contrast, Justice Wilkins, in his 
concurring opinion with whom Justices Kaplan and Hennessey joined, thought that the 
statutory provision allowing the jury to find the degree of murder required "further 
serious consideration as to whether a jury may in its arbitrary discretion return a verdict 
of murder in the second degree." Id. at 1103, 327 N.E.2d at 669. 
Additionally, the Chief Justice refused to accept the defendant's argument that there 
are elements of discretion in a system of mandatory capital punishment such as pros-
ecutorial discretion, plea-bargaining and executive clemency which make that system 
constitutionally defective. Id. at 1092 & n.2, 327 N.E.2d at 665 & n.2. The Chief Justice 
noted that plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion are "necessary aspects of our 
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After supplemental briefing and argument by the parties, Common-
wealth v. O'Nea121 (O'Neal II), the subject of this note, was decided on 
December 22, 1975 on state constitutional grounds. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held: "[t]he mandatory death penalty for murder commit-
ted in the course of rape or attempted rape violates the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and is unconstitutional."22 Four of the seven 
justices on the Court ruled, in separate concurring opinions, that the 
mandatory death penalty for rape-murder ran afoul of the article 26 
prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments.23 Two of the four jus-
tices in the majority also concluded that the mandatory sentence of 
death offended not only article 26, but also the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process as embraced in articles 1, lO and 12 of the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration of RiKhts.24 
criminal justice system and their legality should not be questioned in this regard." [d. 
19 Chief Justice Tauro argued that due process limitations should govern an appraisal 
of the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty statute. [d. at 1096-97 & n.5, 
327 N .E.2d at 667 & n.5, 668. Recognizing the novelty of his due process approach, 
Chief Justice Tauro announced: "We elect ... to adopt an approach free from the 
abundant commentary and exhaustive material surrounding the Eighth Amendment 
route." [d. at 1096, 327 N.E.2d at 667. Justices Wilkins and Kaplan believed that the 
constitutional question should be determined under the eighth amendment ("cruel and 
unusual punishments" clause) and its state constitutional counterpart ("cruel or unusual 
punishments" clause). [d. at 1102, 327 N.E.2d at 669. (Wilkins j., joined by Hennessey, 
Kaplan, j.j., concurring). Justice Hennessey was willing to employ either approach. [d. 
at 1105, 327 N.E.2d at 670 (Hennessey,j., concurring). 
20 [d. at 1102, 327 N.E.2d at 669 (Wilkins j., joined by Hennessey, Kaplan j.j., con-
curring). The Chief Justice called for further briefing on the more limited issue of 
"whether the Commonwealth has a compelling interest which is served by imposition of 
the death penalty in rape-murder cases, and whether such penalty is the least restrictive 
means for furtherance of the Commonwealth's permissible objectives." [d. at 1101, 327 
N.E.2d at 668-69. Justice Reardon, joined by Justices Braucher and Quirico, dissented, 
arguing that the Court should decide the issue on eighth amendment grounds without 
further briefing. [d. at 1106-07, 327 N.E.2d at 670. (Reardon, j., joined by Quirico, 
Braucher, j.J., dissenting). 
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3502,339 N.E.2d 676 [hereinafter cited as O'Neal II.] 
22/d., 339 N.E.2d at 677. 
23 [d. at 3530, 339 N.E.2d at 688 (Tauro, C.j., concurring); id. at 3545, 339 N.E.2d at 
693 (Hennessey, j., concurring); id. at 3548, 339 N.E.2d at 694 (Wilkins, J., concurring 
in the result); id. at 3552, 339 N.E.2d at 696 (Kaplan, j., concurring in the result). 
Justice Braucher failed to reach the constitutional issues but concurred in the result 
on the basis of statutory construction. [d. at 3554, 339 N.E.2d at 696 (Braucher, J., con-
curring in the result). See note 110 infra. Justice Reardon, joined by Justice Quirico, 
registered a strong dissenting opinion. See text at notes 111-29 infra. 
24 [d. at 3530, 339 N.E.2d at 688 (Tauro, C.j., concurring); id. at 3454. 339 N.E.2d at 
693 (Hennessey, j., concurring). MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I provides in full: "All men are 
born free and equal and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among 
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; 
that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and ob-
taining their safety and happiness." 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X provides in pertinent part: "Each individual of the society 
has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, ac-
cording to standing laws .... " 
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Only seven months after the decision in O'Neal II, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its first major opinions on capital punishment 
since Furman. In a series of five cases,25 a plurality of the Supreme 
Court declared two mandatory capital sentencing statutes un-
constitutional26 and three guided discretionary capital sentencing sta-
tutes constitutional27 under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to 
the federal constitution. The Court thus indicated that guided 
discretionary capital sentencing legislation could be compatible with 
the cruel and unusual punishments ban of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
This note will briefly discuss the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion of Furman v. Georgia28 and the Supreme Judicial Court's reaction 
to Furman which set the stage for the O'Neal II decision. Next, both 
the state constitutional standards employed by the four justices in the 
O'Neal II majority and the federal constitutional requirements for 
death penalty legislation, as expressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in the five related death penalty cases decided after O'Neal II 
will be examined. Massachusetts legislation providing for capital sen-
tencing for the crime of murder will then be considered in 
light of these two constitutional hurdles-the state standards 
established in O'Neal II and the federal requirements under the eighth 
amendment.29 Finally, this note will demonstrate that the stringency 
of the O'Neal II tests30 casts doubt on the constitutionality of future 
Massachusetts capital punishment statutes, except where such statutes 
apply only to a few specific murder offenses. 
I. Furman AND THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO Furman IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
In a number of cases prior to Furman, the United States Supreme 
Court had upheld death sentences in the face of constitutional attack 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII provides in pertinent part: 
"And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, 
immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his 
life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." 
25 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct. 197 (1976); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct. 198 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242, rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct. 198 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct. 248 (1976). 
28 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. 
27 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259. 
28 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
29 Although O'Neal II involved a narrowly drawn mandatory death penalty statute, the 
O'Neal II Court introduced state constitutional tests that may be used to judge the con-
stitutionality of discretionary capital sentencing statutes enacted hereafter in Mas-
sachusetts. See text at notes 254-282 infra. 
30 The O'Neal II decision sets forth two tests whereby the constitutionality of the 
mandatory death penalty for rape-murder was judged: a compelling state interest/least 
restrictive means test, see text at notes 77-94 infra, and a substantial public purpose test, 
see text at notes 98-103 infra. 
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on the mode of inflicting the punishment of death,31 and, only one 
year before the Furman decision, the Supreme Court failed to find 
that standardless jury sentencing in capital cases violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.32 In Furman, a five to four 
majority of the United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, vacated three death sentences33 imposed under uncontrolled jury 
discretion statutes.34 The Furman majority held that "the imposition 
and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments."35 However, because the Court was deeply divided in 
its reasoning, each of the nine Justices wrote a separate opinion.36 
31 In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the sentence of death by shooting imposed for the crime of first degree murder 
did not come within the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments. /d. at 134-36. In the case of In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), the Supreme 
Court rejected the petitioner's argument that a New York state statute prescribing the 
mode of execution to be by electrocution violated either the privileges and immunities 
clause or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which the petitioner 
contended prohibited the states from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at 
444-46, 449. Significantly, the Supreme Court said: "Punishments are cruel when they 
involve tortute or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within 
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something in-
human and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Id. at 
447. In Louisiana ex rei. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), Justice Reed, who 
announced the judgment of the Court, declared that a second attempt at execution of 
the petitioner by electrocution, after a mechanical failure prevented consummation of 
the first attempt, would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in the eighth 
amendment sense. Id. at 460-61, 463-64. Justice Reed elaborated by stating: "The 
cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in 
the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method 
employed to extinguish life humanely." Id. at 464. 
32 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971). In McGautha, Justice Harlan, 
writing for the Court, went so far as to announce, in dicta, that "[i)n light of history, 
experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it impossible to 
say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce 
life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." Id. at 207. See 
note 255 irifra. In Crampton v. Ohio, decision reported sub. nom., McGautha v. California, 
402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Supreme Court also decided that a sentencing phase separate 
from a guilt phase in a capital trial was not constitutionally mandated. /d. at 217,220. 
33 The two cases consolidated with Furman were Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. 
Texas. 
34 408 U.S. at 239-40. See text at note 11 supra. Petitioner in Furman was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (as 
in effect prior to July 1, 1969). Petitioner in Jackson was convicted of rape and sen-
tenced to death pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to 
July 1, 1969). Petitioner in Branch was convicted of rape and sentenced to death pur-
suant to TEX. PENAL CODE, Art. 1189 (1961). 408 U.S. at 239. 
3~ Id. at 239-40. The eighth amendment has been applied to the states through the 
fourteenth amendment, see note 11 supra. 
38 The five Justices who concurred in the judgment of the Court were Justices Doug-
las, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist filed separate dissenting opinions. 
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Of the five Justices who concurred in the judgment, three indicated 
that it was the manner of imposing capital punishment under these 
discretionary statutes that created the constitutional defect. 37 Justice 
Douglas, focusing on the disproportionate number of poor and 
minority group members sentenced to death,38 invoked an equal pro-
tection notion to find that the statutes in question violated the eighth 
amendment.39 In this context, Justice Douglas stated that such 
"discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They 
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient 
not compatible with the idea of equal protection that is implicit in the 
ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."49 Similarly, Justice Stewart 
considered the arbitrary application of the death penalty offensive, for 
he found the petitioners "among a capriciously selected random hand-
ful upon which the sentence of death has in fact been imposed .... 
[and] that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate 
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit 
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."41 
Justice White also stressed that the "death penalty is exacted with 
great infrequency . . . and . . . there is no meaningful basis for dis-
tinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases 
in which it is not."42 Because of this infrequency of inflicting the 
death penalty, Justice White further concluded that capital punish-
ment as administered under the statutes in Furman and the consoli-
dated cases did not operate as a deterrent and, hence, did not serve 
the goals of the criminal justice system.43 
Only two of the Furman Justices characterized capital punishment as 
unconstitutional per se. Viewing the basic concept of the eighth 
amendment as that of human dignity,44 Justice Brennan found the 
31 Commentators have debated whether the statutes in Furman and the companion 
cases were held unconstitutional because of actually demonstrated "arbitrariness" in the 
imposition of the death sentence by the sentencing authority or because of the potential 
for arbitrary imposition of the death penalty built into a capital sentencing system which 
gives the sentencing authority unguided discretion in imposing the punishment of 
death. See, e.g., Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1692-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD NOTE]; Comment, 
The Supreme Judicial Court and the Death Penalty: The Effects of Judicial Choice on Legislative 
Options, 54 B.U. L. REV. 158, 162-66 (1974) [hereinafter cited as B.U. COMMENT]. 
38 408 U.S. at 249-52, 250 n.15 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
39/d. at 256-57 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
4°Id. 
u Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, j., concurring). 
42Id. at 313 (White, j., concurring). 
43Id. at 312-14 (White, j., concurring). 
44Id. at 270 (Brennan, j., concurring). Justice Brennan asserted that the Supreme 
Court had "repudiated" the purely "historical" view of the eighth amendment cruel and 
unusual punishments clause, that the only punishments prohibited by the clause were 
those considered torturous at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 266. In-
stead, Justice Brennan emphasized that the meaning of the clause is not "static." Id. at 
269. Drawing from another eighth amendment case, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 
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punishment of death incompatible with four principles underlying the 
cruel and unusual punishments ban: 
Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is 
a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by 
contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to 
believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the 
less severe punishment of imprisonment.45 
Justice Marshall viewed the death penalty as excessive and un-
necessary since it serves no valid legislative goal which could not be 
achieved by lesser penalties. The penalty could not be defended on 
grounds of retribution, deterrence, prevention of recidivism, encour-
agement of guilty pleas, eugenics or reduction of governmental ex-
penditures.46 Furthermore, Justice Marshall believed that capital 
punishment would be morally unacceptable to American citizens if 
they were well-informed on the use and effects of the death penalty.47 
None of the four dissenting Justices, Chief Justice Burger, Justice 
Blackmun, Justice Powell, or Justice Rehnquist, accepted the view that 
capital punishment invariably violates the Consitution,48 or that the 
manner of imposing the capital sentences in Furman offended the 
Constitution.49 All four Justices expressed the opinion that the 
judiciary should not encroach upon the legislative power to set 
punishments for crimes. 50 Three dissenters pointed out, with dis-
approval, that the result of the majority's holding was to invalidate 
the death penalty statutes enacted by 40 jurisdictions-39 states and 
the District of Columbia-and several provisions of the United States 
Code.51 
(1958), in which 4 Justices had determined that loss of citizenship for the offense of de-
sertion was a punishment banned by the cruel and unusual punishments clause, 356 
U.S. at 87, 101-03, Justice Brennan arrived at his vision of the contours of the eighth 
amendment provision: 
At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the inflic-
tion of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must 
treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A 
punishment is "cruel and unusual," therefore, if it does not comport with human 
dignity. 
408 U.S. at 270. 
451d. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
481d. at 342-359 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
47/d. at 360-64 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
<'Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 
433-34 (Powell, J., dissenting); see id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
<9Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see id. at 413-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 
id. at 414-16 (Powell, J., dissenting); see id. at 465-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
50ld. at 404-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id, at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 
465 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
51 /d. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 417-18 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice 
Rehnquist stated that Furman would invalidate the death penalty enactments of at least 
forty states. Id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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The discretionary sentencing provision of section 2 of chapter 265 
of the General Laws52 was among those state statutes expressly placed 
in constitutional jeopardy by the Furman decision. 53 For example, in 
Stewart v. Massachusetts,54 a per curiam opinion issued on the same day 
as the Furman decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of 
the Supreme Judicial Court affirming the death sentence of appellant 
Stewart.55 Stewart had been convicted of murder in the first degree by 
a jury which failed to recommend that the sentence of death not be 
imposed under the discretionary sentencing provision of section 2 of 
chapter 265.56 The Supreme Court cited Furman as authority for its 
finding that the imposition of the death penalty in the Stewart case 
would be violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the 
federal constitution. 57 
While the Furman holding expressly passed on the constitutionality 
of certain discretionary death penalty statutes, it did not affect the 
constitutionality of mandatory death penalty statutes, a question that 
none of the three Justices who joined Justices Brennan and Marshall 
to form the majority in Furman passed on directly.58 However, in 
dicta, Justice Douglas questioned the constitutionality of such statutes 
stating: 
Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be applied in 
such a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Such conceivably might be the fate of a man-
datory death penalty, where equal or lesser sentences were im-
posed on the elite, a harsher one on the minorities or members of 
the lower castes. Whether a mandatory death penalty would 
otherwise be constitutional is a question I do not reach. 59 
52 See note 2 supra, for text of G.L. c. 265 § 2. The first sentence of section 2 consti-
tutes the discretionary sentencing provision. 
53 Immediately following the Furman decision, the Supreme Court vacated the death 
sentences of defendants imposed under the statutes of twenty-six states. See HARVARD 
NOTE, supra note 37, at 1690. 
54 408 U.S. 845 (1972). 
55Id. 
56 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 359 Mass. 671, 672, 675-76, 270 N.E.2d 811, 812, 814 
(1971). 
51 408 U.S. at 845. While the Court did not explicitly state it, presumably, the Su-
preme Court in citing Furman, was indicating that the Massachusetts discretionary capi-
tal sentencing provision suffered from similar constitutional inadequacies as did the 
statutes invalidated in Furman. 
58 Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion in Furman, forecast that state legisla-
tures might react to the Court's decision by enacting mandatory death penalty statutes. 
408 U.S. at 400-01 (Burger, C.j., dissenting). See HARVARD NOTE. supra note 37, at 
1699-1712, which describes the different kinds of statutory schemes embodying capital 
sentencing enacted by twenty-eight states after Furman. Fourteen states were reported as 
having adopted mandatory death penalty statutes following the Funnan decision. Id. at 
1710. 
5' 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, j., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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Justice Stewart, in noting that a few legislatures had enacted manda-
tory death penalty statutes for narrowly defined categories of crime, 
specified the Massachusetts law requiring the death sentence for any-
one convicted of rape-murder as an example. However, he left no 
doubt that had such a statute been under consideration, the Court 
would have been confronted with a different issue-the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty "for all crimes and under all circumstances."6o 
Justice White also agreed that the "facial constitutionality of statutes 
requiring the imposition of the death penalty for first-degree murder, 
for more narrowly defined categories of murder, or for rape would 
present quite different issues under the Eighth Amendment than are 
posed by the cases before US."61 Furman and Stewart, therefore, had 
the effect of nullifying the discretionary sentencing provision of sec-
tion 2 of chapter 265 of the General Laws, but left untouched the 
mandatory sentencing provision for rape-murder. 
Responding to the commands of Furman and Stewart, the Supreme 
Judicial Court overturned the death sentence as prohibited by the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments in cases where the sentence had 
been imposed under the discretionary jury provision of section 2 of 
chapter 265.62 In Commonwealth v. LeBlanc,63 the defendant had been 
convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death before 
the Supreme Court's decision in Furman. On appeal after Furman, the 
Supreme Judicial Court determined that: "In the light of the Furman 
case the Commonwealth agrees that the defendant's present sentence, 
which has been stayed, may not remain. The defendant is entitled to 
be resentenced to life imprisonment."64 In the more recent case of 
Commonwealth v. Harrington,65 the Supreme Judicial Court confirmed 
that a death sentence could not be imposed pursuant to section 2 of 
chapter 265 for a first degree murder committed after the Furman de-
cision.66 However, the Court exempted from its holding sentencing 
under the provision requiring the death penalty for murder commit-
ted in connection with rape.67 
60 [d. at 307 (Stewart, j., concurring). 
6'1d. at 311 (White, j., concurring). 
62 Two commentaries that discuss the interpretation of Furman v. Georgia by the Su-
preme Judicial Court are B.U. COMMENT. supra note 37; Note, The Death Penalty in Mas-
sachusetts, 8 SUFF. L. REv. 632,647-52 (1974). 
63 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091,299 N.E.2d 719. 
64 [d. at 1104-05, 299 N.E.2d at 726-27 . 
.. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 447, 323 N.E.2d 895. 
66 [d. at 461-62, 323 N.E.2d at 901. In Harrington, the Commonwealth had argued 
and the trial judge ruled that Furman nullified the jury discretionary sentencing provi-
sion so that a mandatory death penalty remained. [d. at 459, 323 N.E.2d at 900. The 
Supreme Judicial Court rejected this construction of the statute, and consequently, 
found no need to consider the constitutional questions raised with respect to a manda-
tory death penalty. [d. at 459-62, 323 N.E.2d at 900-01. 
67 [d. at 462, 323 N.E.2d at 901. The Court indicated that the question of sentencing 
for the crime of rape-murder had not been presented in the Harrington case. [d. 
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Commonwealth v. A juvenile 68 gave the Supreme Judicial Court an in-
itial opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the mandatory 
death penalty for rape-murder in light of Furman. In juvenile, the 
defendant, who was under 17 at the time of commission of the crime 
and under 18 at the time of sentencing, was convicted on separate in-
dictments of murder and rape.69 The mandatory sentence of death 
was imposed by the trial court under section 2 of chapter 265 for the 
murder conviction and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed 
by the jury for the rape conviction. 70 The Supreme Judicial Court af-
firmed the sentence of life imprisonment for rape, but reduced the 
death sentence to life imprisonment,71 reasoning that the trial judge 
had been given sentencing discretion, which discretion was forbidden 
by the federal constitution under Furman. Because of the defendant's 
age, the trial judge theoretically had the option of adjudicating the 
defendant's case under statutes providing for special procedures in 
juvenile cases,72 rather than sentencing him under the mandatory 
death penalty statute.73 Injuvenile, the Court explicitly reserved for a 
later case the question of the constitutionality of the mandatory death 
penalty for rape-murder when imposed on an adult. 74 This question 
was squarely presented in Commonwealth v. O'Neal. 
II. Commonwealth v. O'Neal: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR 
JUDGING THE MASSACHUSETTS MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY FOR 
RAPE-MURDER. 
O'Neal II showed a sharply divided Supreme Judicial Court able to 
muster a majority only for the proposition that the mandatory death 
penalty imposed on a defendant convicted of rape-murder in accord-
ance with section 2 of chapter 265 of the General Laws violated the 
68 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1199, 300 N.E.2d 439. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile is the 
subject of B.U. COMMENT. supra note 37. 
69 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1199, 1202,300 N.E.2d at 439,441. 
7°Id. at 1199, 300 N.E.2d at 439-40. The text of G.L. c. 265, § 2 is set out at note 2 
supra. 
7 1 Id. at 1204-05, 300 N .E.2d at 442. 
72 Under G.L. c. 119, § 83, the superior court was given the discretion to adjudicate a 
convicted person, under the age of eighteen at the time of sentencing. as a delinquent 
child according to G.L. c. 119, § 58, which permits the court upon adjudging the child a 
delinquent to place the case on file, or place the delinquent child in a probation of-
ficer's care or in the custody of the youth services department. 
73 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1203-04, 300 N.E.2d at 441-42. The defendant had initially 
argued that the death penalty violated article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights. Main Brief for Defendant at 19-25, Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 1973 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1199, 300 N.E.2d 439. However, the Court called for supplemental briefs and 
argument on the constitutional validity of discretion given to the trial judge under the 
Juvenile Code. The Court, thus, bypassed the state constitutional issue. See B.U. COM-
MENT.supra note 37, at 166-67. 
74 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1204, 300 N.E.2d at 442. 
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cruel or unusual punishments prohibition of the state constitution.75 
In basing its decision solely on state constitutional grounds, the major-
ity in O'Neal II was free to fashion independent state standards for de-
termining the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for 
rape-murder. 76 Although four justices arrived at the same conclusion, 
that the mandatory capital sentencing provision was constitutionally 
infirm, the Justices were unable to agree on the constitutional stan-
dard to be utilized for determining whether the mandatory death 
penalty statute was unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. 
Chief Justice Tauro, in an opinion with which Justice Hennessey 
agreed in both result and reasoning, viewed the question of the con-
stitutionality of the mandatory death penalty statute for rape-murder 
as involving considerations under the due process guarantees,77 as 
well as under the cruel or unusual punishments prohibition,78 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In this context, the Chief Justice 
reasoned that the two constitutional provisions aligned to the point of 
merging and that a compelling state interest standard should there-
fore be employed. 79 Quoting in part from Justice Marshall's opinion 
in Furman, Chief Justice Tauro explained: 
This dual analysis is possible here where these two concepts are 
"so close as to merge" because the "due process argument re-
iterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause ... -i.e., punishment may not be 
more severe than is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of 
the State."80 
Under the due process prong of the Chief Justice's analysis, he 
stated that: 
In order to be sustained against a due process challenge, a stat-
ute affecting fundamental rights must be shown to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest .... "[AJ heavy burden of justifica-
tion is on the State .... " Additionally, it must be shown that the 
75 Only two Justices, not a majority, found that the mandatory death penalty statute 
violated the due process guarantees of the state constitution. See text and notes at notes 
81-83 and 95 infra. 
76 Chief Justice Tauro underscored that the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation 
of the state constitution in O'Neal II would be final and could not be contested in the 
federal court system. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3535, 339 N.E.2d at 690. The Chief Jus-
tice cited the Supreme Court case of Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 
552-55, 558-59 (1940), in which Justice Douglas discussed the principle of federalism, 
that state courts should not be interfered with in determining the meaning of their re-
spective state constitutions. [d. at 557. 
77 See text and note at note 24 supra. 
78 See note 13 supra. 
79 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3504-05, 3507, 330 N.E.2d at 677-79. 
80 [d. at 3504-05, 339 N.E.2d at 677, quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 359-60 
n.141 (Marshall,]., concurring). 
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statutory scheme is the least onerous means of reaching the com-
pelling goal.81 
The Chief Justice grounded his due process analysis in the belief that 
life is a fundamental right.82 Since the imposition of the mandatory 
death penalty for rape-murder would entail the extinction of that 
fundamental right, the Chief Justice found that strict judicial scrutiny 
was appropriate for reviewing the constitutionality of the sentence of 
death as required by section 2 of chapter 265.83 Accordingly, the in-
quiry under the compelling state interest and least restrictive means 
tests was whether the penal goals of the mandatory death penalty, 
which penalty infringes the fundamental right to life, could be 
achieved as effectively by the lesser punishment of life imprisonment. 
Under the cruel or unusual punishments prong of his analysis,84 
Chief Justice Tauro announced that the standard was likewise that of 
compelling state interest: 
In order to uphold the constitutionality of punishment which· 
inflicts such suffering and absolutely extinguishes all rights, the 
State must advance a substantial justification to demonstrate that 
the penalty of death is not disproportionate or unnecessary and is 
not, thus, cruel in a constitutional sense. I believe that the re-
quired showing is that of compelling State interest.85 
The stringent standard of compelling state interest was appropriate to 
review the mandatory death penalty because, as Chief Justice Tauro 
reasoned, death is a qualitatively different kind of punishment from 
punishments involving monetary penalties and incarceration. The 
death penalty entails an immeasurable degree of physical pain and ex-
treme mental suffering as well as the extinguishment of all human 
rights of the capital offender.86 Thus, where the punishment is a re-
straint on liberty or a fine, the Chief Justice stated, the sentenced de-
fendant bears the heavy burden of showing that the punishment is 
disproportionate to his crime.87 However, the burden of sustaining a 
81 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3505, 339 N.E.2d at 678, quoting from Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). 
82 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3506,339 N.E.2d at 678. 
83Id. 
84 Chief Justice Tauro made it clear that the majority in O'Neal II did not base its de-
cision on the use of the disjunctive article "or" in the cruel or unusual punishments 
clause of article 26. See note 13 supra. The Chief Justice noted that the Supreme Judi-
cial Court had in the past employed the disjunctive phrase, cruel or unusual punish-
ments, interchangeably with the conjunctive phrase, cruel and unusual punishments, 
used in the eighth amendment. He also did not distinguish the word "cruel" in meaning 
from the word "unusual" for purposes of his constitutional argument. Id. at 3508 n.4, 
339 N.E.2d at 679 n.4. 
85Id. at 3511-12,339 N.E.2d at 681 (citations omitted). 
86Id. at 3510-11,339 N.E.2d at 680. 
87/d. at 3510, 339 N .E.2d at 680. 
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legislative judgment to enact a mandatory death penalty statute rests 
with the state.88 
Having found compelling state interest to be the appropriate stan-
dard under both a due process and "cruel or unusual" analysis, the 
Chief Justice proceeded to determine that the Commonwealth had not 
advanced adequate justification for retention of the mandatory death 
penalty for rape-murder. 89 In making this determination, the Chief 
Justice found that the punishment of life imprisonment was a less re-
strictive means of serving the state's interests. First, the evidence that 
capital punishment, either discretionary or mandatory, serves as a 
more effective deterrent than life imprisonment was found by the 
Chief Justice to be "equivocal."9o Secondly, the sentence of life im-
prisonment adequately isolates and incapacitates the capital offender 
so that the death penalty is not necessary to serve the penal purpose 
of isolationlincapacitation.91 Finally, retribution and moral reinforce-
ment do not require a capital sanction and, in Chief Justice Tauro's 
88 [d. at 3511-12,339 N.E.2d at 681. 
89 [d. at 3529-30, 339 N.E.2d at 687-88. The Chief Justice stated: "The Common-
wealth has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that, in pursuing its legitimate 
objectives, it has chosen means which do not unnecessarily impinge on the fundamental 
right to life." [d. 
90 [d. at 3522-23, 339 N.E.2d at 685. Canvassing the vast array of studies and reports 
on the deterrent effect of capital punishment, the Chief Justice found that legislative 
commissions, including the special commission established by the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture in 1967 to study the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent to crime, and 
criminologists and experts generally had concluded that the death penalty was not an 
effective deterrent. [d. at 3514-18, 339 N.E.2d at 682-83. Chief Justice Tauro noted that 
most of the information available on the deterrent effect of capital punishment related 
to the discretionary rather than the mandatory use of the death penalty. /d. at 3518, 
339 N.E.2d at 683. However, the Chief Justice cited one recent study concluding that 
there is no indication that mandatory capital punishment is a superior deterrent of 
homicidal offenses than is the discretionary death penalty. [d. Chief Justice Tauro 
found no empirical support for the contention that police officers are safer in jurisdic-
tions that retain capital punishment. [d. at 3520, 339 N.E.2d at 684. The one report, 
the "Erhlich" study, Erhlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life 
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975), noted by the Chief Justice as supporting the 
proposition that capital punishment has a deterrent effect, has been criticized for its 
methodology and results. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3521 & n.15, 339 N.E.2d at 684 & 
n.15. See note 283 infra for a listing of recent articles discussing Erhlich's work concern-
ing capital punishment as a deterrent. Chief Justice Tauro also rejected the subjective 
statements of offenders who had been apprehended as a reliable basis for finding the 
death penalty an effective deterrent. /d. at 3521-22, 339 N.E.2d at 684-85. 
91 [d. at 3523-26, 339 N.E.2d at 685-86. Chief Justice Tauro emphasized that effective 
management of pardon and parole systems as well as custody and incarceration in 
prison can operate to protect society from murderers and, in particular, rape-
murderers. He mentioned that special measures may be taken in respect to rape-
murderers who may be more uncontrollable and thus more dangerous to society. /d. at 
3523-25, 339 N.E.2d at 685-86. He added that incapacitating rather than executing the 
murderer keeps the offender available should his conviction be reversed. [d. at 3526 
n.18, 339 N.E.2d at 686 n.18. 
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view, could not solely justify imposing the death penalty.92 
The Chief Justice took care to restrict his finding of un-
constitutionality to the statute at hand, which statute mandated the 
death sentence for rape-murder. In a footnote, he indicated that "he 
would not intend to foreclose the Commonwealth from enacting any 
statute authorizing the death penalty."93 He also declared, however, 
that a future legislative enactment embodying a death penalty would 
be measured by the compelling state interest and least restrictive 
means tests. 94 
In a brief separate concurring opinion, Justice Hennessey registered 
his agreement with Chief Justice Tauro that the mandatory death 
penalty for rape-murder violated both the due process and cruel or 
unusual punishment provisions of the state constitution under the 
compelling state interest test.95 Justice Hennessey seemed to suggest 
that, because the punishment of death had not been inflicted in Mas-
sachusetts in more than 25 years, it was unlikely that the state con-
stitution would currently permit resumption of executions, at least as 
punishment for the crime of rape-murder.96 Significantly, Justice 
Hennessey concluded that a death penalty for some categories of 
murder, such as murder in connection with kidnapping or acts of ter-
rorism, might pass the test of compelling state interest and thus be 
constitutional. 97 
The other two majority justices, Justices Wilkins and Kaplan, unlike 
Chief Justice Tauro and Justice Hennessey, regarded the article 26 
ban on cruel or unusual punishments as the only appropriate provi-
sion of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights for determining the 
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for rape-murder. 98 
921d. at 3526-29, 339 N.E.2d at 686-87. The Commonwealth argued that its legiti-
mate interest in preserving the "social compact" required that a punishment be pro-
portionate to the offense. But Chief Justice Tauro, although conceding that the most 
grave crimes must be punished most seriously, declined to accept moral reprobation as 
a reason for a punishment as severe as that of death. /d. at 3526-27, 339 N .E.2d at 
686-87. Quoting directly from Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), that retribu-
tion "is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law," id. at 248, Chief Justice 
Tauro specifically declared that retribution "cannot act as the sole justification for a 
particular penalty." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3528, 339 N.E.2d at 687. The contention 
that capital punishment prevents vigilantism among the citizenry was also rejected by 
the Chief Justice because of lack of evidence that the punishment of imprisonment 
rather than death encourages acts of private vengence. Id. at 3528-29, 339 N.E.2d at 
687 . 
• 3Id. at 3530 n.23, 339 N.E.2d at 688 n.23 . 
• </d. 
9'ld. at 3545,339 N.E.2d at 693. 
96 Justice Hennessey noted that no one had been executed in the Commonwealth be-
tween 1947 and 1972 when Furman was decided, and that the death sentences of 25 
persons had been either reduced by the executive or commuted during the terms of 
seven different Governors.ld. at 3546, 339 N.E.2d at 694. 
971d. at 3546-47, 339 N.E.2d at 694. 
961d. at 3548, 339 N.E.2d at 694 (Wilkins, j., concurring in the result); id. at 3552, 
339 N.E.2d at 696 (Kaplan, j., concurring in the result). 
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In an opinion with which Justice Kaplan agreed in both substance and 
result, Justice Wilkins introduced a substantial public purpose stan-
dard for evaluating the death penalty under article 26. According to 
Justice Wilkins' analysis, the sentence of death must be shown by the 
state to serve a substantial public purpose that cannot be achieved by a 
sentence of life imprisonment.99 Justice Wilkins' substantial public 
purpose standard may arguably not have required the same degree of 
showing by the Commonwealth if use of the term "substantial" is re-
garded as calling for a lesser showing than does the term "compel-
ling." Justice Wilkins, however, did not indicate that his standard was 
either different in content or less stringent than that of Chief Justice 
Tauro, and Justice Wilkins' test, like the test enunciated by the Chief 
Justice, put the onus on the state to demonstrate a need for imposing 
the sentence of death. loo 
Drawing on the opinion of Chief Justice Tauro, Justice Wilkins 
found that deterrence would be the likely basis for sustaining the 
death penalty if it could be sustained at all. lOl Murder in the course of 
kidnapping or holding a hostage or murder by anyone already con-
victed of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment were proposed 
by Justice Wilkins as examples of crimes for which the threat of death 
might achieve the purpose of deterrence. According to Justice Wil-
kins, however, the Commonwealth had not demonstrated that the po-
tential perpetrator of rape-murder could be effectively deterred by a 
threat of the death sentence and, therefore, had not shown that the 
mandatory death penalty for rape-murder fulfilled any substantial 
public purpose.102 In a footnote, Justice Wilkins reiterated Chief Jus-
tice Tauro's belief that retribution alone could not justify the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in the instant case.103 
Neither Chief Justice Tauro nor Justice Wilkins pointed to any di-
rect sources in Massachusetts case law interpreting the article 26 ban 
on cruel or unusual punishments for their respective compelling state 
interest and substantial public purpose tests. Both justices indicated 
that they took an expansive view of article 26. 104 In a footnote, the 
DDld. at 3548-49, 339 N.E.2d at 694-95 (Wilkins, j., concurring in the result). 
loold. at 3549, 339 N.E.2d at 695 (Wilkins, j., concurring in the result). Justice Kap-
lan went beyond Justice Wilkins' opinion in two respects. Justice Kaplan believed that if 
a death penalty statute for a particular homicidal offense could be shown to be a more 
effective deterrent than life imprisonment, the statute would still be subject to other 
constitutional inquiries: (I) whether it is imposed in a discriminatory fashion, and (2) 
"whether, judged by evolved standards, the penalty itself is not so brutal and brutalizing 
as to be proscript." Id. at 3552-53, 339 N.E.2d at 696 (Kaplan, j., concurring in the re-
sult). 
1011d. at 3550, 339 N.E.2d at 695 (Wilkins, j., concurring in the result). 
I02Id. 
103/d. at 3549 n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 695 n.2. 
104 Both Chief Justice Tauro and Justice Wilkins cited the same United States Su-
preme Court cases interpreting the eighth amendment to support their expansive read-
ing of article 26.ld. at 3512 n.10, 339 N.E.2d at 681 n.10 (Tauro, C.J., concurring); id. 
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Chief Justice explained that the Supreme Judicial Court had assumed 
in the 1901 case of Storti v. Commonwealth 105 that the death penalty was 
constitutional under article 26. 106 In Storti, Chief Justice Holmes 
found that the punishment of death by means of electrocution im-
posed on a defendant convicted of murder was not cruel or unusual 
within the meaning of article 26. 107 Chief Justice Tauro announced, 
however, that the Court was not bound by the decision in Storti "be-
cause art. 26, like the Eighth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, must be interpreted progressively."108 Justice Wilkins ex-
pressed a similar notion when he stated that "[t]he application of con-
stitutional principles is not immutable, and criminal penalties thought 
appropriate in 1780 are no longer accepted in our society."109 Using 
new standards for judging the constitutionality of the mandatory 
death penalty statute under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
was, thus, justified by the majority justices as required by changing 
societal values. 
In his dissenting opinion in O'Neal II, Justice Reardon, who was 
joined by Justice Quirico,llo rejected both Chief Justice Tauro's due 
process analysis and the O'Neal II majority's standards under the state 
cruel or unusual punishments clause. He believed that traditional fed-
at 3551, 339 N.E.2d at 696 (Wilkins, j. concurring). The cases cited by the Justices were 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In 
Trop, four members of the Supreme Court found that denationalization of the peti-
tioner upon conviction by a military court martial for desertion during wartime consti-
tuted a cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment. 356 U.S. 
at 87, 101-03. Chief Justice Warren, who announced the judgment of the Court, de-
scribed his expansive view of the eighth amendment: "[Tlhe words of the Amendment 
are not precise, and ... their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety." [d. at 100-01. In Weems, the Court ruled unconstitutional a punishment imposed 
under Philippine law for the offense of falsification of a public document. The punish-
ment consisted of hard labor in ankle chains for at least 12 years and a day and civil 
disabilities for life. 217 U.s. at 362-66, 377. Speaking of the constitutional prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments, the Court stated: "The clause of the Constitu-
tion in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is 
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en-
lightened by a humane justice." [d. at 378. 
105 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901). 
106 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3512 n.l0, 339 N.E.2d at 681 n.lO. 
107 178 Mass. at 552-55, 60 N .E. at 210. 
108 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3512 n.lO, 339 N.E.2d at 681 n.l0 (Tauro, C.j., concur-
ring). See note 104 supra. 
109 [d. at 3551,339 N.E.2d at 696 (Wilkins, j., concurring in the result). 
110 Justice Braucher failed to reach the constitutional questions but concurred in the 
result on the basis of statutory construction. He found a "clear statutory direction that 
rape-murder cases be treated like other cases in which no jury recommendation is 
made," id; at 3557, 339 N.E.2d at 697, for which after Furman the only permissible 
punishment was life imprisonment. [d. at 3554-59, 339 N.E.2d at 697. Justice Braucher 
indicated that he was in agreement with Justice Reardon on the constitutional questions. 
!d. at 3554,339 N.E.2d at 696. 
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eral eighth amendment standards should govern a determination of 
the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for rape-
murder. ll1 
Justice Reardon rejected the due process approach as constitution-
ally incorrect. 112 The due process analysis of Chief Justice Tauro, Jus-
tice Reardon pointed out, was designed to demonstrate that the man-
datory death penalty for rape-murder could not withstand a constitu-
tional attack under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.ua But, according to Justice 
Reardon, the due process clause limits a state's power to prescribe 
punishments only because it is through that clause that the eighth 
amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is applied 
to the states.114 Thus, Justice Reardon determined that the due pro-
cess clause does not, as the Chief Justice believed, embody a "second, 
independent substantive limitation on punishments," in addition to 
the cruel and unusual punishments prohibition.us 
Justice Reardon also found Chief Justice Tauro's "fundamental 
rights" analysis under the state due process provision inappropriate. 
Justice Reardon noted that, although Chief Justice Tauro spoke of the 
right to life as fundamental, the Chief Justice had not cited any cases 
to demonstrate that the Supreme Court had treated the right to life as 
a fundamental right for purposes of triggering the compelling state 
interest or least restrictive means tests.116 Therefore, Justice Reardon 
thought strict judicial scrutiny of the mandatory death penalty was 
improper.1l7 By engaging in strict scrutiny of the mandatory death 
penalty statute, Justice Reardon contended, the Court was invading 
the province of the Legislature. In this context, Justice Reardon rea-
soned that the Legislature was the appropriate body "to make an em-
pirical judgment about the efficacy of the death penalty as compared 
to life sentences in serving the various goals of the criminallaw."118 
11l1d. at 3578-79, 339 N.E.2d at 705 (Reardon, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 3566,339 N.E.2d at 700. 
IIsld. at 3565, 339 N.E.2d at 700. 
IHld. at 3566-67,339 N.E.2d at 700-01. 
1I51d. at 3567, 339 N.E.2d at 701. 
IIBld. at 3570-71, 339 N.E.2d at 702. The cases cited by Chief Justice Tauro in O'Neal 
I to support his view that the right to life is fundamental were Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 462 (1938) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
117 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3570-71, 339 N.E.2d at 702. 
IIBld. at 3573-74, 339 N.E.2d at 703. Apparently, Justice Reardon thought the Court 
should steer clear of making the kind of factual determinations involved in selecting an 
appropriate punishment to fulfill the various penological goals. These determinations 
and the fixing of appropriate punishments were best accomplished through study and 
debate of the Legislature. Id. at 3573, 339 N.E.2d at 703. Justice Quirico echoed the 
view that fixing the punishment of death for the crime of rape-murder was a "matter of 
legislative judgment and policy," in his dissenting opinion in the case of Commonwealth 
v. Tarver, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3591, 3619, 345 N.E.2d 671, 682-83, another rape-
murder case decided on the same day as O'Neal 1/, wherein the Supreme Judicial Court 
vacated the defendant's death sentence on the authority of O'Neal II. /d. at 3614, 345 
N .E.2d at 681. 
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Justice Reardon also disagreed with the majority view that the state 
cruel or unusual punishments provision encompassed more restrictive 
standards for evaluating the death penalty than its federal eighth 
amendment counterpart. Justice Reardon saw the eighth amendment 
as setting the boundary for permissible punishments. Reviewing the 
Massachusetts cases decided under article 26,119 Justice Reardon main-
tained that "there is nothing in our case law which suggests that art. 
26 imposes a more rigorous limitation on punishments than the 
Eighth Amendment. Indeed, if anything, art. 26 imposes less restric-
tion on possible punishments."12o 
Having decided that the eighth amendment was the appropriate 
constitutional provision for evaluating the Commonwealth's death 
penalty statute and that article 26 did not require a more restrictive 
analysis, Justice Reardon stated that eighth amendment case law did 
not outlaw a mandatory death penalty as a cruel and unusual 
punishment for a number of reasons. First, Justice Reardon read 
Furman as not forbidding a mandatory death penalty statute for the 
crime of murder primarily because three of the five Justices who 
formed the Furman majority refused to consider whether a statute 
mandating capital punishment would offend the eighth amend-
ment.l2l Secondly, Justice Reardon looked to the historical back-
ground of the eighth amendment and concluded that the amendment 
was designed to eliminate tortures, not capital punishment,122 and to 
preclude the imposition of punishments not authorized by statutory 
law.123 In this context, Justice Reardon noted that capital punishment 
was commonly imposed at the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion.124 In addition, Justice Reardon stated that the eighth amend-
ment had been interpreted to prohibit a punishment that is dis-
proportionate to the o ffe_nse . Although he denied approving of a 
"life-for-a-life" morality, Justice Reardon regarded the penalty of 
death as not grossly out of proportion to the crime of murder for 
which it was imposed.125 Justice Reardon also pointed out that, 
although the eighth amendment has been construed as prohibiting 
punishments that involve the infliction of excessive or unnecessary 
pain, he did not view the death penalty for rape-murder as un-
necessarily cruel merely because a sentence of life imprisonment could 
119 Commonwealth v. Moore, 359 Mass. 509, 269 N.E.2d 636 (1971); Harding v. 
Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 369, 186 N.E.556 (1933); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 
Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874 (1899); Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 33 N.E. 
648 (1893); Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray 482 (1855). 
120 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3578, 339 N.E.2d at 705. (Reardon, j., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original). 
12Ild. at 3580-81, 339 N.E.2d at 705-06. See text and notes at notes 58-61 supra. 
"'ld. at 3584-85, 339 N.E.2d at 706-07. (Reardon, j., dissenting). 
123Id. at 3586, 339 N.E.2d at 707. 
124Id. at 3585, 339 N.E.2d at 707. 
125ld. at 3587, 339 N.E.2d at 707-08. 
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fulfill the same penal purposes. To so conclude, Justice Reardon con-
tended, would overlook retribution as a permissible goal of punish-
ment and, further, would constitute a rejection of the possibility that 
the threat of death is a more effective deterrent than life imprison-
ment. 126 Lastly, Justice Reardon focused on the eighth amendment 
concern that a punishment comport with "contemporary standards of 
decency."127 The divided public opinion on the issue of the retention 
of the death penalty demonstrated to Justice Reardon that capital 
punishment was not repugnant to current concepts of decency.128 
Stressing that the Court should not perform legislative functions, Jus-
tice Reardon concluded that the mandatory death penalty for rape-
murder was not banned by either the eighth amendment or article 
26.129 
Both the compelling state interest and substantial public purpose 
standards set forth by the O'Neal II majority are empirical in nature 
for they both call for· an evidentiary showing in the form of penologi-
calor sociological information, or at least factual or legislative find-
ings, to support the use of the death penalty for a specific homicidal 
offense. 13o Significantly, both standards require a demonstration that 
there is a relationship between the nature of the punishment and the 
purposes of imposing that punishment. In this respect, the O'Neal II 
standards signal a departure from traditional article 26 and eighth 
amendment standards for appraising the constitutionality of punish-
ments. 
O'Neal II clearly represents a departure from the traditional state 
constitutional standards used to determine whether a punishment is 
cruel or unusual. In Storti v. Commonwealth/ 31 a 1901 decision un-
questioned until O'Neal I and II, the Supreme Judicial Court assumed 
that the death penalty for the crime of murder did not offend the 
cruel or unusual punishments prohibition of article 26. 132 Moreover, 
the compelling state interest and substantial public purpose tests were 
not recognized as the appropriate standards for judging punishments 
under the cruel or unusual punishments clause of article 26, as evi-
denced by rulings of the Supreme Judicial Court for over three quar-
126Id. at 3587-88, 339 N.E.2d at 708. 
127Id. at 3588-89,339 N.E.2d at 708. 
128Id. at 3589, 339 N.E.2d at 708. Justice Reardon took judicial notice of the re-
sponse of the Massachusetts voters to a question which appeared on the ballot in the 
1968 general election, "Shall the commonwealth of Massachusetts retain the death pen-
alty for crime?" Out of 2,348,005 ballots cast, 1,159,348 voted "Yes," 730,649 voted 
"No," and the remaining 458,008 were left blank. Id. at 3589 & n.l, 339 N.E.2d at 708 
& n.1. (Reardon, J., dissenting). 
129Id. at 3589-90, 339 N.E.2d at 708. 
130 See id. at 3513-30, 339 N.E.2d at 681-88 (Tauro, C.J., concurring); id. at 3549-50, 
339 N.E.2d at 695 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result). 
131 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901). 
132Id. at 553-54,60 N.E. at 210-1 L See text at notes 105-08 supra. 
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ters of a century. For example, in both the 1899 case of McDonald v. 
Commonwealth 133 and the 1973 case of Commonwealth v. Morrow,134 the 
Supreme Judicial Court evaluated the cruelty or unusualness of a 
punishment by considering whether the punishment was dis-
proportionate to the offense.135 
The compelling state interest and substantial public purpose tests 
also differ from those standards traditionally referred to in United 
States Supreme Court cases decided under the eighth amendment 
prior to the Furman decision.136 The pre-Furman standards included: a 
tortures standard-that the punishment must not be in the nature of 
a torture, or inhuman or barbarous;137 a proportionality test-that the 
punishment be graduated or proportionate to the offense;138 a neces-
sity or excessiveness test-that the punishment not entail unnecessary 
pain139 or be excessive;140 and a human dignity standard-that the 
punishment meet civilized standards, and thereby not be degrading to 
human dignity.14l Furthermore, prior to Furman, capital punishment 
was assumed to be compatible with the federal constitution. 142 In 
Louisiana ex rei. Francis v. Resweber,143 the Supreme Court permitted a 
second attempt at electrocution of the petitioner, after the first at-
tempt failed to be consummated due to a mechanical failure. Justice 
Reed, in announcing the judgment of the Court, stated that the 
cruelty prohibited by the eighth amendment was that "inherent in the 
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any 
method employed to extinguish life humanely."144 In Furman, 145 when 
133 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874 (1899). 
134 363 Mass. 601, 296 N.E.2d 468 (1973). 
135 McDonald, 173 Mass. at 328, 53 N.E. at 875. Morrow, 363 Mass. at 61O-11, 296 
N.E.2d at 476. 
138 In only three cases, prior to Furman, did the United States Supreme Court strike 
down a punishment as cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment. Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910). See Goldberg & Dershowitz, De-
claring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1777-78 (1970). 
137 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890). 
138 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 380-81 (1910). 
139 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947). 
14. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910). 
141 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. ~6, 100 (1958). 
14. See text and notes at notes 31-32 supra. 
143 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
144Id. at 464. A more recent expression of the view that the death penalty is constitu-
tional per se was made by Chief Justice Warren, who announced the judgment of the 
Court, in Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a nondeath case. The Chief Justice stated: 
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral 
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are 
forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a 
day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional 
concept of cruelty. 
ld. at 99. 
145 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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the question of the constitutionality of death penalty statutes was 
posed under the eighth amendment, the opinions of the majority Jus-
tices were so divergent that no uniform standard to judge the con-
stitutionality of a death penalty statute emerged.146 
Despite O'Neal II's break with the traditional eighth amendment 
standards expressed in pre-Furman cases, there appears to be some 
basis in Furman for the O'Neal II majority standards. In their separate 
opinions in Furman, both Justices Brennan and Marshall expressed the 
principle that the death penalty is only constitutionally permissible if it 
serves a penal purpose or a valid legislative goal more effectively than 
a lesser punishment. 147 Similarly, Chief Justice Tauro, in his compel-
ling state interest test, and Justice Wilkins, in his substantial public 
purpose test, required a showing that there was a need for imposing 
the death penalty rather than a lesser punishment. 148 However, the 
extent of the showing called for under the O'Neal II standards appears 
to be greater than that required by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
since Chief Justice Tauro required the governmental interest dem-
onstrated to be a compelling one and Justice Wilkins called for a show-
ing of a substantial public purpose. 149 
146 See text at notes 33-36 supra. It has been observed that no single standard was 
used by more than three of the five Justices who formed the Furman majority. See 
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment after Furman v. 
Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62,62,80 (1972). The author pointed out that Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart and Douglas used an eighth amendment standard based on the notion of 
arbitrariness. [d. at 80. See text at notes 37-47 supra. 
147 408 U.S. at 279-80 (Brennan, j., concurring) ("that the punishment serves no 
penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment"). Justice Brennan cited 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), as the source of this principle. 408 U.S. at 
342 (Marshall, j., concurring) ("In order to assess whether or not death is an excessive 
or unnecessary penalty, it is necessary to consider the reasons why a legislature might 
select it as punishment for one or more offenses, and examine whether less severe 
penalties would satisfy the legitimate legislative wants as well as capital punishment."). 
Justice White voiced a related notion that a penalty that serves no social or public pur-
poses would come within the cruel and unusual punishments prohibition of the eighth 
amendment. [d. at 312. 
148 See text at notes 89-90 and 99-100 supra. 
149 A further reason for viewing Furman as a springboard for the 0' Neal II decision is 
the fact that the two-pronged analysis used by Chief Justice Tauro in O'Neal II was 
suggested by Justice Marshall in a footnote in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. at 359-60 
n.141. Specifically, Justice Marshall proposed that the state must have a compelling state 
interest to justify the use of capital punishment because the death penalty extinguishes 
the individual's fundamental ri~ht to life. [d. In the cruel and unusual punishments 
context, the operative principle IS that a punishment may only be as severe as necessary 
to fulfill valid state interests. [d. A number of commentators have proposed that the 
stricter standard of review of the compelling state interest test be used by courts when 
evaluating the constitutionality of death penalty statutes under the cruel and unusual 
punishments provision. See Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1268, 1353-
54 (1968); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 1773, 1784-85, 1794-98 (1970). See also The Supreme Court Term, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 52, 76-85 (1972) in which the author suggested that a strict scrutiny standard may 
be appropriate for reviewing legislative enactments of the death penalty. Employing this 
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In addition to requiring a greater showing of a governmental in-
terest or public purpose in imposing the death penalty, the O'Neal II 
majority also broke with constitutional precedent by abandoning the 
notion of the presumptive validity of legislative enactments in the area 
of criminal punishments. I5o Chief Justice Tauro saw capital punish-
ment as involving a great degree of suffering as well as the loss of all 
rights of the individual so that the state must justify the imposition of 
such a punishment. l5l Justice Wilkins regarded the death penalty as 
so "brutalizing" that the state must s,how a need to impose it. I52 In 
O'Neal II, the Commonwealth was therefore saddled with the burden 
of proving the validity of the mandatory death penalty statute. I53 In 
order to meet this burden the Commonwealth was required to show 
that the mandatory sentence of death for the offense of rape-murder 
would better serve the penal goals of deterrence, isolation/ 
incapacitation, and retribution/moral reinforcement,I54 or some other 
substantial public purpose than a sentence of life imprisonment. I55 
O'Neal II also represents a departure from constitutional tradition 
insofar as due process guarantees are used to appraise the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory death penalty for rape-murder. The due 
process analysis, introduced by the Chief Justice in O'Neal II, stands or 
falls on the accuracy of his proposition that life is a fundamental right 
for the purposes of triggering strict scrutiny of a statute. In O'Neal J, 
Chief Justice Tauro cited two United States Supreme Court cases to 
lend support to this proposition.I56 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins/ 57 the Su-
preme Court decided that San Francisco ordinances according the 
Board of Supervisors the power to grant or deny licenses to carry on 
standard would mean, in death penalty cases, that a court may require a showing of a 
specific relationship between the punishment and the goal it is to serve. /d. at 82. Citing 
Justice Stone's footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152-53 n.4 (1938), the author contended that two of the reasons for strict scrutiny of 
legislation offered by Justice Stone were applicable to death penalty cases: that a specific 
clause of the Bill of Rights was implicated [eighth amendment] and that those whose in-
terests were protected by the constitutional provision were not likely to be able to use 
the political process for such protection. 86 HARv. L. REV. 52, 82. 
ISO Both United States Supreme Court and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
opinions have consistently adhered to the concept of the presumptive validity of legisla-
tive enactIl}ents which prescribe punishments for crimes. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 99-100, 103 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910); In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890); Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 610-11, 
296 N.E.2d 468, 476 (1973); Harding v. Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 369, 374, 186 N.E. 
556, 558 (1933); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 328, 53 N.E. 874, 875 
(1899). 
1.1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3509-12, 339 N.E.2d at 680-81 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). 
1.2Id. at 3549, 339 N.E.2d at 695 (Wilkins, j., concurring in the result). 
153 See text and notes at notes 88, 100 supra. 
154 See text and notes at notes 89-92 supra. 
IS. See text and note at note 99 supra. 
1S6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1099, 327 N.E.2d at 668. 
157 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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the business of a laundry were administered in a discriminatory fash-
ion so as to deny the petitioners, who were of Chinese national origin, 
equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. 15S In 
dicta, the Court referred to the fundamental "rights to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness,"159 but did not suggest that life is a 
fundamental right for purposes of strict scrutiny of the ordinances. In 
Johnson v. Zerbst,160 the Court remanded the petitioner's cause for a 
writ of habeas corpus to a federal district court to determine whether 
he had waived his right to assistance of counsep61 In the course of dis-
cussing the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel, the Court 
stated that such a safeguard was "deemed necessary to insure funda-
mental human rights of life and liberty."162 However, in neither of 
these cases did the Court speak of a constitutionally guaranteed fun-
damental right to life which would invoke strict scrutiny of a statute 
affecting that right. Thus, it would appear that the Chief Justice was 
incorrect in offering Yick Wo and Johnson as support for the proposi-
tion that life is a fundamental right so as to require strict scrutiny of a 
death penalty statute.163 
Other Supreme Court cases, in which a fundamental rights analysis 
has been used, however, do lay a foundation for Chief Justice Tauro's 
proposition. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 164 
the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided 
for sterilization of habitual criminals, defined as those persons con-
victed at least twice of a felony involving moral turpitude, but which 
exempted certain criminals such as embezzlers.165 The Court held that 
the statute violated the equal protection clause because it drew an "ar-
tificial line" for the purposes of punishment between those who had 
"committed intrinsically the same quality of offense."166 More signifi-
cantly, the Court noted that it would apply strict scrutiny to the stat-
ute because it involved procreation, a basic right of man and one 
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race," and be-
cause it called for a permanent deprivation of that right.167 Arguably 
U8Id. at 356-57, 374. 
15·Id. at 370. 
160 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
161Id. at 469. 
162Id. at 462. 
163 In O'Neal II Justice Reardon pointed out that Chief Justice Tauro had not 
supplied any case law to substantiate his proposition that life is a fundamental right 
which triggers the strict scrutiny of legislation affecting an interest in life. 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 3570, 339 N.E.2d at 702. 
164 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
165ld. at 536-37, 541. 
166Id. at 541-42. The Oklahoma statute was also challenged as a penal statute which 
constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the fourteenth amendment, 
but since the Court rested its decision on the equal protection grounds, it did not reach 
the cruel and unusual punishments issue.Id. at 538. 
167Id. at 541. 
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the interests noted by the Court in Skinner as requiring strict scrutiny 
are also present in the area of capital punishment. Death penalty stat-
utes involve the same threat to the existence and survival of the race 
and the same "permanent deprivation" as the sterilization statute 
examined by the Court in Skinner. Accordingly, the strict judicial 
scrutiny analysis applied by Chief Justice Tauro is not completely 
without precedential roots. 
Further support for the Chief Justice's approach may be found in 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,168 where the Supreme Court 
announced the rule that a fundamental right which triggers strict 
scrutiny must be a right "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution."169 The Rodriguez Court proceeded to find that educa-
tion was not such a fundamental rightYo Using an explicitness test, 
life appears on the face of the Constitution to be guaranteed. l71 The 
Court has so much as conceded this, albeit in dicta, in another fun-
damental rights case, Roe v. Wade,172 in which the Court declared the 
Texas criminal abortion statute unconstitutional under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.173 In Roe, the Court pointed 
out that if it found a fetus to be a "person" within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment, the fetus' "right to life would then be spe-
cifically guaranteed by [that] Amendment."IH The right to life is also 
arguably implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. When a person is 
deprived of life pursuant to a death penalty statute, all other funda-
mental rights-the right to vote, to travel, to procreate, to privacy-
are thereby extinguished .175 
The difficulties with a "fundamental rights" due process analysis for 
evaluating a punishment were underlined by Justice Reardon when he 
questioned· whether it was appropriate to review the nature of 
punishments under the due process clause rather than the specific 
provision in the federal constitution dealing with punishments.176 The 
188 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
189 [d. at 33-34. 
170 [d. at 35-37. 
171 MASS. CON ST. pt. 1', arts. I, II, XII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
171 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
173 [d. at 164. 
174[d. at 156-57. 
175 The Supreme Court h~s found these other personal interests to be fundamental: 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 634 (1969) (interstate travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493, 497 
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (privacy); Skinner ·v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942) (procreation). The novel "fundamental rights" due process approach to evaluat-
ing death penalty statutes, however, is not likely to be used by the United States Su-
preme Court. In Furman, the Court considered the constitutionality of death penalty 
statutes only under eight amendment standards. 408 U.S. 239-40. Furthermore, the 
Court has continued to review capital sentencing statutes under the eighth amendment 
since Furman. See text at notes 192-243 infra. 
178 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3566-69, 339 N.E.2d at 700-01. 
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history of the adoption of the eighth amendment indicates that the 
cruel and unusual punishments provision of the Bill of Rights was 
passed to provide a constitutional limitation on the unbridled power 
of the legislative branch to enact punishments.177 The Supreme Court 
has characterized the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause as specifically framed to restrict the legislative power to 
fix criminal punishment.178 Although the Massachusetts counterpart, 
article 26, is literally worded to restrict only the action of magistrates 
and courts of law,179 and was originally interpreted as a check on the 
judicial and not the legislative power to punish,180 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court has construed that clause as creating a specific constitu-
tional boundary on the legislative power to fix punishments.181 The 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights thus embraces a provision that 
specifically operates to circumscribe legislatively fixed punishments, 
whereas the due process provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights do not directly address the nature of punishments.182 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Reardon, would seem to be correct in concluding 
that the appropriate constitutional source for standards to judge the 
nature of punishments selected by the Legislature would logically be 
either the eighth amendment or article 26 rather than the less specific 
clauses gu~ranteeing due process. 
Although a due process analysis may not be the most appropriate 
constitutional analysis for reviewing death penalty statutes, using a 
stricter standard of review than that used for other punishments 
under the cruel or unusual punishment clause of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights may be justified. The death penalty is rec-
ognized as a unique punishment.183 Unlike other punishments, such 
177 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,262-63 (Brennan, j., concurring). 
178 Weems v. United States,217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (19lO). 
178 See note 13 supra for. text of MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI. 
180 Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 600, 33 N.E. 648, 649 (1893). 
181 Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 6lO-11, 296 N.E.2d 468, 476 (1973). 
182 See note 24 supra for text of MASS. CONST. pt. 1, arts. I, X and XII. 
183 Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-93 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, j., con-
curring). During the colonial period, the number of capital crimes in the colonies 
covered many offenses besides murder. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, by the year 
1684, 21 crimes were punishable by death including idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, 
murder, bestiality, sodomy, adultery, man-stealing, petjury in a capital case, conspiracy, 
rape of a married woman, rape of a single woman (not mandatory), cursing a natural 
parent by a child 16 or older, rebellion of son 16 or over, third offense of burglary, 
third offense of highway robbery, arson, second offense of heresy, returning of a Jesuit 
after banishment, returning of a Quaker after banishment, piracy and mutiny, and mili-
tary service with enemies. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION 
ESTABUSHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING AND STUDYING THE ABOUTION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN CAPITAL CASES, MASS. H. REp. No. 2575, at 98-99 app. c (1959). By 
1852, first degree murder was the only offense subject t~ a mandatory death penalty. 
In 1951, the death penalty for first degree murder was made discretionary, and the 
mandatory death penalty for rape-murder was established. See Note, The Death Penalty 
in Massachusetts, 8 SUFF. L. REV. 632, 633-6 (1974). Thus, during the history of the 
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as fines and incarceration, in recent years the penalty of death has 
been infrequently imposed-in Massachusetts not since 1947.184 By its 
nature it is irreversible. 185 It not only rejects the notion of rehabilita-
tion of the offender, but also denies that there is some value to every 
human life. 186 Because of the unique nature of the death penalty, the 
stricter standards for determining its constitutionality created by the 
O'Neal II majority may be appropriate. Saddling the state with the 
burden of advancing substantial reasons for a death penalty statute is, 
likewise, justified by the unique character of the death penalty in con-
trast to other criminal punishments. 
Death penalty decisions inevitably have moral and social dimensions 
because, to some extent, they rest on the value society places on 
human life. In O'Neal II, the majority decided that retribution could 
not solely justify the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for the 
crime of rape-murder. Society's need for revenge was thus out-
weighed by society's respect for human life, the life of the capital of-
fender. In so deciding, the Court accepted its duty to decide constitu-
tional issues, although they may have far-reaching social and moral 
ramifications.187 
In performing its constitutional duty the Court correctly went be-
yond accepting the Massachusetts constitutional document as the prod-
uct of a single period in history. Justice Reardon argued that the his-
torical meaning of the constitutional phrase, cruel or unusual 
punishments, should delimit the inquiry so that a form of punishment 
acceptable at the time of framing the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights would also currently be acceptable. 188 But the history of the 
phrase is only one of the indicia of the phrase's meaning. The major-
ity in O'Neal II did not flatly dispense with the historical meaning of 
the phrase and rule that capital punishment is invariably cruel or un-
usual in the constitutional sense, rather the O'Neal II Court created a 
useful method of inquiry so that the content of the constitutional 
phrase, cruel or unusual punishments, may be determined in light of 
available penological and sociological knowledge. 
Commonwealth, the death penalty has been abolished except for the most serious kind 
of offense, the slaying of another human. 
184 In O'Neal II, both Justices Hennessey and Wilkins considered the fact significant 
that an execution had not taken place in Massachusetts since 1947. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
3546-47, 339 N.E.2d 694 (Hennessey, J., concurring); id. at 3549, 339 N.E.2d at 695 
(Wilkins, J., concurring in the result). 
185 Chief Justice Tauro contrasted the absolute and irreversible nature of a manda-
tory death penalty with other forms of punishment. [d. at 3506-07 n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 
678 n.2. 
188 Chief Justice Tauro pointed out that the Commonwealth had not offered reforma-
tion of the capital offender as a justification for the mandatory death penalty statute 
because rehabilitation is not consistent as a penal goal with capital punishment. [d. at 
3513-14 n.ll, 339 N.E.2d at 681 n.ll. 
187e! Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); Brown v. Board of 
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.s. 483, 493-95 (1954). 
188 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3584-85, 339 N.E.2d at 707. 
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III. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FUTURE DEATH PENALTY LEGISLATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
In utilizing state standards to strike down the mandatory death 
penalty for rape-murder in O'Neal II, the Supreme Judicial Court 
created the possibility that future death penalty statutes enacted in 
Massachusetts will be subject to identical constitutional scrutiny under 
the state constitution. Just seven months after the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided O'Neal II, the United States Supreme Court ruled on 
the constitutionality of both mandatory and guided discretionary capi-
tal sentencing statutes enacted after Furman. In O'Neal II, Justice 
Reardon had urged for the sake of "symmetry of the law" that the 
Supreme Judicial Court withhold its judgment on the constitutionality 
of mandatory capital punishment for rape-murder until the Supreme· 
Court had passed on a similar statute under the eighth and four-
teenth amendments.189 Justice Reardon hypothesized that if the Su-
preme Court held the death penalty void in all cases and under all 
circumstances on federal constitutional grounds, then the issues in 
O'Neal II would be decided.190 If, on the other hand, the Supreme 
Court declared the death penalty constitutionally permissible, then the 
highest court of Massachusetts, Justice Reardon argued, would still be 
free to review the statute under the state constitution.191 Although 
Justice Reardon did not precisely predict it, the result of going for-
ward with the O'Neal II decision may have been the creation of two 
independent constitutional hurdles, federal and state, for the drafters 
of future death penalty legislation in Massachusetts. 
The federal constitutional requirements under the eighth amend-
ment for state murder statutes allowing capital sentencing were laid 
out in a series of five cases.192 Seven members of the Supreme Court 
found that the death penalty for murder193 is not unconstitutional in 
189 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3562-64, 339 N.E.2d at 699. Justice Reardon called upon 
the Supreme Judicial Court to await the United States Supreme Court decision in North 
Carolina v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974), which he thought involved con-
stitutional questions identical to those in O'Neal II under the federal Constitution. Fowler 
had been argued once before the Supreme Court and had been set for reargument. See 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3562,339 N.E.2d at 699. The judgment of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court upholding a mandatory death penalty in Fowler was eventually vacated 
by the Supreme Court in a memorandum decision. 428 U.S. 904, 904-05 (1976). The 
United States Supreme Court disposed of Fowler in accordance with its decision in 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), issued 4 days earlier. See text at notes 
230-37 irifra for a discussion of Woodson. 
190 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3563-64,339 N.E.2d at 699. 
191/d. 
19' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). For a brief analysis of the five cases 
see The Supreme Court Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 63 (1976). 
193 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review a case which presents the 
issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty for the offense of rape. See Coker v. 
Georgia, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No. 75-5444). 
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all cases and under all circumstances.194 The guided discretionary cap-
ital sentencing statutes of three states were upheld in Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 195 Jurek v. Texas,196 and Priffitt v. Florida, 197 while two mandatory 
aeath penalty statutes were struck down in Woodson v. North Caro-
Lina 198 and Roberts v. Louisiana. 199 
In Gregg, Jurek and Proffitt, seven members of the Court agreed to 
uphold the conviction and death sentence of the petitioners under 
state statutory schemes permitting guided discretionary capital sen-
tencing, but the Court split in its reasoning.20o The pivotal opinions in 
these cases were written by a three-Justice plurality of Justices Stewart, 
Powell, and Stevens [hereinafter referred to as the plurality] who 
found on traditional eighth amendment grounds that the death pen-
alty did not invariably violate the constitutional ban on cruel and un-
usual punishments.201 The plurality presented two major tests to 
194 In the opinion filed by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, announcing the opin-
ion of the Court in Gregg, Justice Stewart stated: "We now hold that the punishment of 
death does not invariably violate the Constitution." 428 U.S. at 169. In the concurring 
opinion of Justice White, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice White said: "[nJeither can I agree with the petitioner's other basic argument that 
the death penalty, however imposed and for whatever crime, is cruel and unusual 
punishment." Id. at 226. In Gregg, Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment and re-
ferred to his dissenting opinion in Furman. Id. at 227. In Furman Justice Blackmun ex-
pressed his regret as he was unable to find the imposition of the death penalty in that 
case incompatible with the United States Constitution. 408 U.S. at 406-08. 
195 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
196 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
191 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
198 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
199 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
200 In each of the three cases, Gregg, jurek and Proffitt, Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens joined in a single opinion, and Justice White wrote a separate concurring opin-
ion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. In each case, Justice 
Blackmun filed a separate statement concurring in the judgment. In Gregg, Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed a separate statement. In jurek, Chief Justice 
Burger wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan and Jus-
tice Marshall dissented separately in all three cases. 428 U.S. 227 (1976) (Brennan, j., 
dissenting); 428 U.S. 231 (1976) (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
201 Justice White, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist formed a second plural-
ity in Gregg, jurek, and Proffitt. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 207; Jurek v. Texas, 428 
U.S. at 277; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 260. Although, in these three cases, the rea-
soning of the second plurality was not clearly distinguishable from that of the first plur-
ality, Justice White emphasized that the Georgia, Florida and Texas statutes passed con-
stitutional muster primarily because these statutes had corrected the infirmities of the 
statutes struck down in Furman. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 220-26; Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. at 277-79; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 260-61. In Gregg, Justice White pointed 
out that the statutory system guided the jury in exercising sentencing discretion so that 
imposition of the death penalty would no longer be freakish or so infrequent that it ful-
fills no useful penological purpose, and that the provision for appellate review in the 
Georgia law made it likely that the death penalty would not be imposed in a dis-
cretionary or arbitrary fashion as prohibited by Furman. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 
220-23 (White, j., joined by Burger, C.j., and Rehnquist, j., concurring). 
Justice White outlined more explicitly his views on the constitutionality of capital 
punishment in his dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 337, in which 
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judge the death penalty in the abstract: (1) whether capital punish-
ment is consonant with contemporary values or standards of decency; 
and (2) whether it comports with human dignity.202 The death pen-
alty, according to the plurality, met contemporary standards of de-
cency because it is acceptable to American society as demonstrated by 
the legislative response to the Furman decision and the actual willing-
ness of juries to impose the death sentence.203 In order to comport 
with human dignity, the plurality said that the penalty of death must 
not be excessive, which, in turn, required that the penalty neither en-
tail unnecessary pain nor be disproportionate to the severity of the of-
fense. 204 With respect to the issue of the excessiveness of the death 
penalty, the plurality found that such a penalty was not excessive be" 
cause it could serve the social purposes of retribution and deterrence 
and therefore was necessary.205 Moreover, death was not a punish-
ment disproportionate to the offense when it is imposed for the crime 
of murder. 206 Having determined that capital punishment does not in 
all cases and under all circumstances violate the eighth amendment, 
the plurality rejected the defendant's alternate contention that arbi-
trariness found constitutionally impermissible in Furman was inherent 
in those stages of the criminal justice system allowing discretionary ac-
tion: prosecutorial decisionmaking, plea bargaining, conviction of 
lesser included offenses, and executive clemency.207 Observing that 
legislatively selected punishments are presumptively valid,208 and that 
a legislature is not required to choose the least severe punishment 
available,209 the plurality placed a heavy burden on the party challeng-
ing the validity of death penalty legislation.210 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. Significantly, in 
Roberts, Justice White argued that a separate sentencing procedure at which the charac-
ter and record of the capital offender would be considered was not constitutionally 
mandated. [d. at 358. See note 243 infra. 
202 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
203 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 179-82. Justice Stewart interpreted the post-Furman legisla-
tive activity in which 35 states passed new death penalty legislation, which attempted to 
satisfy the Supreme Court's concerns expressed in Furman, as evidence of society'S en-
dorsement of capital punishment for the crime of murder. [d. at 179-81. As further 
evidence of society's approval of the death penalty, Justice Stewart noted that juries had 
imposed the death sentence on a minimum of 240 persons since Furman (decided on 
June 29, 1972) and the end of 1974, and that 460 persons were under death sentences 
in March 1976. [d. at 182. 
204 [d. at 173. 
20~ [d. at 182-87. 
206/d. at 187. 
207 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254. A similar 
argument had been rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court in O'Neal [. See text at 
notes 14, 18 and note 18 supra. 
208 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175. Justice Stewart stated: "[I]n assessing a punishment 
selected by a democratically elected Legislature against the constitutional measure, we 
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In Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt, the plurality described the procedural 
attributes of the sentencing systems involved in those cases as consis-
tent with the eighth amendment. In Gregg, Justice Stewart gen-
eralized: 
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty 
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can 
be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentenc-
ing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a 
general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that 
provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing au-
thority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of 
sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the in-
formation.211 
In Gregg, Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, identified a 
number of the specific elements of Georgia's statutory capital sentenc-
ing scheme which made that scheme constitutionally compatible with 
the eighth amendment. The statute called for a bifurcated procedure, 
so that after the guilt phase of the trial, in which the defendant was 
found guilty by either a judge or jury, a separate presentence hearing 
was held in which the judge or jury heard evidence in extenuation, 
aggravation, or mitigation of punishment.212 The judge or jury was 
required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of ten 
statutory aggravating circumstances existed before imposing the death 
sentence. The sentencing body was further authorized to consider any 
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The statute, in ad-
dition, provided for an expedited appeal to the highest state court. In 
reviewing capital sentences, that court was required to decide whether 
the death penalty was imposed under the influence of prejudice or 
passion, whether the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance 
was supported by the evidence, and whether, as compared to the sen-
tences imposed in similar cases, the sentence was disproportionate.213 
The Texas statutory capital sentencing framework scrutinized in the 
Jurek case differed from that of Georgia as presented in Gregg. The 
Texas statutory definition of capital homicide was limited to five 
categories of intentional and knowing murder: (1) murder of a fire-
man or peace officer; (2) murder committed in the course of certain 
felonies such as kidnapping, robbery or forcible rape; (3) murder 
committed for remuneration; (4) murder committed while escaping or 
attempting to escape from a penal institution; and (5) murder of a 
prison employee by a prison inmate.214 If the jury found the de-
211 428 U.S. at 195. 
212Id. at 163-64. 
213Id. at 164-67. 
214Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268 (Stevens, J., joined by Stewart and Powell, JJ., concurring). 
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fendant guilty of one of the five types of capital homicides, then in a 
subsequent sentencing proceeding, the death sentence was imposed if 
the jury answered three questions and determined that the state had 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the response to each question 
was affirmative. The three questions to be presented to the jury are 
(1) whether the defendant's c~nduct resulting in death was deliberate 
and engaged in "with the reasonable expectation that the death of the 
deceased or another person would result," (2) whether it is probable 
that the defendant would engage in criminal acts of a violent nature 
constituting an ongoing threat to society, and (3) if raised by the evi-
dence, whether the defendant's conduct constituted an unreasonable 
response to the provocation by the deceased.215 Texas law also called 
for an expedited appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.216 
Unlike the Georgia statute, which specifically set forth aggravating cir-
cumstances for consideration in imposing the death sentence and em-
powered the sentencing body to take into account any appropriate 
mitigating circumstances, the Texas law required the death penalty to 
be imposed upon certain jury findings. The plurality indicated, how-
ever, that the narrowing of the definition of capital homicide to five 
specific categories of murder was equivalent to requiring jury consid-
eration of some of the aggravating factors spelled out in the Georgia 
law.217 The statutory questions posed in the Texas law, specifically the 
second question, whether the particular defendant would be likely to 
engage in future violent criminal conduct that would constitute a 
threat to society, commanded the sentencing authority to take into ac-
count particularized mitigating circumstances.21s In respect to mitigat-
ing factors, the plurality had stated: "in order, to meet the require-
ment of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital-sentencing 
system must allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating cir-
cumstances."219 Consequently, despite the structural differences be-
tween the Texas and Georgia statutes, the plurality came to the con-
clusion that the Texas capital sentencing scheme did not violate the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments.22o 
Florida's post-Furman capital sentencing legislation was viewed by 
the plurality in Proffitt as similar to Georgia's statutory scheme.221 
Florida law provided for a bifurcated procedure with a guilt phase fol-
lowed by a sentencing phase in which an evidentiary hearing was 
held.222 At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the jury was required 
to consider whether any mitigating circumstances outweighed any ag-
2,. [d. at 269. 
218 [d. 
217 [d. at 270-72. 
218 [d. at 272-74. 
219 [d. at 271. 
220 [d. at 276. 
221 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251-52 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart and Stevens, fl., concur-
~~. ' , 
222 [d. at 248. 
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gravating circumstances, and on that basis to recommend that either 
life imprisonment or the death penalty be imposed. The jury's role, 
however, was only advisory, and the trial judge determined the sen-
tence actually to be imposed. If the trial judge imposed the death sen-
tence, he was directed to make written findings of fact that sufficient 
aggravating circumstances existed and insufficient mitigating circum-
stances existed to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The 
Florida statute enumerated eight aggravating and seven mitigating 
circumstances.223 The sentence of death and the trial judge's findings 
were subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida.224 
In contrast to Georgia law, under the Florida capital sentencing sys-
tem, the jury performed only an advisory function. The plurality in 
Proffitt concluded that this major difference between the Georgia and 
Florida capital sentencing systems did not make Florida's legislation 
constitutionally deficient as there was no constitutional requirement 
that a jury rather than a judge perform the sentencing task of impos-
ing the death penalty.225 
The two mandatory death penalty statutes reviewed by the Supreme 
Court in the Woodson and Roberts cases were invalidated by five to four 
margins.226 In those cases, Justices Brennan227 and Marsha1l228 re-
affirmed the positions they had taken earlier in Furman that the death 
penalty invariably violates the cruel and unusual punishments prohibi-
tion of the eighth amendment.229 With Justices Brennan and Mar-
2231d. at 248-50 & n.6. 
2241d. at 250-51. 
2251d. at 251-53. Although the Supreme Court had previously stressed in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968), that capital sentencing by a jury may 
"perform an important societal function," the plurality indicated that sentencing by the 
judiciary might lead to greater consistency. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252. 
m Wood!'On, 428 U.S. at 305 (Stewart, j., joined by Powell and Stevens, Jj., announc-
ing the judgment of the Court); id. at 305-06 (Brennan, j., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 306 (Marshall, j., concurring in the judgment). Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 
(Stevens, j., joined by Stewart and Powell, Jj., announcing the judgment of the Court); 
id. (Brennan, j., concurring in the judgment); id. at 336-37 (Marshall, j., concurring). 
In Wood50n, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented.Justice Blackmun dissented in a separate statement, and Justice Rehnquist filed 
a separate dissenting opinion. In Roberts, Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting state-
ment.Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehn-
quist, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Blackmun also filed a separate dissenting state-
ment. 
227 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305-06; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336. Justice Brennan referred to 
his dissenting opinion in Gregg, Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336, in 
which he expressed the view that the infliction of capital punishment by the state is de-
grading to human dignity. 428 U.S. at 229-30. 
228 Woodson, 428 U.S. 306; Roberts, 428 U.S. 336-37. Justice Marshall simply said: "I 
am of the view that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." ld. 
UD 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, j., concurring); 408 U.S. at 358-60 (Marshall, j., con-
curring). 
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shall, the plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens formed the 
majority and filed the pivotal opinions. 
In Woodson, the petitioners were found guilty of first degree mur-
der and were, as required by the North Carolina statute, automatically 
sentenced to death. 230 After examining the North Carolina statutory 
scheme and the history of the mandatory death penalty, Justice 
Stewart catalogued the reasons for finding that a death sentence im-
posed under the North Carolina mandatory statute .was un-
constitutionaJ.231 First, the common law practice of mandatorily impos-
ing a capital sentence on all persons convicted of specified crimes had 
been generally rejected before Furman by both legislatures and juries 
as morally unacceptable. Justice Stewart outlined the history of the 
adoption of disqetionary capital sentencing statutes from the mid-
nineteenth century to Furman by the states that originally had manda-
tory statutes and retained capital punishment.232 This legislative rejec-
tion of mandatory capital punishment, together with the practice of 
jury nullification, whereby juries disobey their oaths and refuse to 
find a defendant guilty where the death sentence is to be automati-
cally imposed, provided the support for Justice Stewart's belief that a 
mandatory death penalty statute like that of North Carolina, did not 
comport with contemporary standards for imposing a capital punish-
ment.233 
To some extent the second reason was also grounded in the practice 
of jury nullification. Justice Stewart reasoned that, under a mandatory 
capital sentencing statute, the decision to impose the death penalty 
may turn on the jury's willingness to disobey their oaths and to refrain 
from convicting the defendant of the capital crime because of the au-
tomatic death penalty. 234 Such jury practices under mandatory statutes 
would not alleviate the problem of the arbitrary unbridled discretion 
of the sentencing body exposed in Furman insofar as under a manda-
tory scheme, like North Carolina's statute, juries would not be guided 
by objective standards, and the decision to impose the death sentence 
would not be regularized and made "rationally reviewable".235 Finally, 
180 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 284-86. 
281 Justice Stewart emphasized that in Woodson the Court was not ruling on the con-
stitutionality of a narrowly drawn statute mandating the death penalty for a category of 
murder defined in terms of the character or record of the offender as, for example, 
murder committed by a prisoner who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 428 
U.S. 287 n.7, 292-93 n.25. 
28lld. at 289-95. Justice Stewart also said that the enactment of mandatory death 
penalty statutes by a number of states in response to Furman did not evidence a new ac-
ceptance by society of mandatory capital punishment. Rather, it reflected a concern to 
put into effect capital punishment legislation compatible with the federal constitution. 
Id. at 298-99. 
I88ld. at 289-301. 
1341d. at 292-93, 302-03. 
1351d. at 302-03. 
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Justice Stewart characterized mandatory capital sentencing statutes as 
constitutionally infirm because in capital cases, individualized sentenc-
ing decisions are constitutionally required due to the eighth amend-
ment's basic concept of "respect for humanity".236 The North Carolina 
mandatory death penalty statute failed in this regard as it did not call 
for jury consideration of the individualized nature of the crime or 
character of the capital offender.237 
In Roberts, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, set aside a death 
sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of first degree murder 
under Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute.238 The Louisiana 
statutory system defined first degree murder as homicide in five spe-
cific situations: (1) killing connected with the perpetration of the 
felonies of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, or armed rob-
bery; (2) killing of a fireman or peace officer while performing his 
duties; (3) killing by one serving a life sentence or one previously con-
victed of an unrelated murder; (4) killing with the intent to inflict 
great bodily harm upon at least two or more persons; and (5) killing 
for hire. The Louisiana responsive verdict procedure required, in 
cases of first degree murder, that the jury be instructed on the of-
fenses of first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaugh-
ter regardless of the existence of evidence to support a verdict on the 
lesser offenses, and that the jury return either a verdict of guilty, 
guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, or not 
guilty.239 
Justice Stevens found constitutional infirmities in the Louisiana 
mandatory death penalty scheme similar to those in the North 
Carolina statute.240 With the exception of killing by one serving a life 
sentence or one previously convicted of an unrelated murder, the five 
narrow definitions of first degree murder did not call for jury consid-
eration of the character of the offender and the circumstances of the 
offense.241 The responsive verdict system did not provide standards to 
guide the jury's sentencing discretion. Rather, the system invited 
members of the jury to render a verdict for a lesser offense, in viola-
tion of their oaths, in order to avoid imposition of the death pen-
alty.242 Furthermore, mandatory death penalty systems, like that of 
236 [d. at 303-04. 
237 [d. Four Justices in Woodson would have upheld the North Carolina mandatory 
death penalty statute. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 306-07 (White, j., with 
whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, dissenting); id. at 307-08 
(Blackmun, j., dissenting); id. at 308-09, 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice 
Rehnquist authored a vigorous dissenting opinion in which he accused the plurality of 
importing into the eighth amendment provision banning cruel and unusual punish-
ments "procedural requirements which find no support in our cases." [d. at 309. 
238 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 327-28, 336. 
239 [d. at 329-30. 
240 [d. at 335. 
241 [d. at 333-34 & n.9. 
242 [d. at 334-36. 
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Louisiana, had been consistently rejected by legislatures and juries.243 
Although the plurality warned that henceforth capital sentencing 
systems would be evaluated "on an individual basis,"244 the 1976 Su-
preme Court death penalty cases may be taken to indicate that guided 
discretionary capital sentencing statutes patterned after the Georgia, 
Texas and Florida statutes considered in Gregg, Jurek and Proffitt 
would be likely to satisfy the eighth amendment, while mandatory 
death penalty legislation, identical to that successfully challenged in 
Woodson and Roberts, would not. A mandatory death penalty for 
rape-murder, like the statute found violative of the state constitution 
in O'Neal II, would probably have fallen within the shadow of un-
constitutionality cast by the Supreme Court in the Woodson and Roberts 
cases. The North Carolina statute invalidated in Woodson defined first 
degree murder, inter alia, as murder "committed in the perpetration 
or attempt to perpetrate ... rape"245 and mandated death as the 
punishment for that offense,246 as did the mandatory provision of sec-
tion 2 of chapter 265 of the Massachusetts statute.247 In Roberts, the 
243 [d. at 336. Four Justices in Roberts would have declared the Louisiana capital sen-
tencing scheme constitutional. Justice White wrote an extensive dissenting opinion in 
which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice 
White rejected the petitioner'S argument that the Louisiana statute was susceptible to a 
Furman-based attack because of the possibilities of jury nullification, prosecutorial dis-
cretion and discretion in the criminal process in the form of plea bargaining and execu-
tive clemency. [d. at 348-50. More importantly, Justice White discussed the reasons why 
the death penalty does not violate the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and un-
usual punishments in all cases and under all circumstances. First, the framers of the 
Constitution expressly contemplated the use of capital punishment in the fifth amend-
ment, as did those who drafted the fourteenth amendment. Second, the death penalty 
has been in the arsenal of punishments of a majority of states since the formation of the 
country. [d. at 350-51. Justice White further noted that the death penalty was assumed 
to be constitutionally permissible before Furman. [d. The enactment of death penalty 
statutes by a large number of states in response to Furman demonstrated to Justice 
White that capital punishment was currently acceptable to the American people and 
that life imprisonment did not fulfill the citizens' need for retribution. [d. at 353-54. 
Because reasonable persons and legislators may differ as to the relative effectiveness of 
the death penalty and life imprisonment in satisfying the penal goal of deterrence, Jus-
tice White contended that legislative judgments should be respected. /d. at 355. Justice 
White refused to overturn the post-Furman statutes on the ground that life imprison-
ment serves the goals of the criminal justice system as efficaciously as the death penalty. 
Accordingly, Justice White rejected the notion that the death penalty satisfies no valid 
legislative or social purpose. [d. at 353-55. Justice White also expressed his disapproval 
of the plurality'S view that a separate sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required 
and that the sentencing authority must consider the record and character of the capital 
offender. /d. at 356-58. Finally, Justice White noted that, contrary to the position of Jus-
tice Stewart, mandatory death penalties were not necessarily rejected by the American 
people, and, thus, could not on that basis be found to violate the Constitution. [d. at 
358-63. 
244 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. 
245 Woodson, 428 V.S. at 286, quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
246 [d. 
247 See note 2 supra for the text of G.L. c. 265, §2. 
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Louisiana statute struck down automatically required imposition of the 
death penalty upon a finding of first degree murder, which was nar-
rowly defined in one category as killing in connection with certain 
felonies, one of which was rape. 248 Speaking of the deficiencies of the 
Louisiana law, Justice Stevens stressed that narrowing the categories 
of homicide to be covered by a mandatory capital sentencing statute 
did not cure a basic infirmity of the statute, the failure to focus on the 
character of the offender and the particular circumstances of the of-
fense. 249 Mandatory statutes, like the Massachusetts mandatory death 
penalty for rape-murder, did not permit the sentencing body to con-
sider, what Justice Stevens described as, "[t]he diversity of circum-
stances presented in cases falling within the single category of killing 
during the commission of a specified felony, as well as the variety of 
possible offenders involved in such crimes."25o The Massachusetts 
mandatory death penalty provision would presumably have failed the 
eighth amendment test in another respect. Like the North Carolina 
statute, the Massachusetts mandatory provision did not encompass 
standards to guide the jury in imposing the death sentence, and may 
have encouraged jury nullification.251 Moreover, the language in both 
Woodson and Roberts, which rejects mandatory capital sentencing as out 
of line with current societal concepts of decency,252 portends that a 
statutory scheme that calls for an automatic sentence of death upon 
conviction of even a narrowly defined category of first degree murder 
is not likely to be tolerated under the federal constitution.253 
Because mandatory capital sentencing schemes are particularly sus-
ceptible to constitutional challenge under the federal constitution,254 
248 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329 n. 3, quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1974). The stat-
ute read in pertinent part: 
"First degree murder. First degree murder is the killing of a human being: 
(I) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and 
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated rape or armed robbery .... " Id. 
"2"49 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332-33. 
250 !d. 
251 See text and notes at notes 234-35 supra. 
252 See text and notes at notes 232-33 and 243 supra. 
253 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review a case which poses the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of a mandatory death penalty for the offense of killing a 
police officer. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 45 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Nov. II, 1976) (No. 
76-5206). In Woodson, the plurality left open the possibility that some narrowly drawn 
mandatory death penalty statutes might be constitutional. However, the plurality in-
dicated that such statutes would mandate the death sentence for a category of murder 
defined in terms of the character or record of the offender, 428 U.S. at 287 n.7, 292-93 
n.25, not in terms of the identity of the victim. See note 231 supra. 
254 Several months after the U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty decisions, the Su-
preme Court of California in Rockwell v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 18 Cal. 3d 
420, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101 (1976) struck down a mandatory capital sentenc-
ing statute in light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
(1976), and the four companion cases. 556 P.2d at 1104, 1106-10. In Rockwell, the peti-
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new death penalty legislation in Massachusetts most likely will take the 
form of a discretionary capital sentencing statute, which is designed 
with procedural features similar to those found acceptable in the 
statutes upheld in Gregg, Jurek and Proffitt. Primary among the pro-
cedural features of a discretionary capital sentencing system would be 
the inclusion of objective standards to guide the judge or jury in exer-
cising sentencing discretion. Such objective standards could take the 
form of enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors to be consid-
ered or an equivalent, such as questions which focus on the character 
of the offender and the circumstances of his offense.255 Other pro-
cedural features, not explicitly required by the federal cases, but 
which were encompassed in each of the Georgia, Texas and Florida 
statutory systems, were provisions for a bifurcated procedure and for 
expedited and meaningful appellate review. 
A guided discretionary capital sentencing statute embodying these 
procedural components, however, would not, as a matter of course, 
satisfy the state standards that the O'Neal II majority established. The 
federal procedures do not require that the factors taken into account 
by the sentencing authority in imposing the death penalty be rooted 
in or relate to the penal purpose of deterrence which the O'Neal II 
Court indicated could possibly justify the use of capital punishment. 
For example, a sentencing body under the Georgia statute could de-
cide to impose the sentence of death rather than life imprisonment on 
the basis that the "offense of murder . . . was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim,"256 or under the Florida 
tioner, who had been convicted of first degree murder, sought a writ of prohibition to 
restrain the Ventura County Superior Court from holding a retrial on the issue of the 
existence or nonexistence of special circumstances, which, if found to exist by the trier 
of fact according to the California procedures, would have permitted the imposition of 
the death penalty. Id. at 1103-04. The Supreme Court of California granted a pre-
emptory writ of prohibition and held that those sections of the California Penal Code 
which provide for a death sentence upon a finding of special circumstances violated the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 1116. Although the California law called for 
consideration of aggravating circumstances, it lacked a provision requiring the sentenc-
ing authority to consider mitigating circumstances relating to the nature of the offense 
and individual characteristics of the offender. Id. In his concurring opinion in Rockwell, 
Justice Clark suggested that the California Legislature, if it desired to reenact death 
penalty legislation, could use the statutes upheld in Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt as models. 
Id. at 1117. 
255 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 
(1971), see note 32 supra, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Woodson, pro-
tested that the plurality's procedural requirements of standards to guide the jury's de-
termination and individualized consideration of the capital offender were not constitu-
tionally mandated. 428 U.S. at 319-24. In a footnote in Gregg, Justice Stewart appeared 
to distinguish McGautha from Furman and Gregg and the companion cases as a due pro-
cess rather than eighth amendment decision. Justice Stewart stated: "In view of Furman, 
McGautha can be viewed rationally as precedent only for the proposition that standard-
less jury sentencing procedures were not employed in the cases there before the Court 
so as to violate the Due Process Clause." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196 n.47. 
258 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9. 
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statute on the ground that the capital offender had been previously 
convicted of a "felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person."257 The aggravating factor in the Georgia statute appears to 
be aimed at channeling the sense of moral reprobation of the com-
munity and the aggravating factor in the Florida statute may be di-
rected toward incapacitating the individual offender, rather than de-
terring others from committing similar crimes.258 Under Chief Justice 
Tauro's analysis in O'Neal II, however, the penal goal of retribution 
may not provide the ground for imposing the death penalty as op-
posed to a life sentence.259 Likewise, isolation/incapacitation of the of-
fender can be achieved as effectively by a sentence of life imprison-
ment as by capital punishment,260 and, thus, the death penalty may 
not be imposed solely on the basis of incapacitation according to 
O'Neal II standards. In sum, whjle the federal procedures insure that 
the sentencing authority will focus on the individual offender's back-
ground and character and the specific circumstances of his crime, by 
contrast, the state standards formulated in O'Neal II demand that the 
court focus on the nature of the substantive homicidal offense to de-
termine whether the death sentence may in any case serve any compel-
ling or substantial governmental interest that life imprisonment could 
not serve as effectively as punishment for the offense. Because the 
majority in O'Neal II established a set of state constitutional standards 
different in content from the federal procedural standards, a dis-
cretionary capital sentencing statute enacted in Massachusetts, which 
could clear the federal constitutional hurdle, would encounter a sec-
ond constitutional hurdle under the due process and cruel or unusual 
punishments provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. 
The state standards enunciated in O'Neal II should apply to future 
discretionary capital sentencing statutes enacted in Massachusetts, 
notwithstanding that that case involved a mandatory death penalty 
statute. The Supreme Judicial Court could narrowly limit the decision 
in O'Neal II to the consideration of the specific statutory provision in-
volved, the mandatory death penalty for rape-murder,261 holding that 
257 Proffitt, 428 u.s. at 248 n.6. 
258 See The Supreme Court Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 63, 72, 73-74 & n.73 (1976), in which 
the commentator discusses the Supreme Court's failure to justify the three statutory 
capital sentencing systems upheld as serving the purposes, retribution and deterrence, 
which that Court found could possibly justify the imposition of capital punishment. 
It should be added that it would be anomalous to permit a jury to determine whether 
imposing the death penalty in a particular case would serve the purpose of deterring 
others from engaging in homicidal conduct if expert opinion is so divided on the ques-
tion of the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent. See note 90 supra and 
note 283 infra. 
259 See text and note at note 92 supra. 
280 See text and note at note 91 supra. 
281 In one case decided since O'Neal II, the Supreme Judicial Court has spoken of the 
limited holding in O'Neal II. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 444, 343 
N.E.2d 388. In Hall, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgments insofar as the 
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the state constitutional standards only apply to mandatory capital sen-
tencing statutes. Some support for such a view could be found in the 
1976 Supreme Court death penalty cases, where the plurality of Jus-
tices Stewart, Powell and Stevens treated mandatory capital punish-
ment statutes as a separate class of legislation particularly repugnant 
to our society's values. It is also plausible that the constitutional stan-
dards introduced in O'Neal II were so stringent because the statute re-
viewed was mandatory and not discretionary. Since mandatory capital 
punishment statutes were effectively banned by the Supreme Court in 
the Woodson and Roberts cases, the state constitutional tests presented 
in O'Neal II may no longer be useful and· may not apply to guided 
discretionary capital sentencing legislation.262 
Limiting the O'Neal II standards to mandatory capital sentencing 
schemes, however, would refute much of the language and reasoning 
in that opinion. Chief Justice Tauro expressly envisioned the applica-
tion of the state constitutional tests to future death penalty legislation 
and did not state in O'Neal II that the compelling state interest test 
could only be used to evaluate the constitutionality of mandatory stat-
utes.263 Justice Wilkins formulated his substantial public purpose test 
death sentence was imposed on the defendant. who had been convicted on two murder 
indictments and sentenced under the discretionary sentencing provision of C.L.c. 265. § 
2 prior to the decision in Furman. Id. at 445. 472-74. 343 N.E.2d at 391. 401. Because 
of delay in the appellate procedure followed. the case reached the Supreme Judicial 
Court after O'Neal II had been decided. Id. at 452-54. 475. 343 N.E.2d at 394. 402. The 
Court remanded the case to the superior court for resentencing of the defendant to life 
imprisonment on the basis of Furman. as in other decisions in which the death penalty 
had been imposed pursuant to C.L.c. 265, § 2. Id. at 472-75. 343 N.E.2d at 40. 
Although Justice Quirico made it clear in Hall that the O'Neal II holding did not apply 
to the case at hand "[b]ecause of the purported limitation of the holding to death sen-
tences for the crime of rape-murder ...... id. at 475. 343 N.E.2d at 402. it may also be 
noteworthy that he did not state that the state constitutional standards established in 
O'Neal II could only be applied to mandatory capital sentencing statutes or that the 
O'Neal II standards could not be employed by the Court to determine the constitutional-
ity of future death penalty legislation enacted in Massachusetts. 
282 It could also be argued that. at the time of the writing of O'Neal II, it was assumed 
by the Massachusetts Court that only mandatory, and not discretionary, capital sentenc-
ing statutes were constitutional under the Supreme Court's holding in Furman. Hence, 
the majority justices in O'Neal II contemplated that. if their standards would be applied 
to future death penalty legislation, it would only be legislation cast in a mandatory 
mold. This argument is unpersuasive, however. sin(:e the Furman decision addressed 
only unbridled discretionary capital sentencing statutes and left wide open the issue of 
the constitutionality of either guided discretionary or mandatory statutes. See text at 
notes 51-58 supra. 
283 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3530 n.23. 339 N.E.2d at 688 n.23. Chief Justice Tauro 
also stated: "My opinion is restricted solely to the pertinent statute which mandates the 
death penalty in rape-murder cases." Id. This statement may be intended to limit only 
his finding of unconstitutionality with respect to the mandatory death penalty statute for 
rape-murder and not his opinion as to the appropriate standards to apply in all death 
penalty cases. In O'Neal I, Chief Justice Tauro had written: "We address the constitu-
tionality of a general statute requiring a death sentence for a murder committed during 
a rape. Consequendy. our decision is limited to this issue and not to a discussion of 
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in terms of the death penalty in general and indicated that death pen-
alty statutes for other types of murder might be evaluated and survive 
a constitutional attack under that test.264 Furthermore, the policy rea-
sons that justify using stringent state standards for evaluating the con-
stitutionality of a mandatory death penalty apply equally to dis-
cretionary death penalty statutes. A capital sentence, whether imposed 
under a mandatory or discretionary sentencing scheme, is different 
from other punishments. Such a penalty is irrevocable,265 infrequently 
utilized, and rejects the concept of rehabilitation and the value of the 
life of the offender.266 The rationale suggested by Chief Justice Tauro 
and Justice Wilkins for requiring the state to justify imposing a man-
datory death sentence also applies to discretionary death penalty sen-
tences, for death involves an immeasurable degree of suffering,267 and 
is just as brutalizing268 whether inflicted pursuant to mandatory or dis-
cretionary sentencing. Beyond the reasoning of the O'Neal II opin-
ions, there is little doubt that a state court may establish a stricter 
standard of constitutional protection for criminal defendants under a 
provision in the state constitution which is identical or nearly so to 
standards applicable to particular sentences imposed by judges exercising their sentenc-
ing discretion under other statutes." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1086-87, 327 N.E.2d at 
663. This limiting statement may be addressed to criminal sentencing statutes other 
than capital sentencing statutes, since, at the time of writing, capital sentencing pur-
suant to the Massachusetts discretionary provision of G.L.c. 265, § 2, had been pro-
hibited under the Supreme Judicial Court's application of Furman v. Georgia. See 
Commonwealth v. Harrington, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 447, 461-62, 323 N.E.2d 895, 901. 
284 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3549-50,339 N.E.2d at 695. 
285 Since the O'Neal II decision, the Supreme Judicial Court has had occasion to dif-
ferentiate capital punishment from other criminal penalties in order to determine the 
constitutional standard of review. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
735,344 N.E.2d 166, the defendant, who had been convicted of the offense of carrying 
a firearm without a license and sentenced to a mandatory one year term in a house of 
correction pursuant to G.L.c. 269, § 10(a), contended that the appropriate standard of 
review of the constitutionality of the mandatory one year sentence statute under the 
due process provisions of both the state and federal constitutions was a compelling state 
interestlleast restrictive means test. /d. at 735, 749, 752, 344 N.E.2d at 168, 175. The 
Court, however, referring to its decisions in O'Neall and II pointed out that it had dis-
tinguished the punishment of death from other punishments and declined to apply a 
strict scrutiny standard to the mandatory one year sentence statute. ld. at 752-53, 344 
N.E.2d at 175. Justice Hennessey wrote: "[IJn O'Neal II ... , although subjecting the 
mandatory death penalty prescribed by G.L.c. 265, § 2, to strict scrutiny, the Court was 
careful to differentiate capital punishment from all other punishments because of the 
absolute and irreversible deprivation involved." ld. at 753, 344 N.E.2d at 175 (citation 
omitted). In response to the defendant's argument that the same statute was un-
constitutionally cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment and the parallel state 
provision, article 26, the Court applied a disproportionality test, rather than either a 
compelling state interest or substantial public purpose test in upholding the mandatory 
one year sentence statute.ld. at 740-49, 344 N.E.2d at 170-74. 
288 See text at notes 183-86 supra. 
281 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3509-12, 339 N.E.2d at 680-81. 
2881d. at 3549, 339 N.E.2d at 695. 
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federal constitutional language.219 Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court 
is free to interpret O'Neal II as creating standards of constitutional re-
view of capital punishment legislation which are more stringent under 
the state constitution than those used by the United States Supreme 
Court under parallel language of the federal constitution. 
When a discretionary capital sentencing statute is challenged under 
O'Neal II standards, in order to sustain the statute, the state must 
demonstrate that imposing the death penalty for the specific homici-
dal offense in question fulfills a compelling state interest or substantial 
public purpose that could not be satisfied if the lesser penalty of life 
imprisonment were imposed. Of the three primary penal purposes to 
support utilization of capital punishment, deterrence, isolation/ 
incapacitation, and retribution/moral reinforcement, as the O'Neal II 
majority indicated, deterrence would be the probable ground for sus-
taining the death penalty.270 Future death penalty enactments in Mas-
189 See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 105-06, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 274, 280, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 362, 368 (1976) (en banc) (Supreme Court of California, rejecting 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), held prosecution's use of defendant's extra-
judicial inculpatory statements for impeachment purposes violated the privilege against 
self-incrimination of the California constitution); People v. Beavers, .393 Mich. 554, 
562-64, 567-68, 227 N.W.2d 511, 513-14, 516 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 8'l8 (1975) 
(Supreme Court of Michigan, rejecting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), 
held participant monitoring of the conversation of the defendant by a government in-
formant violated the unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the Michigan con-
stitution); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 352-54, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975) (Supreme 
Court of New Jersey, rejecting language in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973), held state had burden of demonstrating "waiver," when state attempts to justify 
a search in a non-custodial situation on the basis of consent, in order to comply with 
unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the New Jersey constitution; court 
raised state constitutional issue sua sponte). For reasoning of a state court for resting a 
decision on state constitutional gro.unds, see People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-
51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-14, 19 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329-30 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 
51, 58 n.7, 58-59 (Haw. 1974); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-03 (Alas. 
1970). The basis for the insulation of a state court decision grounded solely on a state 
constitutional provision from review by the United States Supreme Court is the doctrine 
that the Supreme Court will not review state court decisions resting on state grounds 
which are adequate and independent. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Mur-
dock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). See generally, Brennan, Slate 
Constitutions and the ProtectUm of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 495-504 (1977); 
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 
873, 874-79, 891-907 (1976); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: Slate Court 
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in 
Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J. 873 (1975). 
170 Chief Justice Tauro's findings in O'Neal II that the penal goal of isolation/ 
incapacitation could be achieved by life imprisonment as well as by a death sentence, 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3523-25, 339 N.E.2d at 685-86, and that retribution/moral re-
inforcement alone could not justify imposing a death penalty, id. at 3526-29, 339 
N .E.2d at 686-87, would eliminate these grounds as justification for capital punishment. 
Justice Wilkins also expressed the view that the need for retribution may justify the 
amount of a punishment, but could not bear the sole burden of justifying inflicting a 
sentence of death rather than life imprisonment, at least under the circumstances in the 
O'Neal II case, id. at 3549 n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 695 n.2, and that deterrence would be the 
probable ground for sustaining the death penalty.ld. at 3549,339 N.E.2d at 695. 
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sachusetts, thus, could be struck down under the O'Neal II standards if 
the Commonwealth fails to carry its burden of demonstrating that the 
sentence of death is a more efficacious deterrent for the specific crime 
for which it was imposed than life imprisonment. 
An example of discretionary capital sentencing legislation that may 
be enacted by the Massachusetts General Court in the future was pro-
vided by House Bill 5272 which was drafted and considered by the 
state legislature within two months after the United States. Supreme 
Court's rulings in Gregg and the companion cases.271 House Bill 5272 
would amend section 2 of chapter 265 to eliminate both the jury 
discretionary sentencing provision and the mandatory death penalty 
provision for rape-murder.272 The amended section 2 restores to the 
jury the authority to decide when the death penalty should be im-
posed once the defendant has been found guilty of first degree mur-
der.273 In particular, House Bill 5272 would add several new sections 
to the statutes which would provide for a bifurcated procedure, objec-
tive standards to guide the jury in exercising discretion to impose the 
death penalty, and expedited and meaningful appellate review. After 
a defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder, a pre-
sentence hearing would be held in which the sentencing authority 
would hear "all relevant evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and ag-
gravation of punishment"274 as well as oral argument in respect to 
imposing punishment. The sentencing authority would be required to 
consider any of eleven aggravating circumstances and any of six 
mitigating circumstances enumerated by statute which may be raised 
by the evidence.275 The death penalty may be imposed only if the sen-
271 MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 5272 (1976). 
272/d. § 3. Both of these provisions have been abolished judicially. See text at notes 
21-24 and 62-66 supra. 
273 MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 5272 § 3 (1976). 
274Id. § 4. 
275 Id. The proposed statutory language reads: 
In all cases for which the death penalty may be authorized, the court in cases tried 
by the court shall consider, or it shall include in its instructions to the jury in cases 
tried by a jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating cir-
cumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory ag-
gravating and statutory mitigating circumstances which may be supported by the 
evidence: 
(a) The following shall be the statutory aggravating circumstances: 
(I) The offense of murder was committed by a person in connection with the 
commission of rape or an attempt to commit rape on the victim. 
(2) The offense of murder was committed on the victim who was killed while serv-
ing in the performance of his duties as a police officer, firefighter 'or cOl:rectional 
officer. 
(3) The offense of murder was committed on the victim during the commission of 
a breaking and entering into a dwelling. 
(4) The offense of murder was committed on the victim in the course of a kidnap-
ping for ransom of the victim or attempted kidnapping for ransom of the victim. 
(5) The offense of murder was committed by a person who had previously been 
convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree. 
87
Cronin: Chapter 13: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
430 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.5 
tencing authority finds beyond a reasonable doubt and designates at 
least one of the eleven statutory aggravating circumstances. If the sen-
tencing is performed by a jury, the jury's recommendation of death 
must be unanimous. Upon automatic appeal of a death sentence to 
the Supreme Judicial Court, the Court must determine, taking into 
account the sentences imposed in like cases: 
Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence 
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and (2) 
Whether the evidence supports the jury's or trial court's finding 
of a statutory aggravating circumstance ... and (3) Whether the 
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the de-
fendant. 276 
Because this House Bill adopted some of the key aspects of the 
statutory systems found compatible with the eighth amendment in 
Gregg and Proffitt, such as a bifurcated procedure, objective standards 
to guide the sentencing authority in the form of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and provision for expedited and meaningful 
appellate review of a capital sentence,277 the constitutional uncertainty 
(6) The offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman 
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim. 
(7) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the 
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. 
(8) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed 
murder as an agent or employee of another person. 
(9) The offense of murder was committed on the victim during the commission of 
an armed robbery. 
(lO) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of death to 
more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which 
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. 
(11) The offense of murder was committed on the victim during the course of a 
hijacking or attempted hijacking of an airplane or school bus. 
(b) The following shall be the statutory mitigating circumstances: 
(1) The offense of murder was committed by one with no history of prior serious 
criminal activity. 
(2) The offense of murder was committed by one who was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(3) The offense of murder was committed by one who was a participant in the de-
fendant's homicidal conduct or connected to the homicidal act. 
(4) The offense of murder was committed by one under duress or under the 
domination of another person. 
(5) The offense of murder was committed by one whose capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the req\1irements of law 
was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or alcoholic or drug intoxica-
tion. 




'77 See text and notes at notes 212-13 and 221-25 supra. 
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that such legislation faces arises from the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights rather than the federal constitution.278 Under the majority tests 
espoused in O'Neal II, a court reviewing a discretionary capital sen-
tencing statute would determine whether there is a compelling state 
interest or substantial public purpose in imposing the death penalty 
for each category of first degree murder embodied in the list of 
statutory aggravating circumstances. Specifically, under House Bill 
5272, a reviewing court would determine whether the sentence of 
death could serve the penal goal of deterrence which goal could not 
be achieved by a sentence of life imprisonment imposed on a de-
fendant found by a jury to have committed rape-murder or one of 
the other ten specific categories of murder as set forth in the statute, 
in the form of aggravating factors: (1) rape-murder; (2) murder of a 
police officer, firefighter or corrections officer engaged in the per-
formance of his duties; (3) murder committed in the course of 
burglary; (4) murder of the victim of a kidnapping or an attempted 
kidnapping; (5) murder by a convicted first degree murderer; (6) 
murder which was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or in-
human in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim;" (7) murder for monetary gain; (8) mur-
der for hire; (9) murder committed during armed robbery; (10) mur-
der by one who knowingly caused a great risk of death to two or more 
278 The constitutional status of House Bill 5272 was considered debatable by the 
House of Representatives which requested an advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial 
Court on the constitutionality of the bill under articles 1, 10, 12, and 26 of the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration of Rights, in light of the O'Neal II decision. MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 
5310 (1976). The House request recited the reasons for seeking the court's advisory 
opinion: 
[d. 
The opinion of your Honorable Court in the case of the Commonwealth v. 
Robert O'Neal indicated that Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
may be found to be more restrictive than the eighth amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States; and 
... Said decision involved only the question of punishment for rape-murder 
but the language and reasoning of the court could be construed as being applica-
ble to other murders; ... 
In a letter dated November 16, 1976, the members of the Supreme Judicial Court re-
sponded to the House request. Answer of the Justices, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2621. The 
Court declined to render the advisory opinion since the 1976 session of the General 
Court had been prorogued, and, hence, House Bill 5272 was no longer pending in the 
legislature. [d. at 2623. 
The substance of House Bill 5272 has been reintroduced in the 1977 legislative ses-
sion as House Bill 3373, MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 3373 (1977), and a request for an advi-
sory opinion on its constitutionality has again been sent to the Supreme Judicial Court, 
MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 5429 (1977). In addition, the 1977 session has witnessed the in-
troduction of a number of proposals for capital punishment legislation: MASS. SEN. Doc. 
No. 643 (1977); MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 4474 (1977); MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 2581 (1977); 
MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 3560 (1977); MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 4289 (1977). The latter three 
bills are mandatory in form and may not pass constitutional muster under the federal 
cases. See text at notes 226-43 supra. 
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persons in public by a device usually hazardous to two or more per-
sons; (11) murder during the hijacking or attempted hijacking of a 
school bus or airplane.279 
In respect to rape-murder, as the O'Neal II court found, deterrence 
would not supply the grounds for imposing the death penalty rather 
than life imprisonment as punishment for this offense. However, two 
majority Justices in O'Neal II indicated that there may be a few 
homicide offenses, such as murder of a hostage or victim of a kidnap-
ping and murder in connection with an act of terrorism, for which the 
threat of death is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment 
because of the nature of these offenses.28o Such homicides may be 
categorized generally as planned or contemplated offenses, and, at 
least four of the types of homicides embodied in the aggravating cir-
cumstances of House Bill 5272 may be similarly categorized as 
planned or contemplated: murder of the victim of a kidnapping or at-
tempted kidnapping, murder for hire, murder by one who knowingly 
caused a great risk of death to two or more persons in public by a de-
vice usually hazardous to two or more persons, and murder during 
the hijacking or attempted hijacking of a school bus or airplane. If the 
Commonwealth could demonstrate that these murder offenses are 
more efficaciously deterred by the death penalty than life imprison-
ment, then the death sentence could be constitutionally imposed 
under House Bill 5272 upon a jury finding of the aggravating factors 
which embrace these categories of homicide. The majority Justices 
also suggested that the crime of murder by a convicted murderer 
might pass the stringent compelling state interest or substantial public 
purpose tests281 so that a death penalty imposed on the basis of a jury 
finding that the murder was committed by a convicted first degree 
murderer might serve as a more effective deterrent than life im-
prisonment, and, thus, be constitutional. With respect to the other 
types of homicidal offenses embodied in the House Bill, murder of a 
police officer, fireman or corrections officer, murder committed in 
the course of burglary, murder which involved torture, depravity or 
aggravated battery, murder for monetary gain, or murder committed 
during armed robbery, the state would, likewise, have the heavy bur-
den of demonstrating that the death penalty for these types of of-
fenses serves more effectively a penal or public goal than would a life 
sentence. Under House Bill 5272, as in O'Neal II, a reviewing court 
would demand documentation or evidence that is more than 
"equivocal" that capital punishment fulfills the penal objective of de-
279 MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 5272 § 4 (1976). See note 275 supra for the text of Bill No. 
5272 in part. 
280 See text at notes 97 and 101-02 supra. 
281 See text at notes 101-02 supra. 
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terrence in respect to the type of homicidal offense for which it is im-
posed.282 
House Bill 5272 would not as a whole pass a constitutional attack 
under the compelling state interest or substantial public purpose tests, 
unless the Commonwealth could demonstrate that imposing the death 
penalty for each type of homicide encompassed in the eleven ag-
gravating circumstances served a deterrent purpose or some other 
public purpose more effectively than would a sentence of life im-
prisonment. For a few specific types of planned or contemplated 
homicide offenses, as two Justices suggested, such a demonstration 
may be made. If so, then the bill might be preserved with only a few 
enumerated aggravating circumstances under which the death penalty 
could be imposed. Because the debate among the experts regarding 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment continues to rage, however, 
and the end of the empirical battle is not in sight,283 the evidence 
which may be produced on the effectiveness of the death penalty as a 
deterrent may be "equivocal" for all types of homicide offenses. In 
that case, legislation similar to House Bill 5272 would not comport 
with the state constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in O'Neal II. 
CONCLUSION 
By placing the burden on the Commonwealth to justify the imposi-
tion of a capital sentence, the majority in O'Neal II made it clear that a 
28. One of the legislative responses to the O'Neal II decision has been a proposal for a 
legislative amendment to the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights which would au-
thorize the imposition of the death penalty under article 26. The article of amendment 
would add to the end of article 26: "The legislature may for the purpose of protecting 
the general welfare of the citizens authorize the imposition of capital punishment. No 
provision of the Constitution shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of capital 
punishment." MASS. H.R. Doc. No. 3385 (1977); MASS. SEN. Doc. No. 684 (1977). 
Under this amendment, the hands of the judiciary would probably be tied with re-
spect to scrutinizing the penological purposes for which capital punishment is imposed 
by the legislature for any specific type of homicide offense. In a similar situation, the 
California electorate nullified the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. An-
derson, 6 Cal. 628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,493 P.2d 880 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 
(1972). See note 13 supra. In the November 1972 general election, 67 per cent of the 
California voters approved proposition 17 which amended the state constitution to de-
clare expressly that capital punishment is not cruel or unusual. CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 27 
(effective Nov. 7, 1972). Rockwell v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 
446 n.1134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 666 n.1 556 P.2d 1l01, 1117 n.1 (1976) (Clark,]., concur-
ring). 
283 See Editor's Introduction, Statistical Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish-
ment, 85 YALE L.]. 164 (1975); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorstein Sellin 
and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); 
Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 
85 YALE L.]. 187 (1975); Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 
(1976); Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE 
L.]. 359 (1976); Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 YALE L.J. 368 (1976). See also note 90 supra. 
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legislative judgment to enact a death penalty statute will not be ac-
cepted without question. The state constitutional standards enunciated 
by the majority in O'Neal II may be applied to guided discretionary 
capital sentencing legislation enacted hereafter in Massachusetts. 
Discretionary capital sentencing legislation which includes objective 
standards to guide the judge's or jury's sentencing discretion, a bifur-
cated process and expedited and meaningful appellate review proce-
dures, would be likely to meet the federal constitutional requirements 
expressed by the Supreme Court in Gregg and the companion cases. 
However, it is doubtful whether a guide~ discretionary capital sen-
tencing bill, such as House Bill 5272, would survive intact a constitu-
tional challenge under the due process guarantees or the cruel or un-
usual punishments prohibition of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, for the O'Neal II standards would require an affirmative show-
ing by the Commonwealth that the death penalty satisfies some penal 
or public purpose more effectively than does life imprisonment for 
the specific murder offense for which it is imposed.284 
BARBARA JOHNSTON GREEN 
284 Editor's Note: On June 8, 1977, five Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court deliv-
ered an advisory opinion to the House of Representatives finding that House Bill No. 
3373, the successor bill to House Bill No. 5272, see note 278 supra, would violate the ar-
ticle 26 prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments. Opinion of the Justices, 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1254, 1260. 
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